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Summary 
We live in a world where resources are limited and how we invest them has an impact on the 
citizens’ wellbeing. The goal of this thesis is to provide, through the tools of economic analysis, 
some insights for the optimal allocation of our resources in three different areas: economics of 
crime, economics of education and economics of labour. 
First, societies aim at lowering crime rates and this is why a great amount of resources is spent 
in punishing offenders. How effective is punishment in lowering crime rates is still unclear: 
what are the forms of custody that deter lawbreakers from resuming their life of crime? 
Through a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we show that keeping young offenders 
separate from their older peers and far from an overcrowded environment is beneficial only 
when rehabilitation is offered. 
Second, empowering women and enhancing children’s early childhood development are two 
important objectives that are often pursued by independent policy initiatives in developing 
countries. Understanding the consequences of exploiting potentially beneficial 
complementarities in pursuing both aims together can be relevant. Through a quasi-natural 
experiment we evaluate a program implemented in Quito, Ecuador, that targets both. We find 
that women who are involved in the education of their children are empowered in different 
dimensions, as reflected in their higher likelihood to find full-time employment in the formal-
sector and in their greater independence in intra-household decision-making. Children’s drop-
out rates decrease, while school grades and scores on cognitive tests increase, particularly for 
girls. 
Finally, governments can introduce and raise minimum wage levels in order to protect their 
workers. We want to understand the implications of minimum wages on informal markets in 
developing countries. By exploiting relative variation in minimum wages across labour market 
groups within countries we show that a higher minimum wage is associated with a larger self-
employment share. 
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1 
Tough on young offenders: harmful or helpful?
ABSTRACT 
How harshly should society punish young lawbreakers in order to prevent or reduce their criminal 
activity in the future? Through a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we shed light on the question by 
exploiting two quasi-natural experiments stemming to compare outcomes from relatively harsh or 
rehabilitative criminal incarceration practices involving young offenders in 1980’s in England and 
Wales. According to our local linear regression estimates, young offenders exposed to the harsher youth 
facilities are 20.7 percent more likely to recidivate in the nine years subsequent to their custody, and 
they commit on average 2.84 offences more than offenders who experienced prison. Moreover, they are 
more likely to commit violent offences, thefts, burglaries and robberies. On the contrary, offenders who 
were sent to the more rehabilitative youth facilities are less likely to reoffend in the future when 
compared to offenders sent to prison. We conclude that it is effective to keep young offenders separate 
from their older peers in prison, but only when they are held in institutions that are not solely focused 
on punishment. 
JEL Codes: K42, Z13 
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1.1 Introduction 
How tough societies should be on young criminal offenders has always been at the 
centre of a heated debate in history. Currently the answer is still unknown, and the evidence 
mixed.  
On the one hand, tough policies and harsh sentences may have a general deterrence 
effect by discouraging people from embarking on criminal activity.  Severe punishment could 
also have a specific deterrence effect by discouraging people who have already undertaken 
criminal activity from committing new crimes in the future (Galbiati et al. 2014). On the other 
hand, severe punishment may have instead a negative effect on offenders who are incarcerated, 
weakening their already fragile links with society, nourishing negative networks, and, as a 
result, increasing the likelihood of future criminal activity. Furthermore, keeping offenders in 
custody is expensive for society. In England and Wales for example, “the average annual 
overall cost of a prison place for 2013-14 was £36,237”, but “45% of adults are reconvicted 
within one year of release” (Bromley Briefings, 2015). Hence, looking for ways in which 
taxpayers’ resources can be spent effectively is important.  
Because the subject is difficult to study, and quality evaluations are few, supporters 
and opponents of tough policies have often based their stances on differing views and personal 
opinions rather than on empirical, causal evidence. 
In this paper we investigate the outcomes of two quasi-natural experiments in 
incarceration practices that occurred in the 1980’s in England and Wales.  At the beginning of 
the decade, offenders younger than 21 who were given a custodial sentence were sent to youth 
custody and detention centres. At the time, youth custody centres and detention centres in 
Britain were managed as more punitive facilities than previously had been the case, and, thus, 
young offenders held there experienced a tougher regime than had been usual. Towards the end 
of the decade, these tough regimes were abolished and turned into young offender institutions 
more oriented towards rehabilitation. This change allows us to evaluate the outcomes for young 
offenders under distinct scenarios, in which offenders experience incarceration in settings that 
are more punitive or more rehabilitative in nature. 
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To undertake the analysis, we first consider a sample of young offenders who appeared 
in court when 20/21 years old and were given a custodial sentence at the beginning of the 
decade, when these tough regimes were in place. Our first sample includes all the offenders in 
England and Wales who were born in three randomly sampled weeks in 1963. In total they are 
558 young offenders. We observe their criminal records until they are 30 years old. Through a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we exploit the fact that young offenders who appeared 
in court when below 21 years old were sent to youth custody centres and detention centres, 
while young offenders who were 21 or older were sent to prison. Everything else being equal, 
the only reason why offenders were sent to one of the two different types of custody was the 
age at court appearance. To capture the effects of the different custodial treatments we exploit 
the plausibly exogenous variation in the age at which offenders appeared in court which, in 
turn, determined the type of custody the offender was sentenced to. We compare the future 
offences of these two groups and find that young offenders who were exposed to the harsher 
youth facilities are 20.7 percent more likely to recidivate in the nine years subsequent to their 
custody, they commit on average 2.84 offences more than offenders who experienced prison, 
and they are also brought to court on average 1.39 times more. The crimes committed by young 
offenders who were exposed to a harsher regime also appear to be more serious, as suggested 
by the fact that in the future they are sentenced more often to prison (even though the effect is 
not significantly different from zero). Moreover, their felonies are not minor, but major crimes, 
such as violent offences, thefts, burglaries and robberies. 
Second, we analyse a cohort of young offenders who appeared in court when 20/21 at 
the end of the decade. This sample is formed by all the offenders born in four randomly sampled 
weeks in 1968. In this second group there are 297 young offenders. However, we can observe 
their future offences only for 2.5 years after their release from custody. Through a second fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design, we exploit the fact that young offenders who appeared in court 
when younger than 21 were sent to the new young offender institutions, while young offenders 
who were 21 or older were sent to adults’ prisons. Once again, the choice of sentencing 
offenders to one of the two types of custody depended only on their age at court appearance. 
17 
 
Thanks to the plausibly exogenous random variation in the age at court appearance we also 
compare the future outcomes of these two groups. We find that offenders who were sent to the 
more rehabilitative youth facilities are less likely to reoffend in the future when compared to 
offenders sent to prison, they commit fewer offences, and they are less likely to be brought to 
court over a 2.5-year time period, even though all of these effects are not significantly different 
from zero. Moreover, offenders experiencing the rehabilitative regime are sentenced to custody 
again 1.28 times less than offenders experiencing prison (significant at 5%), and they are 
significantly less likely to commit burglaries and robberies.  
While prisons do not change much across the decade, the regimes in the youth custody 
facilities do. This setup allows us to compare the effects of experiencing a milder/harsher 
custody on recidivism. We conclude that keeping young offenders separate from their older 
peers in prison is beneficial only if they are not kept in a solely punitive regime. 
Our strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the offenders’ age at court 
appearance, which guarantees for the continuity of the conditional expectation of 
counterfactual outcomes. The ability of agents (offenders, judges, police force) to partially or 
completely manipulate the age at court appearance would invalidate our identification strategy. 
If this was the case, we would observe a discontinuity in the density function of the age at court 
appearance around the threshold. We perform a McCrary test and show that there is no evidence 
of a discontinuity in the running variable (age at court appearance) around the cut-off in neither 
of the two cohorts.  
Our results are robust to a series of other checks: different estimation techniques 
(parametric and non-parametric); adding control variables in the estimation; adopting different 
bandwidths, samples and time windows; testing for discontinuities around the cut-off in pre-
treatment variables; testing for discontinuities at points different from the cut-off in the running 
variable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the most 
relevant empirical literature related to the effects of detention on criminal re-offending. In 
Section 3 we outline the background of the quasi-natural experiment and the design. In Section 
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4 we describe the data. In Section 5 we present the empirical strategy and the results. In Section 
6 we conduct some robustness checks and in Section 7 we conclude. 
1.2 Literature Review 
The empirical literature on the general and specific deterrent effects is still scarce 
(Galbiati and Drago, 2014). The main reason for this research gap is the difficulty in identifying 
a causal link between custody conditions and crime rates. In most cases, self-selection impedes 
establishing connections that are anything more meaningful than correlations: the most 
dangerous criminals are both more likely to be sentenced to harsher custody conditions and to 
reoffend in the future precisely because they are intrinsically more prone to criminal activity. 
Therefore, whether higher reoffending rates are driven by harsher custody conditions or by the 
offenders’ higher propensity to recidivate cannot be distinguished.  
The difficulty of identification is exacerbated by the challenges in gaining access to 
data on offenders at the micro level that are necessary to isolate a specific deterrence effect, 
and to determine the causal link between the harsh conditions of a custodial system and the 
offenders’ propensity to be reconvicted. Moreover, the time span over which offenders are 
observed is usually short. 
The findings from the literature so far are mixed. Among those who find evidence of 
deterrent effects, Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) use aggregate data on prison death rates 
(per state per year) as a proxy for prison conditions, providing evidence of a general deterrence 
effect; they find a negative relationship between death rates among prisoners and violent and 
property crime rates in the United States between 1950 and 1990. However, the effect they 
report is very small (they find elasticities smaller than 0.05.). Hjalmarsson (2009) finds 
evidence of a specific deterrence effect in examining juveniles (16 years old on average) 
sentenced to custody in juvenile residential facilities in the State of Washington.  Exploiting 
the discontinuities in punishment in juvenile sentencing, he finds that after 1.5 years 
incarcerated offenders are 13 percent less likely to reoffend than offenders who were not 
incarcerated.  However,  the study only examined juvenile residential facilities in the State of 
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Washington, and, as a result, the author points out that “it is certainly feasible that incarceration 
has an exacerbating effect in states other than Washington, which have, for instance, worse 
prison conditions or educational programs” (Hjalmarsson, 2009). Lee and McCrary (2009) 
analyse arrests in Florida and take advantage of the more punitive sanctions for offenders who 
turn 18. They also find support for a specific deterrence effect, but a very small one: when 
offenders turn 18 and the punishment is harsher (as measured by a higher-than-expected 
sentence length), crime rates decline by 2 percent. 
Another stream of researchers finds the opposite - showing no evidence of either 
general or specific deterrent effects stemming from harsh treatment - with some cases in 
literature concluding that harsh treatment increases the likelihood of recidivism, or that more 
rehabilitative facilities show  deterrent effects.  Aizer and Doyle (2015) look at a slightly 
younger population: juvenile offenders, ages 10 to 16.  They use randomly assigned judges as 
an instrumental variable to show that offenders who have been incarcerated are more likely to 
recidivate over a 10-year period. Chen and Shapiro (2007) also find no deterrent effect of a 
harsher punishment.  They observe 949 inmates for three years after release. Exploiting the 
discontinuities in the assignment rules of prisoners to security levels, they estimate that the 
offenders incarcerated in higher security prisons are no less prone to being rearrested than 
offenders in minimum security facilities. Drago and Galbiati (2011) employ the variation in 
the prison assignment to evaluate the impact of prison harshness (as measured by prison 
overcrowding and prisoner death rates), and the degree of isolation of a prison on the propensity 
to recidivate. They conclude that the harshness of Italian prisons actually increases the 
likelihood of re-offending in the seven months following release. Moreover, Mastrobuoni and 
Terlizzese (2014) estimate the effects of being exposed to a rehabilitative environment rather 
than to the usual prison conditions on recidivism over a three-year time window; they find that 
spending one more year in a rehabilitating prison (instead of one year in a regular prison) lowers 
the offenders’ future likelihood of committing crimes by 10 percent, implying that the 
deterrence effect is given by the softer punishment rather than the harsher. 
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The evidence on the specific deterrence effect is mixed mainly due to the difference in 
punitive treatments, targeted populations and time windows in which offenders are observed: 
it is hard to draw conclusions from few and diverse studies.  
 The literature frequently distinguishes between the effects on offenders by their age, 
and whether they are classified as adults or juveniles. The former are more mature and less 
likely to change in response to the circumstances. The latter are more vulnerable to the 
surrounding environment. Malleability is not a desirable or undesirable trait per se: it implies 
that a young individual who lives in a negative environment is more likely to be negatively 
affected by it; at the same time, a young individual who lives in an edifying environment is 
more likely to positively change. How an individual is affected in the context of custody 
environments might push the individual in one of two directions: either he/she will be damaged 
and become more likely to reoffend in the future or he/she will not be willing to engage in 
crime anymore to avoid experiencing custody again.  
How offenders respond to the environment when they are 20 or 21 is even more 
uncertain: individuals at those ages fall into a gap, in that they are not considered juveniles, and 
yet, at the same time, they are not as mature as adults. There is no study we are aware of that 
looks at how 20/21 years old offenders respond to harsh prison conditions. 
 
1.3 Background and Design 
We will compare the effect of sending a young offender to prison rather than to one of 
the two types of youth facilities: either the tougher youth custody and detention centres or the 
educational young offender institutions (YOIs). Because the regimen in prisons did not change 
much in these years, the comparisons also allow us to say something about the difference 
between keeping young offenders in establishments oriented towards punishment (youth 
custody/detention centres) or towards rehabilitation (young offender institutions). 
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1.3.1 Youth Custody and Detention Centres 
The desire to keep young offenders separate from their older peers in the prison 
environment gained traction at the beginning of the 20th century in England. The idea of 
focusing on education rather than punishment led to the birth of a new type of youth detention 
centre: the borstal, an institution initially meant to guard and rehabilitate young offenders. Its 
name derived from the city where the first centre was opened in 1902: Borstal, Kent, England.  
In 1952 detention centres were also opened to “provide a sanction for those who could 
not be taught to respect the law by such milder measures as fines, probation and attendance 
centres, but for whom long-term residential training was not yet necessary or desirable…” 
(Walker, 1965).  
In the first decades borstals appeared to be successful. Despite their initial success, 
across the years, borstals did not adapt to the new, more criminally sophisticated generations, 
and 70 percent of the offenders released from borstals were reconvicted within two years 
(Warder and Wilson, 1973). More generally, crime rates, particularly among youths, rose in 
the 1970s, and the public attitude toward young offenders became more concerned with 
punishment (Pyle and Deadman, 1994).   
Hence, in 1979 the conservative party pushed for the implementation of a “short, sharp 
shock” on young offenders in detention centres. “The theory was that if a young man who was 
convicted of a first crime was given a short period of intense regimented activity from morning 
till night, with everything done ‘at the double’, the experience would give him such a shock 
that he would give up any idea of a life of crime” (Coyle, 2005). The life in detention centres 
during the “short sharp shock” became tough, mainly as a result of the isolation it produced: 
“Two visits were permitted each month and new 
arrivals were entitled to a mere 30 minutes, increasing to 45 
minutes and then to an hour […]. From this point (5:45 a.m.), 
prisoners were under a rule of silence, with commands 
shouted at them by prison officers. […] By 1pm the prisoners 
had changed their clothes three times, been inspected twice, 
marched everywhere and had remained in total silence. The 
routine continued throughout the day. At 8 p.m., following a 
lengthy period spent in isolation in their cells, prisoners were 
allowed 30 minutes’ recreation. For five days each week 
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prisoners were able to talk to each other for only 30 minutes 
daily. […] The rule of silence created an atmosphere of mental 
isolation. At weekends that mental isolation was consolidated 
by long periods of physical isolation. […] Lining the 
corridors, awaiting barked instructions, the sullen, pale-faced 
boys fixed their eyes on their jailers. It was a collective stare 
of silenced resentment.” (Newburn, 2009) 
In the same spirit, the 1982 Criminal Justice Act (CJA) abolished borstals and replaced 
them with youth custody centres. The name of the sentence was changed from “borstal training 
recommendation” to “youth custody order”, reflecting “the view that containment is more 
appropriate than attempts to rehabilitate via ‘training’”. The 1982 CJA “for good or ill 
abandons the notions that young people are sent to penal establishments for treatment or 
rehabilitation” (Muncie 1984). The institution of the “short, sharp shock” and the replacement 
of borstals with youth custody centres represented a shift from a welfare policy system targeting 
rehabilitation towards a justice and retributive system focused on tighter control (Muncie, 
2005; Smith, 2007). Anecdotal evidence highlights the suffering that both these centres 
imposed on young offenders (Muncie 1984; Taylor et al 1979); “(the centres) were, if anything, 
more brutal jungles than the adult prisons” (Smith, 1984). The young custody centres were not 
imposing the “short, sharp shock”, but life in these institutions was also tough: 
“If the rule of silence, heavy discipline and limited 
recreation created conditions of mental and physical isolation 
in the Detention Centre, the endemic verbal harassment and 
physical violence in the Young Offenders’ Institution (Youth 
Custody Centres) created a climate of fear and aggression. 
‘Doing time’ in either regime was about negotiating and 
handling punitive conditions created formally (institutionally) 
and informally (cultural).” (Newburn, 2009) 
 Magistrates were given the power to choose whether an offender below 21 was 
to be sent to youth custody or detention centres. However, they were not convinced about the 
new “short, sharp shock” regime in detention centres (Pilcher and Wagg, 2005), and they 
preferred to sentence young offenders to youth custody. This led to an increase in the number 
of young offenders in youth custody centres, and to a lower staff to prisoners’ ratio, making 
the general conditions even more unbearable (Scanlan and Emmins, 1988): 
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“Staff were so stretched that inmates were now 
regularly locked up for 23 hours a day, and control problems 
were rapidly reaching crisis proportions. […] Since the centres 
were established the number of assaults on staff had more than 
doubled and there were now five times as many attacks by 
inmates against other inmates. Violence, bullying, drug-
taking, and solvent abuse were becoming regular features of 
the system.”  
Source: “Youth centres' reaching crisis point'”, The 
Guardian, May 25, 1985. 
In general during the “short, sharp shock” members of staff were often cited in the 
news for being violent against the offenders: 
“The incident1 is the latest in a series of disturbing 
episodes concerning alleged staff mistreatment of youths since 
the Government introduced the short, sharp shock regime, 
with its emphasis on discipline, parades and physical activity, 
at all 18 detention centres in England and Wales last year. […] 
It seems that assaults on young people in end have become 
institutionalised and are viewed by some staff as an intrinsic 
part of the ‘short sharp shock’. […] we should not go along the 
road of cruelty in our prisons and turn out youths who were 
more aggressive when they came out of custody than they 
were when they went in”. 
Source: Ballantyne, Aileen. “Youth centre report 
criticises discipline”, The Guardian, Nov 25, 1985. 
“Two dossiers containing fresh allegations of assaults 
by prison officers on youths at ‘short sharp shock’ detention 
centres are to be sent to Mr Douglas Hurd, the Home 
Secretary. They have been prepared by the National 
Association of Probation Officers and the Children’s Legal 
Centre after several complaints from probation officers and 
social workers who have come into contact with boys who say 
they have been slapped and punched at Blantyre House in Kent 
and Haslar in Hampshire.” 
Source: Ballantyne, Aileen. “Prison officers punched 
youth, Hurd told: The practice—and…;” The Guardian, Nov 
24, 1986. 
“Boys (in custody) are alleged to have been punched 
for forgetting to say “sir”, for not knowing their numbers 
before being given any, and for not running quickly enough. 
[…] “We are talking about people being punched quite 
forcibly in the stomach, and being given quite hard slaps 
around the face. I have seen a boy whose lip had been split by 
a blow.” […] The baton they were jumping over had been 
raised by the instructor just as they had estimated the height of 
it and had started the jump. They were clipped on the ankles, 
1 An officer who behaved violently towards a youth in custody. 
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and the baton they were running under was deliberately 
lowered in the same way so that they were whacked on the 
back. […] As soon as he arrived, he said, he was subjected to 
racial abuse and slapped in the face with a ruler. A prison 
officer then punched him in the stomach and took off his belt 
and slapped him around his face with it.” 
Source: Ballantyne Aileen. “Punching inquiry at sharp 
shock centre”, The Guardian, Apr 26 1985. 
It is in these years that our first quasi-natural experiment takes place. As the 1982 CJA 
stated, if an offender was to be punished with custody in England and Wales, he/she would 
have been sentenced to detention/youth custody centres if he/she was below 21 years old and 
to prison if he/she was 21 or older. Hence, the first comparison that we will make in this paper 
will be between being sentenced to a normal adults’ prison, and being sentenced to a youth 
custody/detention centre, where the government had decided to be more punitive. 
At the time, adults’ prisons were just as tough as usual. Inmates in prison, like offenders 
in youth custody, could be locked up for 23 hours per day, and there were very few intermittent 
opportunities to work, and “little or no access to educational facilities, recreation or 
association” (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 1993). 
The main differences that young offenders experienced in prison rather than in youth 
custody/detention centres were a) the exposure to older peers (from 21 years old onwards) and 
b) overcrowded cells. As Table 1.1 shows, local prisons could hold up to 150 percent of the
population that the facility was originally intended to allow. 
1.3.2 Young Offender Institutions 
Due to their failure2, in 1988 the experiments under the “short, sharp shock” regime 
were abolished, and detention centres and youth custody centres were merged into young 
offender institutions (YOIs). The rules by which a young offender could be sentenced to a YOI 
rather than to a prison were the same in 1988 as in 1982:  the offender needed to be below 21 
2 Crime rates did not decrease, nor the propensity to recidivate of the criminals who experienced the 
short, sharp shock.  
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when convicted of an imprisonable offence, and the court needed to be satisfied that he 
qualified for a custodial sentence (Scanlan and Emmins, 1988, p. 98). 
These rules give us the opportunity for our second quasi-natural experiment. 
It is relevant for the purpose of our study to highlight that the new institutions for young 
offenders were not meant to be tough anymore: at the end of the ‘80s there was a switch from 
a punitive system for young offenders towards a rehabilitative system (Coleman and Warren-
Adamson, 1992; Muncie, 1990). 
The first main differences between YOIs and prisons were that young offenders in 
prisons were exposed to a) older peers and to b) an overcrowded environment. As Table 1.2 
shows, at the end of the ‘80s local prisons could be filled with 150 percent of the certified 
normal accommodation, as it used to happen at the beginning of the decade. A further 
dissimilarity between prisons and YOIs was c) the new educational and rehabilitative target of 
the latter: the aim of young offender institutions was now “to help offenders to prepare for their 
return to the outside community.” (HC Deb 06 June 1989). The target was to be met by 
“providing a programme of activities, including education, training and work designed to assist 
offenders to acquire or develop personal responsibility, self-discipline, physical fitness, 
interests and skills and to obtain suitable employment after release; fostering links between the 
offender and the outside community; co-operating with the services responsible for the 
offender’s supervision after release.” (CJA 1988, rule 3). Encouraged to maintain their 
networks with the outside world, young offenders were entitled to send and to receive a letter 
once a week, and to receive a visit once in four weeks.  Outside contacts with persons and 
agencies were also encouraged. 
By contrast, the provision of educational or training opportunities was still low for 
inmates in prison: 
“[...] for many imprisonment results not only in a loss 
of liberty in stark conditions but also in the imposition of a 
regimented and unconstructive way of life. Meals are taken at 
close intervals during the day, opportunities for socialising can 
be few and far between, and evening activities and recreation, 
where they exist at all, are crammed into a few hours with 
nothing to occupy inmates after lock up. Employment, if it 
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exists, can be soulless and unrelated to sentence and needs. In 
most cases very little is done to prepare prisoners for release 
and equip them for a life outside.” (Her Majesty’s Chief 
Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 1993) 
 
Towards the end of the decade the time during which inmates were confined in their 
cells diminished, but to a much larger extent in YOIs than in prisons. Among all offenders in 
custody, inmates in open YOIs were forced to stay in their cells for the fewest hours (42 percent 
of weekend hours, 40 percent on weekdays), while inmates in male local prisons were locked 
up in their dormitories for approximately 60 percent of their time (with peaks in London of 
even 83 percent during weekends)3 (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and 
Wales, 1993).  
The number of monitored activities provided in the establishments also differed. For 
example, 23 out of 35 male and female YOIs in England and Wales offered inmates the option 
of undertaking agricultural and horticultural work in the open air (HC Deb 30 November 1989, 
HC Deb 07 November 1991), and, more generally, the largest range of activities (12–15) was 
provided by YOIs. Table 1.3 shows that the most popular activities were usually either equally 
likely to be available in both prisons and YOIs or more likely to be offered practiced in the 
latter4.  
 
1.4 Data 
Data  provided by the Research, Development and Statistics Directorate of the Home 
Office allow for examination of a wide range of variables: gender; ethnicity5; the type and 
number of offences for which the transgressors appeared in court; the length of the sentence 
they were given, the disposal; whether or not they pleaded guilty; the type of proceedings (e.g. 
                                                     
3 The study from the Report of a Review of Regimes in Prison Service Establishments in England and 
Wales is based on 64 prison establishments in England and Wales in 1991/2. 
4 There were few exceptions, mainly related to activities whose availability depended on whether the 
establishment had the necessary ground to host them (like Farms Party) or to Prison Service Industries 
and Farms (PSIF) activities, that were not necessarily good quality workshops (Her Majesty’s Chief 
Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 1993). 
5 Unfortunately the variable describing the ethnicity of the offenders of the 1963 cohort has a high 
percentage of missing values. 
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summoned by police, committed to Crown Court for trial, beach of probation order, etc.); and 
the date of birth (day, month and year). 
We are able to access the offenders’ crime records of the first (second) cohort since 
their birth year until 1993, which means until they are 30 (25) years old. We measure the age 
at which they commit their first offence to have an indication of their initial propensity to 
commit a crime. 
We construct several outcome variables: the likelihood of being brought to court at 
least once in the future; the number of offences for which an individual is sent to court; the 
number of times the offender appears in court again6; and the number of sentences to prison. 
These outcomes refer to different time spans depending on the cohort considered. For the 
cohort born in 1963, the future time window in which offenders are observed is nine years (or 
four years after release)7. Due to data constraints, we can observe the crime records of the 
offenders born in 1968 for a shorter time period. In order to maximize the time span after 
release in which we can observe the offenders born in 1968, we only consider the offenders 
who are sentenced to custody for one year or less, and we restrict the sample to offenders who 
turned 20/21 before June 19908. This way we broaden the time window in which we observe 
the future offences of the second cohort to 2.5 years after release. 
                                                     
6 Please note that the number of offences for which an individual is brought to court is different from the 
number of times the individual is brought to court: an offender could be brought to court once for having 
committed multiple offences. For example, an individual who stole a car and, when escaping, broke a 
shop window will go to court once but he/she will be sentenced for two different offences.  
7 We reduce the time window in which we analyse the future criminal records of the offenders to nine 
years (instead of 10) so that the outcomes of the two groups of offenders are comparable: we could 
observe for 10 years the offenders in our sample who have been sentenced at age 20, but we cannot do 
the same with the offenders who are sentenced when 21. This is why we choose a time window of nine 
years to construct our outcome variables. Therefore, we measure the future offences of the offenders 
who are sentenced when 20 (looking at their outcomes when they are 21 to 29), and we compare them 
with the future offences of the offenders who are sentenced at 21 (looking at their outcomes when they 
are 22 to 30). Let us point out that in the nine-year time window we are also considering offenders with 
a sentence longer than one year, i.e. offenders who are still in custody in this period. However, as we 
will see later, the sentence length is balanced between offenders assigned to youth custody/detention 
centres, and offenders assigned to prison, meaning that the time spent in custody by offenders from the 
two groups is not significantly different, and consequently, should not affect the estimates. As a 
robustness check we will re-conduct the analysis by looking at the offences committed only in a time 
window where we can observe all the offenders after release. This time window will necessarily be 
shorter: four years. As expected, results are perfectly in line with what is found over the nine-year period. 
8 We do this because we can observe offenders until December 1993, and if we limit our sample to 
offenders who turn 20/21 before June 1990, we can observe them for a longer time period. Otherwise, 
28 
 
We can also observe the type of offences committed in the future: whether they are 
thefts, violent offences, sexual offences, burglaries/robberies, frauds, criminal damages, drug 
offences, minor offences or other offences. This way we can have a measure of both the 
quantity and quality of future crimes. 
Our first (second) sample consists of all the offenders who were born in three (four) 
randomly sampled weeks9 of 1963 (1968), and who were sent to either youth custody/detention 
centres (young offender institutions) or adults’ prisons in England and Wales when they were 
20/21 years old.  
The Criminal Justice Act 1982 that established the rules for youth custody and 
detention centres was implemented on the 24th of May 1983. We therefore include in our first 
sample only offenders who were 20/21 years old after that date. In total there are 558 
offenders10. Of them 315 offenders were sent to adults’ prisons (our treatment group), and 243 
offenders were sent to youth custody/detention centres (our control group). The Criminal 
Justice Act 1988, which abolished youth custody/detention centres and established YOIs, was 
implemented on the 1st of October 1988. Following the same reasoning, we include in our 
sample offenders who appeared in court when 20/21 after that date. In total there are 297 
offenders. Of them, 132 were sentenced to adults’ prisons (our treatment group), and 165 were 
sentenced to YOIs (our control group).   
Summary statistics of the observable characteristics of offenders from both cohorts are 
reported in Table 1.4. Most of the offenders born in 1963 (Panel A) are male (93.2 percent), 
and they appeared in court for the first time when they were almost 17 years old on average. 
Around 90 percent of them pleaded guilty when 20/21, and they were given a sentence of 
                                                     
we would also observe offenders who turned 20/21 between July and December 1990, but we would 
examine their post-release behaviour for two years only.  
9 Dates for the 1963 cohort: 3rd-9th March, 28th September-4th October, 17th-23rd December.  Dates for 
the 1968 cohort: 3rd-9th March, 28th September-4th October, 17th-23rd December and 19th-25th June for the 
1968 cohort. 
10 We exclude from the 1963 cohort offenders who committed their first crime when they were younger 
than 14 years old. This way we get rid of the most dangerous criminals, who are more numerous in our 
control group and consequently might bias our results. In a robustness check, we will re-conduct the 
analysis in the full sample, including offenders who committed their first crime when younger than 14 
years old. 
29 
 
approximately 9.5 months on average. The offences were: burglaries (36.7 percent), violent 
offences (17 percent), and thefts of different kinds (30.5 percent). Most of the offenders born 
in 196811 (Panel B) are male (97.3 percent) and of White European ethnicity (58.1%). The 
offences committed by the 1968 cohort are also mainly burglaries (30.7 percent), violent 
offences (22.6 percent) and thefts (26.4 percent).  
 
1.4.1 Treatment-Control Comparisons: Balancing Tests 
We rely on a standard regression discontinuity design assumption, specifically in this 
case that the assignment to treatment is not correlated to individuals’ characteristics other than 
age. Therefore, we provide visual evidence of whether other covariates exhibit a jump around 
the threshold. As shown in Appendix Figure A1.1, this is not the case for any of the available 
observable characteristics: gender, ethnicity, birth year (the members of the groups we compare 
are all born in the same year), month of birth (March, June12, September/October, December), 
whether they pleaded guilty, the type of offence, the age at which they committed their first 
offence and the proceedings types. The absence of a jump in observable characteristics around 
the cut-off further supports our analysis.  
 
1.5 Empirical Strategy and Results 
1.5.1 Empirical Strategy 
The 1963 and 1968 cohorts are analysed separately through a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity (RD) design. It is a fuzzy RD because not all the offenders who should be 
sentenced to either prison or separate youth establishments are effectively sentenced to them. 
That is, 230 (160) offenders out of the 243 (164) who appeared in court when age 20 from the 
1963 (1968) cohort were sent to youth custody/detention centres (young offender institutions), 
                                                     
11 We limit our sample of offenders born in 1968 to offenders who were given a custodial sentence of 
one year maximum, which makes summary statistics of the 1968 cohort slightly different compared to 
the 1963 cohort. 
12 June is available only for the 1968 cohort. 
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and 297 (128) young offenders out of the 315 (132) who appeared in court when age 21 were 
sent to adults’ prisons. This gives us the possibility of estimating the local average treatment 
effects (LATE) by two-stage least squares (2SLS). The following model illustrates how. 
First stage equation: 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖) + 𝜌𝜌𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
Second-stage equation: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝑓𝑓2(𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖) + 𝛾𝛾𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
Where: 
Yi = the outcome for individual i, i.e. the likelihood to re-offend in the future, the 
number of crimes committed, the number of court appearances, the number of sentences to 
prison, the number of specific types of crime committed; 
Di = the treatment variable, equal to 1 if individual i is sentenced to an adults’ prison, 
and 0 otherwise; 
Ti = 1 if individual i is 21 years old or older, and 0 otherwise; it is used as instrument 
for Di. 
Xi = age of individual i when sentenced, centred so that it is 0 when the individual turns 
21 years old, positive if the individual is sentenced when 21 years old or older, and negative 
when the individual is younger than 21 years old13.  
The functional forms f1 and f2 need to be correctly specified. 
Our main specification is estimated through a non-parametric approach, implementing 
a local linear regression constructed with a triangular kernel regression14. As Lee and Lemieux 
13 The centred running variable is equal to 1 the day after the offender turned 21 and -1 the day before 
his 21st birthday. 
14 A triangular kernel is ideal for estimating effects at the boundary (Fan and Gijbels 1996, Lee and 
Lemieux 2014). Moreover, results (available upon request) are robust to using different kernels, like the 
uniform or Epanechnikov.  
(2) 
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(2010) suggest, it is better not to rely on one method only, so we will also estimate equations 
(1) and (2) through a parametric approach.  To allow for non-linearities, we use polynomials, 
but up to the second order only. We do not control for higher polynomials (third, fourth, etc.) 
of the forcing variable because it could lead to misleading results (see Gelman and Imbens 
(2014)). We also allow the treatment to have a different impact before and after the cut-off by 
including an interaction of the centred variable and the treatment variable. Finally, for a further 
robustness check, we also include in our parametric approach estimations control variables 
such as gender, month of birth, ethnicity, age at which the offender committed the first offence, 
sentence length, plea, proceedings and type of offence when the offender was sentenced to 
youth custody/detention centres/young offender institutions or adults’ prisons. 
1.5.2 Results 
For both our cohorts, the first stages are strong: the estimated coefficients in equation 
(1) are 0.761 for the 1963 cohort and 0.891 for the 1968 cohort (Table 1.5), very precisely 
estimated. We can visualize the strength of our first stages in Figure 1.1. 
1.5.2.1 Prison vs. harsher youth punishment 
Let us begin our treatment effects analysis by looking at the future offences of the 1963 
cohort through the local linear regression (Table 1.6). In the first column we report the 
estimated treatment effect when the bandwidth is one year on both sides15. In column (2) we 
present the estimates with the bandwidth suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007), in column 
(3) we restrict the bandwidth to ¾ of a year and in column (4) to half a year.
We find that young offenders who experienced custody in prison are 20.7 percent less 
likely to re-offend than those who were exposed to a harsher treatment over a nine-year time 
span. The effect is significant and does not change even when we reduce the bandwidth around 
15 By this, we mean that we include in our sample young offenders who appear in court from the date of 
their 20th birthday up to young offenders who are sentenced the in their 22nd birthday, i.e. +/- 1 year from 
the threshold of 21.  
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the cut-off from one year to the optimal bandwidth suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007) or 
to ¾ of a year. The effect is no longer significantly different from zero at conventional 
significance levels only if we reduce the bandwidth to half a year. Hence, young offenders 
exposed to a harsher punishment are more likely to reoffend, and this is also reflected in the 
number of future offences they commit over the nine-year period: on average 2.84 offences 
more than their peers who were subject to less severe incarceration conditions. This is true 
across all different bandwidths. Not only young offenders who experienced the harsher 
treatment are more likely to be sentenced for more offences in the future, but they are also 
brought to court on average 1.39 times more. The two outcomes differ in magnitude because 
an offender can go to court once and be sentenced for more than one offence at the same court 
appearance. 
We then investigate on the seriousness of the crimes committed in the nine subsequent 
years. Using the number of future sentences to prison as a proxy for severe crimes, we find that 
offenders who experience the tougher regime are more likely to be sentenced to prison in the 
future, but not significantly so. In Table 1.7, we examine the types of crimes committed, and 
we show that the overall effects we find are not driven by minor offences, but mainly by violent 
offences, thefts, burglaries and robberies. These differences between the two groups of young 
offenders are significant even when we restrict the bandwidth as previously detailed16. We find 
no significant differences in the number of future violent crimes (such as sexual offences), or 
in the number of various other crimes (drug offences, minor offences, motoring offences, 
frauds). There seems to be an effect on criminal damage too, but it vanishes when we restrict 
the bandwidth around the threshold.  
In summary, on the one side there are overcrowded prisons where offenders are 
exposed to older peers; on the other side there is a tougher than usual regime, with the main 
purpose to punish and shock offenders. The overall effects of the latter are more detrimental: 
16 While in the first column we report the estimated treatment effect when the bandwidth is one year on 
both sides, in column (2) we present the estimates with the bandwidth suggested by Ludwig and Miller 
(2007), in column (3) we restrict the bandwidth to ¾ of a year and in column (4) to half a year. 
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offenders who are sentenced to youth custody/detention centres are more likely to re-offend in 
the future, to commit a greater number of offences and to commit offences that are more 
dangerous for society. Through this analysis we are not able yet to disentangle the mechanisms 
that are driving the results. 
1.5.2.2 Prison vs. softer youth punishment 
We now analyse the future offences of the 1968 cohort, comparing the young 
individuals who were sent to the usual adults’ prisons to the ones assigned to YOIs. As we 
previously explained, we examine this cohort over a shorter period: 2.5 years after release. We 
will then re-conduct our analysis for the 1963 cohort limiting the time window to 2.5 years, 
and limiting the sample to offenders sentenced for one year or less. This way we can compare 
the results we obtain by analysing the 1963 and 1968 cohorts.  
In Table 1.8, Panel B we can see a higher incidence of the number of future felonies, 
the number of subsequent court appearances, and the likelihood of reoffending among those 
sentenced to prison compared to those sent to other institutions.  In each instance, the 
magnitude is greater, but not significant. The number of times that former prisoners are 
sentenced again to custody is positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that the 
future offences they commit represent a greater danger for society. If we then consider the types 
of offences that they commit, we see that young offenders who experienced prison are more 
likely to commit burglaries and robberies. Let us keep in mind that these results are the opposite 
of what we found when the treatment for younger offenders was harsher, i.e. for the 1963 
cohort, where it is the young offenders kept in youth custody and detention centres who become 
more dangerous instead. In order to make the comparison more adequate, we now repeat the 
analysis for the 1963 cohort restricting the sample to offenders sentenced for one year or less 
and limiting the time window in which we observe their offences to 2.5 years after release. 
Now that the time window is shorter, the number of future offences considered will necessarily 
be smaller, but we find that results go in the same direction as over the nine-year period. As 
shown in Table 1.8, Panel A, young offenders born in 1963 who were sentenced to prison 
rather than youth custody/detention centres, are 31 percent less likely to reoffend in the 2.5 
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years following release, they commit on average 1.03 fewer offences,  and they appear in court 
0.57 times fewer. Hence, it seems that even in the short term, young offenders who experience 
the harsher treatment become more dangerous for society. All these estimates are significantly 
different from zero and, as we highlighted before, they go in the opposite direction of what we 
find once the harsh treatment for young offenders is abolished.  
Moreover, similarly to what we found over the nine-year time window, this shorter 
time window still shows that violent offences and thefts constitute the types of crimes more 
often committed more often by offenders who experienced youth custody and 
detention centres (Table 1.9).  
In summary, being exposed to (harsher) youth custody/detention centres makes 
offenders more dangerous than  being exposed to prisons; while being exposed to (less harsh) 
YOIs makes offenders less dangerous than being  exposed to prisons. Given that prisons did 
not experience major changes over the ‘80s, and given that the differences in the age of peers 
and in overcrowding rates between prisons and establishments for youth did not change 
significantly over time, our findings seem to suggest that it is wise to keep young offenders 
away from prisons, but only if they are kept in institutions with a rehabilitative purpose. If 
instead, young offenders are kept separate from their older peers and far from an overcrowded 
environment, but with the aim of punishing them, their likelihood of reoffending in the future 
is exacerbated.   
1.6 Robustness Checks 
 We now verify whether our local treatment effects are robust to a series of checks. 
First, we consider whether results are stable across alternative estimation methods: we 
find that they hold also when the analysis is carried out through a parametric approach up to 
a second-order polynomial (Table 1.10). Second, in the even columns of Table 1.10 we also 
add control variables as a further check: gender, sentence length, ethnicity, plea, proceedings, 
month of birth, type of offence and age at which the offender committed the first 
offence. 
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Estimated coefficients tend to appear slightly smaller in size when control variables are 
included, but they are not significantly different from the coefficients estimated without control 
variables. In Table 1.11 we show the different treatment effects by offence type, estimated 
through a parametric approach: effects go in the same direction as through the non-parametric. 
One could worry if there were a discontinuity in the distribution of the forcing variable 
(the age at which offenders go to court) at the threshold (21 years). This would suggest that 
people (judges, police, the offenders themselves) can manipulate the forcing variable around 
the threshold. For example, young offenders, knowing ex-ante the harsh conditions of youth 
custody and detention centres, could wait to commit their crimes until they turn 21 years old. 
Reassuringly, the McCrary test shows no manipulation of the assignment variable for 
either cohort (Figure 1.2).  
Let us remember that in the analysis of the 1963 cohort we excluded offenders who 
committed their first offence when younger than 14. We proceeded this way because the age 
at which offenders committed their first offence was the only unbalanced covariate between 
treatment and control groups: young offenders who went to youth custody/detention centres 
were more likely to have committed their first offence when they were younger than their 
counterparts. Because this difference may bias the results, we re-conduct the analysis for the 
1963 cohort with the full sample of offenders, including those who committed their first crime 
before turning 14 years old. The full sample includes 708 offenders in total. As we might have 
expected, the magnitude of the treatment effects in the full sample is slightly greater than in 
our main analysis (Tables 1.13-1.14): young offenders who experienced a tougher 
punishment commit on average 3.46 offences more (2.84 in our original sample); they are 
brought to court 1.65 times more (1.39 in our original sample); they are sentenced to prison 
1.52 times more (0.92 in our original sample); and they are 18.8 percent more likely to re-
offend in the future (20.7 percent in our original sample). All of the treatment effects found are 
significantly different from zero and remain so even when the bandwidth around the 
threshold is reduced. Even when we analyse the type of offence committed (Table 1.14), we 
realize that 
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young offenders who went to youth custody/detention centres are significantly more likely to 
commit thefts, violent offences, burglaries and robberies, as we found in our original sample. 
In Section 5 we analysed the future felonies of the 1963 cohort over the next nine years, 
even though over this time some offenders are not free from confinement, but kept in custody. 
If the sentence length for offenders in youth custody/detention centres and offenders in prisons 
were different, the main results we presented would be biased, as the number of free people 
facing the choice of committing (or not) new offences would be disproportionate. However, 
we have already seen that the sentence length is balanced, meaning that the time spent in 
custody by offenders from the two groups is not significantly different, and consequently, will 
not affect the estimates. As a robustness check we re-conduct the analysis by looking at the 
offences committed only in a time window where we can observe all the offenders outside of 
custody. The time window that enables us to conduct this analysis is four years17. As we can 
see in Table 1.15, results are perfectly in line with what is found over the nine-year and 2.5-
year periods: offenders who have been exposed to prisons rather than to youth 
custody/detention centres on average commit 1.8 fewer offences in the five years following 
release (-1.03 in 2.5 years following release, -2.84 in nine years); they are 35.7 percent less 
likely to commit offences (-31.1 percent in 2.5 years, -20.7 percent in nine years); and they 
appear in court almost once less (-0. 57 time in 2.5 years, -1.39 in nine years). If we then dig 
into the type of offences committed, we can see that they are mostly violent offences, thefts 
and, in this case, also criminal damage.  
We also need to bear in mind that the number of offences captured in the analysis 
underestimates the true level of re-offending because crimes are only partially detected, 
sanctioned and recorded.  Our estimated effects would be biased if there were a difference in 
17 The time window is four years because once we exclude two offenders who have been given a sentence 
of 60 months, the longest sentence we have in the sample is 48 months, i.e. four years. This means that 
offenders born at the latest in our sample (i.e. in December 1963) and who are sentenced to prison until 
they are still 21 (i.e. at the latest December 1985, some days before their 22nd birthday) for the maximum 
time (i.e. four years from December 1985) will be out of custody in December 1989. As we can observe 
offenders until December 1993, our time window is four years maximum. 
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how easy it is to detect, sanction and record the offences of the two groups. However, we do 
not have any reason to believe there was. 
Our first stage is very strong, but as a placebo test we also check if there are other 
jumps in the forcing variable. Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) we only look at one side 
of the discontinuity, take the median of the forcing variable in that side and test for 
discontinuity. Reassuringly, we find none.  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
We use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to analyse two quasi-natural 
experiments in criminal sentence of 20- and 21-year-old offenders to compare the effects of 
incarceration practices that are harsher or more rehabilitative in nature. The work contributes 
to the literature and current public debate on the most effective type of punishment to reduce 
crime among young offenders and to protect the citizens’ wellbeing.  
We find evidence that keeping young offenders separate from their older fellows is 
efficient when we aim to reduce their future criminal activity. However, this is true only if the 
young offenders are housed in institutions that provide for their rehabilitation. Keeping young 
offenders in institutions with a sole punitive purpose proves to be counterproductive instead.  
During the ‘80s, prisons in England and Wales do not experience major changes, while 
institutions where offenders younger than 21 are held separately from their older peers do: 
initially these institutions are meant to punish young offenders severely, but in 1988, they 
adopted a more rehabilitative orientation. We find that young offenders exposed to the 
temporarily tougher regime are 20.7 percent more likely to re-offend in the subsequent nine 
years; they commit on average 2.84 offences more; and they are brought to court 1.39 times 
more often than their counterpart in prison. The crimes that young offenders exposed to a 
harsher regime commit also appear to be more serious, as suggested by the fact that in the 
future they are sentenced more often to prison, even though the effect is not significantly 
different from zero. Moreover, their felonies are not minor, but major crimes, such as violent 
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offences, thefts, burglaries and robberies. By the end of the decade punitive institutions for 
young offenders are abolished and substituted with more rehabilitative ones, which enables us 
to compare young offenders sentenced to the usual prison with young offenders sentenced to 
the separate educational institutions. In the 2.5 years after release, offenders held in the new 
educational facilities are sentenced to custody 1.28 times less than offenders kept in ordinary 
prisons; they are also significantly less likely to commit burglaries and robberies, suggesting 
that they become less of a threat for their society. They are also less likely to re-offend and they 
commit fewer crimes in the future, but the estimates of these effects are not significant.  
Adults’ prisons do not experience major changes over the decade. Moreover, the 
different exposure to overcrowding and to peers between prisons and establishments for 
younger offenders stay the same. The only difference between the two types of custody that 
varies over time is the change of target in institutions for young offenders, from a punitive one 
to a rehabilitative one.  Hence, our results imply that being kept separately from more adult 
criminals is positive only if the purpose of the offender’s custody is rehabilitative. If it is 
punitive, the lawbreaker becomes even more likely to reoffend in the future. 
Our estimates hold to different robustness checks.   
These results suggest that the experience of being held in punitive incarceration 
facilities can have negative long-term consequences on young offenders, and therefore on the 
entire society. The evidence is significant, with the caveat that it relates to a specific group of 
offenders: law breakers who are sentenced to custody when 20/21 years old. While being an 
interesting result per se, it cannot be generalized to juvenile or adult offenders, even though 
our results are in line with the literature that does not find evidence in favour of a specific 
deterrence effect for juveniles (Aizer and Doyle 2015) and adult offenders (Chen and Shapiro 
2007, Drago and Galbiati 2011, Mastrobuoni and Terlizzese 2014).  
Other two caveats need to be kept in mind for policy implications. First, we cannot 
infer anything about unreported crimes, which we know exist, but which we cannot measure 
by definition. If the number of unreported crimes was different between the groups we 
compare, our results would be biased, but we do not have any reason to believe so. Moreover, 
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the aim of our paper is to test for the presence of a specific deterrence effect, but we cannot 
draw any conclusion on the general deterrence effect: we do not know how other individuals 
who did not experience youth custody, detention centres, young offender institutions or adults’ 
prisons when 20/21 respond to the existence of these institutions. 
Finally, more research on the mechanisms behind these effects would be beneficial for 
a better understanding of what are the drivers of the offenders’ behaviour and tailor appropriate 
policy responses. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1. First Stage (20 bins) 
 
Notes: The figure above reports the first stages, i.e. how much of being sentenced to an adults’ prison depends 
on actually being 21. The left (right) hand side refers to the 1963 (1968) cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort 
Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes all the 
offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 
at the date of court appearance. The 1968 sample includes all the offenders who were sentenced to young offender 
institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance. On the x axis lies our running 
variable, age at court appearance, centred at 0 when age at court appearance is 21. Age at court appearance is 
positive (negative) when young offenders are older (younger) than 21. On the y axis the treatment dummy (equal 
to 1 when the offender is sentenced to prison) is plotted. The coloured areas represent the 90% confidence 
intervals around the separate lines of quadratic best fit plotted on the left and right hand side of the cut-off.  
 
  
 
 
Figure 1.2. McCrary Test 
 
Notes: The figure above refers to the 1963 (Panel A) and 1968 (Panel B) cohorts of the Offenders Index Cohort 
Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes all the 
offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when 20/21. The 1968 
sample includes all the offenders who were sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when 
being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance. The McCrary test is “a test of manipulation related to the 
continuity of the running variable density function” (McCrary, 2008). On the x axis lies our running variable, 
age at court appearance, centred at 0 when the age at court appearance is 21. Age at court appearance is positive 
(negative) when young offenders are older (younger) than 21. On the y axis the density function of the running 
variable is plotted. 
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Figure 1.3. Second Stage (20 bins) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure above refers to the two samples from the 1963 (Panel A) and 1968 (Panel B) cohorts of the Offenders Index 
Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who were 
sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance 
and who committed their first offence when older than 14. The 1968 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to young 
offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance, whose sentence was equal or 
shorter than one year and who committed an offence before June 1990. On the x axis lies the variable age at court appearance, 
centred at 0 when age at court appearance is 21. Age at court appearance is positive (negative) when young offenders are older 
(younger) than 21. On the y axis the outcomes measured after release are represented: the number of future offences, the 
likelihood to reoffend, the number of sentences to prison and the times the offenders go to court again. The coloured areas 
represent the 90% confidence intervals around the quadratic of best fit. The time span over which outcomes are observed is 
nine (2.5) years after release for offenders born in 1963 (1968). 
Panel A – 1963 Cohort 
 
Panel B –1968 Cohort 
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Table 1.1. Annual Average Population in Prison Department Establishments & 
Certified Normal Accommodation (CNA) on 30 June by Type of Establishment in 
England & Wales, 1983-1985 
 
Type Of Establishment 
 
1983 
 
1984 
 
1985 
 Average 
Pop. 
CNA Average 
Pop. 
CNA Average 
Pop. 
CNA 
       
Local Prisons 15,801 10,864 15,219 10,934 16,512 10,949 
Open Prisons 3,104 3,246 2,971 3,281 3,194 3,406 
Closed Training Prisons 12,368 11,690 12,096 11,821 13,050 12,669 
Open Youth Custody 
Centres 
1,425 1,557 1,390 1,613 1,351 1,496 
Closed Youth Custody 
Centres 
5,066 5,280 5,244 5,297 5,488 5,375 
Senior Detention Centres 1,144 1,550 943 1,459 968 1,341 
Notes: The table reports the annual average population in the prison department establishments relevant to our paper 
and their certified normal accommodation (CNA) on 30th of June in England and Wales in 1983-1985. 
 
Source: Home Office Statistical bulletin, The Prison Population in 1986.  
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Table 1.2. Annual Average Population in Prison Department Establishments & 
Certified Normal Accommodation (CNA) on 30 June by Type of Establishment in 
England & Wales, 1988-1990 
 
Type Of Establishment 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 Average 
Pop. 
CNA Average 
Pop. 
CNA Average 
Pop. 
CNA 
       
Local Prisons 17,298 11,237 17,354 12,347 15,551 11,460 
Open Prisons 3,141 3,312 3,252 3,700 3,187 3,496 
Closed Training Prisons 15,525 16,090 16,543 17,086 16,651 17,073 
Juvenile Young Offender 
Institutions 
293 502 330 409 285 398 
Short Sentence Young 
Offender Institutions 
438 694 340 570 296 448 
Other Open Young Offender 
Institutions 
1,174 1,472 976 1,456 877 1,312 
Other Closed Young 
Offender Institutions 
5,102 5,361 4,863 5,191 4,232 4,711 
Notes: The table reports the annual average population in the prison department establishments relevant to our paper 
and their certified normal accommodation (CNA) on 30th of June in England and Wales in 1988-1990. Young 
offender institutions were established in October 1988, hence their CNA in 1988 is measured on the 30th of 
December.  
 
Source: Home Office Statistical bulletin, The Prison Population in 1992.  
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Table 1.3.  Monitored Activities Offered by Functional Groups of Establishments, % of 
Group Offering Each Activity in 1991/2 
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Daytime Education 100 100 100 85 100 100 100 92 100 100 100 
VT Courses 6 75 80 70 57 25 67 75 75 - - 
CIT Courses 18 50 80 70 71 25 - 75 100 - - 
Works Party  94 75 80 100 100 75 67 75 100 10 83 
PSIF Workshops 88 100 80 92 86 75 33 58 25 10 67 
Farms Party 12 - 40 54 71 25 33 33 50 - - 
Gardens Party 82 100 80 77 86 75 67 75 100 10 67 
Kitchens 94 100 100 92 100 75 67 75 100 20 67 
Other Domestic 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Induction 29 75 100 77 86 25 67 75 100 30 - 
Other (Specify) 88 50 100 92 86 75 100 83 75 70 33 
All Other 88 100 100 92 100 75 67 92 100 30 83 
PE 100 100 100 92 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Evening Education 94 100 100 100 86 100 100 83 100 30 100 
Chaplaincy 100 100 100 92 100 100 100 92 100 90 100 
Notes: The table reports the percentage of functional groups of establishments offering each set of monitored 
activities in 1991/2. VT and CIT courses are generally courses of bricklaying, plumbing, electrical installation, 
painting and decorating, motor mechanics, etc. Work parties are groups that help the establishments to operate. 
Prison Service Industries and Farms (PSIF) are workshops ranging from sewing mailbags to highly technical 
(engineering/construction) work. Gardens Party and Kitchens “have a dual function in most establishments in that 
they serve both the institution and the inmate by offering training within the networking environment” (Her 
Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 1993). Other domestic activities indicate other work 
activities such as cleaning. Induction is “the process by which inmates are introduced to the establishment’s routines, 
rules and, in most cases, opportunities” (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 1993). 
Other (specify) activities are generally “parties, groups or individuals who are trusted to help prison staff run various 
parts of the establishment” (Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales, 1993). All Other 
occupations are pre-release courses. PE is physical education.  
 
Source: Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales (1993), Doing Time or Using Time, Report 
of a Review of Regimes in Prison Service Establishments in England and Wales, London HMSO. 
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 Table 1.4. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Sd Min Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. 1963 Cohort 
    
    
     
Male 0.932 0.252 0 1 
White European 0.237 0.425 0 1 
Afro-Caribbean 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Oriental 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Arab 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Born in March 0.513 0.500 0 1 
Born in Sept/Oct 0.247 0.432 0 1 
Born in December 0.240 0.428 0 1 
Age at first court appearance 16.783 2.274 14 21 
     
ii. Offence Characteristics     
     
Sentence length     
Sentence length (months) 9.528 9.793 0.467 60 
Plea     
Plea: guilty 0.896 0.305 0 1 
Proceedings     
Apprehension 0.294 0.456 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial 0.572 0.495 0 1 
Offence     
Burglaries/Robberies 0.367 0.483 0 1 
Thefts 0.305 0.461 0 1 
Frauds 0.048 0.215 0 1 
Violent Offences 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Sexual Offences 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Criminal Damage 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Drug Offences 0.018 0.133 0 1 
Motoring Offences 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Minor Offences 0.029 0.167 0 1 
 Observations 558    
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Table 1.4 (continued): Summary statistics 
Mean Sd Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. 1968 Cohort 
Male 0.973 0.162 0 1 
White European 0.582 0.494 0 1 
Dark European 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Afro-Caribbean 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Asian 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Born in March 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Born in June 0.263 0.441 0 1 
Born in Sept/Oct 0.242 0.429 0 1 
Born in December 0.286 0.453 0 1 
Age at first court appearance 15.391 2.983 10 21 
ii. Offence Characteristics
Sentence length 
Sentence length (months) 5.932 3.579 0 12 
Plea 
Plea: guilty 0.778 0.416 0 1 
Proceedings 
Apprehension 0.286 0.453 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial 0.535 0.500 0 1 
Offence 
Burglaries/Robberies 0.306 0.462 0 1 
Thefts 0.259 0.439 0 1 
Frauds 0.030 0.172 0 1 
Violent Offences 0.229 0.421 0 1 
Sexual Offences 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Criminal Damage 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Drug Offences 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Motoring Offences 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Minor Offences 
 
0.067 
 
0.251 0 1 
Observations 297 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of the two samples from the 1963 and 1968 cohorts of the 
Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 
sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons 
when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 
14. The 1968 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ 
prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance, whose sentence was equal or shorter than one 
year and who committed an offence before June 1990. In Panel A (B) the means, standard deviations, 
minima and maxima of the 1963 (1968) cohort of offenders’ observable characteristics are reported, 
measured at the time the offenders were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres (young 
offender institutions) or adults’ prisons. If the offender was sentenced for multiple offences at the court 
appearance, the characteristics of the offence for which the sentence was longer are reported.  
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Table 1.5. First Stage - Parametric Approach 
Notes: The table reports the first stages, i.e. how much of being sentenced to an adults’ prison depends on actually 
being 21. Columns (1)-(2) refer to the sample from the 1963 cohort, which includes offenders who were sentenced 
to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance 
and who committed their first offence when older than 14; Columns (3)-(4) refer to the sample form the 1968 cohort, 
which includes offenders who were sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 
at the date of court appearance, whose sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence 
before June 1990. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. In 
Columns (2)-(4) control variables are included: gender, sentence length and other controls (ethnicity, plea, 
proceedings, month of birth, type of offence and age at which the offender committed the first offence). 
Independent Variable: Dummy=1 if Offender is 21 at  Court Appearance 
1963 cohort 1968 cohort 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sentence to Adults’ Prison 0.761*** 0.748*** 0.891*** 0.862*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.021) (0.043) 
Age at Court 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.038 -0.051
(0.053) (0.074) 
Sentence Length 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Other Controls X X 
Centered R2 0.793 0.806 0.882 0.893 
Uncentered  R2 0.910 0.916 0.935 0.941 
Observations 558 297 
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Table 1.6. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres (in the Next 
Nine Years) 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
365 days Ludwig and 
Miller 
(2007) 
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Likelihood to reoffend -0.207** -0.208** -0.186* -0.126
(0.095) (0.096) (0.109) (0.148) 
Mean in Control Group 0.737 
Offences -2.838*** -2.856*** -2.713** -2.273*
(1.021) (1.028) (1.081) (1.339) 
Mean in Control Group 5.243
Times to court -1.385*** -1.404*** -1.426** -1.320*
(0.521) (0.527) (0.573) (0.739) 
Mean in Control Group 2.749
Sentences to prison -0.920 -0.947 -0.962 -0.691
(0.613) (0.618) (0.648) (0.729) 
Mean in Control Group 1.848 
Observations 558 542 457 288 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 
cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 
1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons 
when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. 
The time window over which the outcome variables are observed is nine years. Each set of rows corresponds to a 
different outcome variable: the likelihood to reoffend (a dummy equal to 1 if the offender commits at least 1 offence 
in the future time window), the number of offences the offender commits, the times he/she is brought to court and 
the times he/she is sentenced to prison again. The estimation is conducted through a local linear regression 
constructed with a triangular kernel regression. Each Column corresponds to a different bandwidth selection: in 
Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) the bandwidth is the one suggested by Ludwig and Miller 
(2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 183 days. Standard errors are reported in parentheses:  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres by Type of 
Offence (in the Next Nine Years) 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
365 days Ludwig and 
Miller (2007) 
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Thefts -0.906** -0.803 -0.967** -0.805
(0.456) (0.502) (0.445) (0.501)
Mean in Control Group 1.835
Violent offences -0.695** -0.698** -0.707** -0.843*
(0.299) (0.305) (0.348) (0.464)
Mean in Control Group 0.613
Sexual offences -0.021 -0.022 -0.016 -0.008
(0.037) (0.036) (0.032) (0.009)
Mean in Control Group 0.041
Burglaries/robberies -0.431* -0.442* -0.430 -0.234
(0.248) (0.250) (0.264) (0.332)
Mean in Control Group 0.716
Minor offences -0.318 -0.314 -0.267 -0.265
(0.292) (0.298) (0.338) (0.460)
Mean in Control Group 0.663
Frauds -0.146 -0.015 0.001 0.220 
(0.207) (0.212) (0.213) (0.214) 
Mean in Control Group 0.514
Criminal Damage -0.166** -0.161** -0.119 -0.075
(0.074) (0.075) (0.081) (0.100)
Mean in Control Group 0.144
Drug offences 0.127 0.125 0.119 0.128 
(0.095) (0.096) (0.103) (0.121) 
Mean in Control Group 0.165 
Motoring Offences -0.039 -0.041 -0.073 -0.119**
(0.085) (0.085) (0.076) (0.051)
Mean in Control Group 0.082
Other offences† † -0.323** -0.320** -0.329** -0.334*
(0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.178)
Mean in Control Group 0.453
Observations 558 542 457 288 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 cohort of the 
Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who 
were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who 
committed their first offence when older than 14. The time window over which the outcome variables are observed is nine years. Each set 
of rows corresponds to a different type of offence. The estimation is conducted through a local linear regression constructed with a 
triangular kernel regression. Each Column corresponds to a different bandwidth selection: in Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in 
Column (2) the bandwidth is the one suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 183 days. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. † Other offences include mainly: failing to surrender to bail 
(65.63%), going equipped for stealing (20.79%) and other offences against the state or public order (6.55%).
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Table 1.8. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres & vs. Young 
Offender Institutions (in the 2.5 Years Following Release) 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
365 days Ludwig and 
Mill  (2007)
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Panel A. 1963 Cohort 
Likelihood to reoffend -0.311*** -0.314*** -0.317** -0.238
(0.110) (0.112) (0.125) (0.163)
Mean in Control Group 0.709
Offences -1.029* -1.020* -0.893 -0.602
(0.603) (0.612) (0.679) (0.869)
Mean in Control Group 3.452
Times to court -0.567* -0.567* -0.541 -0.358
(0.292) (0.297) (0.336) (0.445)
Mean in Control Group 1.927
Sentences to prison -0.388 -0.393 -0.377 -0.284
(0.367) (0.372) (0.413) (0.528)
Mean in Control Group 1.194
Observations 445 435 364 228 
Panel B. 1968 Cohort 
Likelihood to reoffend  0.115 0.114 0.113 0.130 
(0.124) (0.126) (0.140) (0.169) 
Mean in Control Group 0.606 
     Offences 1.050 1.009 0.841 0.139 
(0.992) (1.007) (1.104) (1.360) 
Mean in Control Group 2.856 
Times to court 0.351 0.340 0.365 0.253 
(0.366) (0.372) (0.409) (0.485) 
Mean in Control Group 1.303 
Sentences to prison 1.281** 1.286** 1.311* 1.171 
(0.618) (0.625) (0.670) (0.846) 
Mean in Control Group 0.879 
Observations 297 291 254 182 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 
1963 cohort (Panel A) and the effects of experiencing prison rather than young offender institutions for the 
1968 cohort (Panel B) of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and 
Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/
detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed 
their first offence when older than 14. The 1968 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to young 
offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance, whose 
sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence before June 1990. The time 
window over which the outcome variables are observed is 2.5 years following release from custody. Each set 
of rows corresponds to a different outcome variable: the likelihood to reoffend (a dummy equal to 1 if the 
offender commits at least 1 offence in the future time window), the number of offences the offender commits, 
the times he/she is brought to court and the times he/she is sentenced to prison again. The estimation is 
conducted through a local linear regression constructed with a triangular kernel regression. Each Column 
corresponds to a different bandwidth selection: in Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) the 
bandwidth is the one suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 
183 days. Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres & vs. Young 
Offender Institutions by Type of Offence (in the 2.5 Years Following Release) 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 
1963 cohort (Panel A) and the effects of experiencing prison rather than young offender institutions for the 
1968 cohort (Panel B) of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and 
Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/
detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who 
committed their first offence when older than 14. The 1968 sample includes offenders who were sentenced 
to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance, 
whose sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence before June 1990. The 
time window over which the outcome variables are observed is 2.5 years following release from custody. 
Each set of rows corresponds to a different type of offence. The estimation is conducted through a local 
linear regression constructed with a triangular kernel regression. Each Column corresponds to a 
different bandwidth selection: in Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) the bandwidth 
is the one suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 183 days. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
365 days 
Ludwig and 
 (
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2)
Miller (2007)
(3) (5)
Panel A. 1963 Cohort 
Burglaries and Robberies 0.113 0.188 0.199 0.365 
(0.197) (0.222) (0.227) (0.298) 
Mean in Control Group 0.485 
Thefts -0.567** -0.595** -0.603** -0.487*
(0.236) (0.250) (0.253) (0.288)
Mean in Control Group 1.282
Violent Offences -0.477** -0.477** -0.459* -0.518
(0.223) (0.228) (0.261) (0.357)
Mean in Control Group 0.432
Panel B. 1968 Cohort 
Burglaries and Robberies 0.684* 0.679* 0.616 0.566 
(0.386) (0.394) (0.444) (0.550) 
Mean in Control Group 0.467 
Thefts 0.200 -0.018 -0.002 -0.491
(0.387) (0.414) (0.411) (0.533)
Mean in Control Group 1.055 
Violent Offences -0.051 -0.051 -0.033 0.016 
(0.188) (0.193) (0.221) (0.278) 
Mean in Control Group 0.206
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Table 1.10. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres (in the Next Nine Years) - Parametric Approach 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when 
being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. The time window over which the outcome variables are observed 
is nine years. Each set of rows corresponds to a different outcome variable: the likelihood to reoffend (a dummy equal to 1 if the offender commits at least 1 offence in the 
future time window), the number of offences the offender commits, the times he/she is brought to court and the times he/she is sentenced to prison again. The estimation is 
conducted through a parametric approach using a polynomial up to the second order. We also allow the treatment to have a different impact before and after the cut-off by 
including an interaction of the centred variable and the treatment variable (age at court*prison). Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. The control variables in the even Columns include gender, sentence length, ethnicity, plea, proceedings, month of birth, type of offence, age at which the offender 
committed the first offence. 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
       Likelihood to reoffend -0.244** -0.164* -0.248** -0.173* -0.265* -0.226*
(0.101) (0.094) (0.099) (0.091) (0.146) (0.127)
Offences -3.142** -2.209* -3.289** -2.430* -3.096* -2.201
(1.311) (1.306) (1.332) (1.317) (1.689) (1.650)
Times to court -1.460** -1.097* -1.481** -1.169* -1.754** -1.476*
(0.625) (0.614) (0.631) (0.614) (0.889) (0.830)
Sentences to prison -0.757 -0.273 -0.783 -0.303 -1.630* -1.342
(0.724) (0.707) (0.750) (0.715) (0.973) (0.964)
Age at Court X X X X X X 
Age*prison X X X X 
Age2*prison X X 
Age at Court2 X X 
Controls X X X 
 Observations 558 557 558 557 558 557 
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Table 1.11. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres (in the Next Nine Years) by Offence Type - Parametric 
Approach 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when 
being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. The time window over which the outcome variables are observed is 
nine years. Each set of rows corresponds to a different type of offence. The estimation is conducted through a parametric approach using a polynomial up to the second order. 
We also allow the treatment to have a different impact before and after the cut-off by including an interaction of the centred variable and the treatment variable (age at 
court*prison). Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The control variables in the even Columns include gender, sentence 
length, ethnicity, plea, proceedings, month of birth, type of offence, age at which the offender committed the first offence. † Other offences include mainly: failing to surrender 
to bail (65.63%), going equipped for stealing (20.79%) and other offences against the state or public order (6.55%). 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Thefts -0.778 -0.124 -0.840 -0.204 -0.944 -0.367
(0.626) (0.628) (0.635) (0.632) (0.692) (0.688)
Violent offences -0.818*** -0.892*** -0.843*** -0.927*** -0.918 -1.080*
(0.304) (0.322) (0.323) (0.335) (0.561) (0.563)
Sexual offences -0.014 -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.029 -0.010
(0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059)
Burglary/robbery -0.372 -0.219 -0.414 -0.279 -0.609 -0.480
(0.340) (0.348) (0.341) (0.346) (0.379) (0.372)
Minor offences -0.385 -0.406 -0.453 -0.471 -0.419 -0.558
(0.298) (0.306) (0.312) (0.316) (0.513) (0.484)
Fraud -0.385 -0.301 -0.383 -0.312 0.236 0.495
(0.273) (0.280) (0.261) (0.266) (0.276) (0.304)
Criminal damage -0.249*** -0.255*** -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.103 -0.118
(0.086) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.124) (0.134)
Drug offences 0.182 0.218* 0.208* 0.229* 0.082 0.146
(0.131) (0.128) (0.124) (0.122) (0.147) (0.136)
Motoring offences -0.001 -0.013 -0.017 -0.026 -0.067 -0.101
(0.117) (0.113) (0.116) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113)
Other offences† -0.459** -0.353 -0.411* -0.322 -0.336 -0.141
(0.226) (0.254) (0.222) (0.249) (0.260) (0.286)
Age at Court X X X X X X 
Age*prison X X X X 
Age2*prison X X 
Age at Court2 X X 
Controls X X X 
Observations 558 557 558 557 558 557 
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Table 1.12. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres & vs. Young 
Offender Institutions by Type of Offence (in the 2.5 Years Following Release) - 
Parametric Approach 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 cohort 
(Panel A) and the effects of experiencing prison rather than young offender institutions for the 1968 (Panel B) cohort of the 
Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes 
offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of 
court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. The 1968 sample includes offenders who were 
sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance, whose 
sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence before June 1990. The time window over which 
the outcome variables are observed is 2.5 years following release from custody. Each set of rows corresponds to a different 
outcome variable: the likelihood to reoffend (a dummy equal to 1 if the offender commits at least 1 offence in the future time 
window), the number of offences the offender commits, the times he/she is brought to court and the times he/she is sentenced 
to prison again. The estimation is conducted through a parametric approach using a polynomial up to the second order. We 
also allow the treatment to have a different impact before and after the cut-off by including an interaction of the centred variable 
and the treatment variable (age at court*prison). Each Column corresponds to a different bandwidth selection: in Column (1) 
the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) the bandwidth is the one suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it 
is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 183 days. Robust Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. The control variables in the even Columns include gender, sentence length, ethnicity, plea, proceedings, month of birth, 
type of offence, age at which the offender committed the first offence.  
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 1963 cohort 
Likelihood to reoffend -0.346*** -0.354*** -0.356*** -0.363*** -0.521** -0.522***
(0.127) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.214) (0.198)
Offences -1.272* -1.224* -1.302** -1.250* -1.334 -1.113
(0.676) (0.708) (0.658) (0.699) (1.004) (1.011)
Times to court -0.663** -0.664** -0.672** -0.671** -0.817 -0.824*
(0.316) (0.318) (0.313) (0.317) (0.519) (0.492)
Sentences to prison -0.298 -0.404 -0.363 -0.457 -0.809 -0.697
(0.427) (0.457) (0.415) (0.448) (0.623) (0.642)
Age at Court X X X X X X 
Age*prison X X X X 
Age2*prison X X 
Age at Court2 X X 
Controls X X X 
Observations 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Panel B: 1968 cohort 
Likelihood to reoffend 0.147 0.169 0.154 0.157 0.130 0.207 
(0.118) (0.115) (0.120) (0.116) (0.205) (0.205) 
Offences 1.596 0.698 1.722 0.699 0.835 0.838 
(1.072) (1.077) (1.107) (1.093) (1.726) (1.927) 
Times to court 0.537 0.481 0.540 0.455 0.288 0.423 
(0.358) (0.362) (0.366) (0.369) (0.602) (0.648) 
Sentences to prison 1.399** 0.990 1.463** 1.080* 1.894* 1.998* 
(0.630) (0.607) (0.683) (0.645) (1.026) (1.164) 
Age at Court X X X X X X 
Age*prison X X X X 
Age2*prison X X 
Age at Court2 X X 
Controls X X X 
Observations 297 297 297 297 297 297 
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Table 1.13. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres (in the Next 
Nine Years) - Full Sample 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
365 days Ludwig and 
Miller 
(2007) 
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Likelihood to reoffend -0.188** -0.189** -0.183** -0.143
(0.080) (0.082) (0.092) (0.117) 
Mean in Control Group 0.779 
Offences -3.462*** -3.480*** -3.377*** -3.849***
(0.994) (1.002) (1.067) (1.382)
Mean in Control Group 6.000
Times to court -1.645*** -1.665*** -1.742*** -2.082***
(0.489) (0.495) (0.537) (0.685)
Mean in Control Group 3.061
Sentences to prison -1.524*** -1.541*** -1.492*** -1.467**
(0.537) (0.541) (0.568) (0.680) 
Mean in Control Group 2.285
Observations 706 690 578 382 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 
cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 
1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons 
when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and as a robustness check we also include offenders who 
committed their first offence when younger than 14. The time window over which the outcome variables are 
observed is nine years. Each set of rows corresponds to a different outcome variable: the likelihood to reoffend (a 
dummy equal to 1 if the offender commits at least 1 offence in the future time window), the number of offences the 
offender commits, the times he/she is brought to court and the times he/she is sentenced to prison again. The 
estimation is conducted through a local linear regression constructed with a triangular kernel regression. Each 
Column corresponds to a different bandwidth selection: in Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) 
the bandwidth is the one suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 
183 days. Standard errors are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.14. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres (in the Next 
Nine Years) by Offence Type - Full Sample 
365 days 
Ludwig and 
 
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Thefts -0.867* -1.459** -1.042** -1.375**
(0.461) (0.678) (0.484) (0.617)
2.043
Violent offences -0.883*** -0.874*** -0.795*** -0.872**
(0.247) (0.251) (0.281) (0.365)
0.745
Sexual offences -0.017 -0.019 -0.027 -0.041*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023)
0.034
Burglaries/robberies -0.754*** -0.760*** -0.740** -0.664*
(0.277) (0.279) (0.297) (0.358)
0.862
Minor offences -0.338 -0.328 -0.229 -0.253
(0.226) (0.229) (0.251) (0.317)
0.779
Frauds -0.232 -0.224 -0.154 -0.103
(0.197) (0.199) (0.213) (0.259)
0.607
Criminal Damage -0.120** -0.115* -0.057 -0.034
(0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.072)
0.169
Drug offences 0.127 0.124 0.104 0.086 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.087) (0.107) 
0.175
Motoring Offences -0.046 -0.048 -0.084 -0.177**
(0.077) (0.077) (0.074) (0.078)
0.092
Other offences † -0.384*** -0.386*** -0.407*** -0.452***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.146)
0.463
Observations 706 690 578 382 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 
cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 
1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons 
when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and as a robustness check we also include offenders who 
committed their first offence when younger than 14. The time window over which the outcome variables are 
observed is nine years. Each set of rows corresponds to a different type of offence. The estimation is conducted 
through a local linear regression constructed with a triangular kernel regression. Each Column corresponds to a 
different bandwidth selection: in Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) the bandwidth is the one 
suggested by Ludwig and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 183 days. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. † Other offences include mainly: failing to surrender 
to bail (65.63%), going equipped for stealing (20.79%) and other offences against the state or public order (6.55%). 
Miller 
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Table 1.15. Effects of Adults’ Prison vs. Youth Custody/Detention Centres (in the Four 
Years Following Release) 
Independent Variable: Adults’ Prison 
365 days Ludwig and 
Miller 
(2007) 
274 days 183 days 
(1) (2) (3) (5)
Likelihood to reoffend -0.357*** -0.362*** -0.391*** -0.387***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.106) (0.140)
Mean in Control Group 0.672
Offences -1.804** -1.807** -1.785** -1.529
(0.749) (0.758) (0.820) (1.038) 
Mean in Control Group 3.021 
Times to court -0.961*** -0.966*** -0.981*** -0.841*
(0.331) (0.336) (0.375) (0.501) 
Mean in Control Group 1.656
Sentences to prison -0.506 -0.514 -0.489 -0.217
(0.496) (0.501) (0.530) (0.620) 
Mean in Control Group 1.104 
Observations 555 539 454 286 
Notes: The table reports the effects of experiencing prison rather than youth custody/detention centres for the 1963 
cohort of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 
1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres or adults’ prisons 
when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. 
The time window over which the outcome variables are observed is four years after release. Each set of rows 
corresponds to a different outcome variable: the likelihood to reoffend (a dummy equal to 1 if the offender commits 
at least 1 offence in the future time window), the number of offences the offender commits, the times he/she is 
brought to court and the times he/she is sentenced to prison again. The estimation is conducted through a local linear 
regression constructed with a triangular kernel regression. Each Column corresponds to a different bandwidth 
selection: in Column (1) the bandwidth is 365 days; in Column (2) the bandwidth is the one suggested by Ludwig 
and Miller (2007); in Column (3) it is 274 days; in Column (4) it is 183 days. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix Figure A1. 1. Pre-Treatment Variables (20 bins) 
Panel A – 1963 cohort 
60 
61 
Panel B – 1968 cohort 
62 
Notes: The figures above refer to the two samples from the 1963 (Panel A) and 1968 (Panel B) cohorts of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home 
Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate). The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention 
centres or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. The 1968 
sample includes offenders who were sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance, 
whose sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence before June 1990. On the x axis lies the variable age at court 
appearance, centred at 0 when age at court appearance is 21. Age at court appearance is positive (negative) when young offenders are older (younger) 
than 21. On the y axis there are the shares of pre-treatment characteristics: gender, month of birth, ethnicity, age at first court appearance, sentence 
length, proceedings type, plea and type of offence committed when 20/21 years old. The coloured areas represent the 90% confidence intervals around 
the separate lines of quadratic best fit plotted on the left and right hand side of the cut-off.
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Appendix Table A1. 1. Proceedings Characteristics in More Detail 
Mean Sd Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 1963 cohort 
Proceedings 
Apprehension 0.292 0.455 0 1 
Summons by police 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Committed for sentence - young offenders institution (over 6 months) 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Committed for sentence for offences triable either way 0.032 0.177 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.573 0.495 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Appearance for sentence after deferment without further conviction 0.004 0.060 0 1 
Notice of Transfer 0.004 0.060 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Breach of requirements of probation order 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Breach of requirements of probation order over 1 year and up to 2 years (dealt 
with for original offence) 
0.007 0.084 0 1 
Breach of requirements of probation order over 2 years (dealt with for original 
offence) 
0.004 0.060 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
offence 
0.002 0.042 0 1 
Breach of probation order with a term of over 1 year and up to 2 years following 
the commission of a fresh offence 
0.007 0.084 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order; order revoked (dealt with 
for original offence) 
0.016 0.126 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.084 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for over 1 year and up to 2 years, 
no supervision order ever in force 
0.027 0.162 0 1 
Observations 558 
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Mean Sd Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. 1968 cohort 
Proceedings 
Summons by police 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Summons other than by police 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Committed for sentence for offences triable either way 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.534 0.500 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
offence 
0.034 0.181 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.082 0 1 
Summons by police 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Summons other than by police 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Committed for sentence for offences triable either way 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.534 0.500 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
ff  
0.034 0.181 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.082 0 1 
Summons by police 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Summons other than by police 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Committed for sentence - young offenders institution (over 6 months) 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Committed for sentence for offences triable either way 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.534 0.500 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
ff  
0.034 0.181 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.082 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.534 0.500 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
offence 
0.034 0.181 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.082 0 1 
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Mean Sd Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. 1968 cohort – continuation 
Proceedings 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.534 0.500 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
offence 
0.034 0.181 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.082 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for trial on indictment 0.534 0.500 0 1 
Committed to High/Crown Court for sentence for offences tried summarily 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Breach of an order for conditional discharge 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Breach of probation order for 6 months following the commission of a fresh 
offence 
0.034 0.181 0 1 
Breach of requirements of community service order 0.047 0.213 0 1 
Breach of sentence of imprisonment suspended for 1 year, no supervision order 
ever in force Breach of fully suspended sentence of imprisonment 
0.007 0.082 0 1 
Observations 296 
Notes: This table reports the means, standard deviations, minima and maxima of the detailed proceedings of the two samples from 
the 1963 (Panel A) and 1968 (Panel B) cohorts of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and 
Statistics Directorate) at the time the offenders were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres/young offender 
institutions or adults’ prisons. The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres 
or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 14. 
The 1968 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 
at the date of court appearance, whose sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence before June 
1990. If the offender was sentenced for multiple offences at the court appearance, the proceedings of the offence for which the 
sentence was longer are reported.  
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Appendix Table A1. 2. Offence Characteristics in More Detail 
Mean Sd Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. 1963 cohort 
Offence 
Manslaughter 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Wounding and other acts endangering life (felonies) 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Malicious wounding and other like offences 
(misdemeanours) 
0.131 0.338 0 1 
Assault 0.009 0.094 0 1 
Rape 0.005 0.073 0 1 
Indecent assault on a female 0.004 0.060 0 1 
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Burglary in a dwelling (1979- ) 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Burglary, other than a dwelling 0.156 0.363 0 1 
Going equipped for stealing 0.005 0.073 0 1 
Robbery and assaults with intent to rob 0.054 0.226 0 1 
Stealing in a dwelling other than from automatic machines 
and meters 
0.002 0.042 0 1 
Stealing by an employee (1976- ) 0.004 0.060 0 1 
Theft from vehicle 0.018 0.133 0 1 
Stealing from shops and stalls (shoplifting) (1976- ) 0.043 0.203 0 1 
Stealing from automatic machines and meters (1976- ) 0.009 0.094 0 1 
Other stealings and unauthorised takings 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Other frauds 0.038 0.190 0 1 
Receiving/handling stolen goods 0.052 0.222 0 1 
Arson 0.005 0.073 0 1 
Other criminal Damage 0.005 0.073 0 1 
Uttering or possessing counterfeit coin 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Other offences (against the State and Public Order) 0.023 0.151 0 1 
Perjury and false statements 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Misuse of Drugs 0.020 0.139 0 1 
Possession of firearms by persons previously convicted of 
i  
0.002 0.042 0 1 
Bail Act 1976 0.005 0.073 0 1 
Assault 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Interference with a motor vehicle 0.004 0.060 0 1 
Criminal and malicious damage 0.013 0.111 0 1 
Non-patrial having only limited leave remains in United 
Kingdom beyond the time limit 
0.002 0.042 0 1 
Theft or unauthorised taking of motor vehicle 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Dangerous driving 0.002 0.042 0 1 
Driving licence offences 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Observations 558 
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Mean Sd Min Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. 1968 cohort 
Offence 
 Manslaughter 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Wounding and other acts endangering life (felonies) 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Malicious wounding and other like offences (misdemeanours) 0.186 0.390 0 1 
Assault 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Indecent assault on a female 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Burglary in a dwelling (1979- ) 0.145 0.353 0 1 
Aggravated burglary in a dwelling 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Burglary, other than a dwelling 0.145 0.353 0 1 
Going equipped for stealing, etc. 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Robbery and assaults with intent to rob 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Blackmail 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Kidnapping 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Stealing in a dwelling other than from automatic machines and meters 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Theft from vehicle 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Stealing from shops and stalls (shoplifting) (1976- ) 0.041 0.198 0 1 
Stealing from automatic machines and meters (1976- ) 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Theft or unauthorised taking of motor vehicle 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Other stealing and unauthorised takings 0.101 0.302 0 1 
Other frauds 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Receiving/handling stolen goods 0.017 0.129 0 1 
Other criminal Damage 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Uttering or possessing counterfeit coin 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Violent disorder 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Other offences (against the State and Public Order) 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Perjury 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Gross indecency with a child 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Misuse of Drugs 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Absconding from lawful custody 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Bail Act 1976 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Assault 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Interference with a motor vehicle 0.007 0.082 0 1 
Stealing and unauthorised taking 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Criminal and malicious damage 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Dangerous driving 0.020 0.141 0 1 
Driving licence related offences 0.010 0.100 0 1 
Observations 296 
Notes: This table reports the means, standard deviations, minima and maxima of the detailed offences of the two samples from the 
1963 (Panel A) and 1968 (Panel B) cohorts of the Offenders Index Cohort Data (Home Office Research, Development and 
Statistics Directorate) at the time the offenders were sentenced to either youth custody/detention centres/young offender 
institutions or adults’ prisons. The 1963 sample includes offenders who were sentenced either to youth custody/detention centres 
or to adults’ prisons when being age 20/21 at the date of court appearance and who committed their first offence when older than 
14. The 1968 sample includes offenders who were sentenced to young offender institutions or adults’ prisons when being age
20/21 at the date of court appearance, whose sentence was equal or shorter than one year and who committed an offence before
June 1990. If the offender was sentenced for multiple offences at the court appearance, the offence for which the sentence was
longer is reported. 
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2 
Empowering Mothers and Promoting Early 
Childhood Investment: Evidence from a Unique 
Preschool Program in Ecuador 
ABSTRACT 
Empowering women and enhancing children’s early childhood development are two important goals 
that are often pursued by independent policy initiatives in developing countries. In this paper we study 
the consequences of a unique approach that exploits potential dynamic complementarities in pursuing 
both goals at the same time: empowering mothers through tools that also advance their young children’s 
development. We evaluate the PelCa program operated in a poor neighbourhood of Quito, Ecuador, by 
AVSI, an Italian NGO. Targeted to parents of children from birth to age 5, the program provides family 
advisor-guided parent training sessions once every two weeks for groups of six to seven mothers with 
their children. Our evidence compares outcomes for women and children in families that participated in 
the program to a quasi-experimental control group. Our findings show that the program empowered 
women in various dimensions: treated mothers are more likely to be employed, more of them have a full 
time job and they are 19.3 percent more likely to have a formal-sector job. They also earn higher wages, 
and are more likely to make independent decisions. Treated mothers spend also more time with their 
children. The program significantly reduces the children’s drop-out rates, and increases school grades 
and scores on cognitive tests, especially for girls.  
JEL: I24, I25, I28, J13, J16 
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2.1 Introduction 
Empowering women and enhancing children’s early childhood development are two 
important goals which are often pursued by independent policy initiatives in developing 
countries. In this paper we study the consequences of a unique approach that exploits potential 
dynamic complementarities in pursuing both goals at the same time. The approach is based on 
empowering mothers through tools that also advance their young children’s development. The 
mother’s empowerment training relies largely on acquiring knowledge and undertaking home 
and personal practices that empower her, increase her role in her children’s education, and 
enhance cognitive and non-cognitive skills of the family’s young children. The children 
participate in the program sessions with their mothers. These sessions include   joint activities 
with the mother, and separate activities with other children in the program.           
Early childhood education programs have received attention in recent years in research 
and policy because of accumulating evidence that treatment is both more effective and less 
costly when it is undertaken at younger ages. However, questions remain about which policy 
tools offer the most-effective and least-costly ways to improve children’s development in the 
long run. 
 Similarly, empowering women in developing countries has been also the focus of 
research and policy because of the recognition that the development process can be enhanced 
significantly by involving women as equal participants in the community and economy. Doing 
both - empowering women in a way that also enhances early childhood development - has not 
been widely studied; however, it could offer an additional valuable policy solution for 
achieving both goals. This approach offers promising potential to capitalize on the synergy 
between mother’s empowerment and status in her home and wider community, along with the 
human capital development of her children. Women’s empowerment is often defined as 
“improving the ability of women to access the constituents of development – in particular 
health, education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation” (Duflo (2012)). 
Improving mothers’ access to each of these domains can have positive externalities on their off 
70 
 
springs’ early childhood development, with accompanying life-long benefits. For example, 
recent evidence suggests that improving children’s health positively affects children’s 
educational outcomes. Evidence of spillover effects from improved child development on the 
empowerment of their mothers is not yet available but potential mechanisms are offered in the 
literature. 
In this paper we study the consequences of a home-preschool program that aims to 
enhance both women’s empowerment and children’s early childhood development. The PelCa 
(preescolar en la casa – home-pre-schooling) program started in Pisullì, one of the poorest 
neighbourhoods of Quito, Ecuador, in 2005. It is run by Association of Volunteers in 
International Service (AVSI), an international, non-governmental organization that focuses on 
human development. The program currently involves hundreds of children and mothers. 
Mothers with children 3 years old and younger were eligible to participate in the program. A 
qualified family advisor conducted training with groups of six to eight mothers. Children 
accompanied their mothers in these group parenting sessions, which were held every second 
week in the NGO offices. Each meeting consisted of three parts. In the first, mothers received 
structured training focused on strengthening their role in the family, and on learning parenting 
activities, particularly those that emphasized their children’s early development. At the same 
time, children socialized using educational games and didactic materials. In the second part, 
family advisors taught both mothers and their children educational activities that could be 
reproduced at home. In the third part, advisors monitored the homework that had been assigned 
in the previous meeting.  
The program was implemented non-experimentally, but since its initiation in 2005, 
new families have joined it every year. We use this gradual expansion of the program to select 
a control group from the list of applicants to the program in 2012. Assuming that new applicants 
resemble those who joined the program earlier, we selected a control group from the applicants 
in 2012. Following our suggestion, the NGO made a special effort to reach as many eligible 
families as possible in 2012. This provided us a large pool of applicants from which we selected 
our control group, which consisted of families that had an older child in any grade in primary 
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school and a younger child who would enrol in the program jointly with his mother. This setup 
can be viewed as a quasi-natural experiment, and we will demonstrate that it yields well-
balanced treatment and control groups.   
We evaluate the effect on women’s empowerment after two to seven years of 
participation in the program by focusing on mothers’ several domains: cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, quantity and quality of inputs into child home care and schooling, labour-
market participation and earnings, allocation of power within the household, and economic and 
social independence. We also examine the impact on children’s educational outcomes, such as 
how likely children were to repeat a grade or drop out from school, and how they fared in 
cognitive tests. Our evidence shows that the program empowered women in various 
dimensions: mothers who participated in the program between three to seven years are 16.4 
percent more likely to be employed, 19.4 percent more likely to have a full-time job, and 19.3 
percent more likely to have a formal-sector job. Mothers who had been in the program also 
earn higher wages ($13.33 per week more in 2013, reflecting a 46.67 percent increase with 
respect to control mothers), and are 17.8 percent more likely to have their own money and to 
make independent decisions about how to spend it. Women’s autonomy is also reflected in a 
higher likelihood (10.4 percent) of deciding by themselves whether to work outside of the 
home, and a higher likelihood (8.5 percent) of being a student in 2012 or 2013. Moreover, there 
is evidence that these women take on a greater role in overall intra-household decisions, 
especially on matters involving children’s education and discipline. Mothers who participated 
in the program spend more time with their children. However, they are not more likely to 
engage in social activities, or to have greater self-esteem.  
The program had mixed effects on children: it significantly reduced the drop-out rate 
and likelihood of temporarily withdrawing from school, and it improved scores in cognitive 
tests (though the latter is not precisely measured). However, we find no effect on children’s 
attitudes towards schooling (as measured by whether the child indicates that he/she likes 
school; whether, from the mother’s perspective, the child likes school; and whether, as a reward 
for participating in an interview, the child chooses a book over a toy).  
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 The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give an 
overview of the literature review on early childhood development and on women’s 
empowerment. Section 3 outlines the background and design of the quasi-natural experiment. 
In Section 4 we describe the data. Section 5 discusses the empirical analysis and results. In 
Section 6 we explore the potential mechanisms through which results are achieved and in 
Section 7 we conduct robustness checks. In Section 8 we conclude. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
The present work is related to two different literatures: studies on women's 
empowerment and studies on early child development. The literature on women's 
empowerment is more extensive. Kabeer (2005) defines empowerment as the "ability to make 
choices" in ways that change power relations and affect women’s education, employment, and 
political participation. Duflo (2012) defines women's empowerment as "improving the ability 
of women to access the constituents of development - in particular health, education, earning 
opportunities, rights, and political participation." Decision-making within the household is also 
recognized to be an important indicator of the distribution of power within the household 
(Alkire 2007, Narayan et al. 2000). We will follow this approach and will explore intra-
household decisions, capturing women's power relations within the household and their access 
to the constituents of development (e.g., if they are allowed to work).  
Different channels for empowering women have been explored. Education is 
sometimes thought to be one of the first drivers of empowerment (Oyitso 2012), but the 
evidence is mixed. There is substantial evidence that education can improve cognitive skills 
(fundamental for women's empowerment), aspirations, access to information (to bring 
awareness of their condition), access to the tools to deal with dis-equilibrium (‘face the world’) 
and the ability to use them (Kabeer 2005, LeVine 2001). More educated women also seem less 
likely to experience domestic violence (Kabeer 2005). This is consistent with the findings in 
West Bengal by Sen (1999). Mocan and Cannonier (2012) find that an increase in education in 
Sierra Leone makes women “more intolerant of practices that conflict with their well-being”. 
However, whether this change in preferences translates into behaviour is unclear. Andrabi et 
al. (2012) demonstrate that maternal education positively affects maternal care towards 
children, but the study does not find an effect on intra-household decision-making.  
Women can also be empowered if they accumulate wealth. Microfinance programs 
that help women gain access to credit can facilitate such accumulation of economic assets. 
However, evidence on the causal effect of microfinance programs on women empowerment is 
also mixed. Kabeer (2001, 2005) claims that women's access to credit improves women's self-
perception, reduces domestic violence and increases women's power in the household decision-
making process. In households where the loan recipient was male, women with some power in 
decision-making in relation to loan use, enterprise management and the allocation of profits 
were 20 percent; in female loanee households instead, females were the primary decision maker 
in 40 percent of the cases, and in total 90 percent of females participated somehow in the 
decision-making. Banerji et al. (2013) studied the impact of micro-credit in India and find no 
short- or long-run effects on women's empowerment.  
Obviously, more research regarding how to enhance women’s empowerment is still 
needed. In particular, little is known about the effect of involving mothers in group training. 
Such group parenting sessions may be a cost-effective method of service delivery but to date 
this approach has not been properly studied (Baker-Henningham and Lopez Boo, 2010), 
especially the effect on mothers' longer term well-being and life course outcomes. Our study is 
the first to focus on long-term exposure to group parenting sessions and to study the impact on 
both mothers and their children.  
 The view that interventions at an early age have beneficial long-term effects is gaining 
empirical support. For example, the Abecedarian project, High Scope Perry Preschool 
Program, Chicago Child-Parent Centres and the Head Start Program led to improved 
schooling attainment, and better outcomes in adulthood (as measured by higher 
earnings, higher employment and lower crime rates). Focusing on educational 
outcomes, the pre-school treatment of the Abecedarian project affected children more 
strongly on reading than 
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mathematics: at age 8 the effect size on treated children was 0.75 for reading and 0.27 for 
mathematics, equivalent to scores almost 2 years higher for treated children. No significant 
difference on these outcomes by gender was found. By age 21, females who received the pre-
school treatment completed 1.4 years of education more (12.6 vs. 11.3), while males acquired 
an equal amount of completed years of education (12 in the treatment group, 11.9 in the control 
group) (Campbell et al., 2002). Overall, grade retention by age 15 was 56% lower for children 
treated in the Abecedarian project; a similar estimate (60%) was found for children who 
attended the Chicago Child Parent Centres (Temple and Reynolds, 2007). The High Scope 
Perry preschool program affected the schooling outcomes of girls only: by age 19 treated 
females had a higher school GPA and completed a higher grade (Heckman et al., 2010); by age 
27 treated females were 30% less likely to be a drop-out from high-school (Nores et al., 2005). 
However, these experiments target the most-disadvantaged groups. In addition, such programs 
may be unfeasible in most developing countries because they are expensive. Most related 
evidence in developing countries is often based on very short interventions and small samples 
(see Baker-Henningham and Lopez Boo (2010) and Nores and Barnett (2010) for a literature 
review). Few focus on longer treatment and long-term child outcomes, such as Watanabe et al. 
(2005) and Kagitcibasi et al. (2009). In both studies there is evidence of positive effects on the 
cognitive domain; Kagitcibasi et al. (2009) find positive effects on other socio-economic 
domains as well: children exposed to an early treatment entered the workforce later (due to 
longer schooling) and found jobs of a higher status when young adults. 
2.3 Background and Design 
AVSI, the Association of Volunteers in International Service, is an international not-
for-profit, non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Italy. Founded in 1972, it operates 
in 35 countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East and it operates 
more than 80 long-term projects. It reached Ecuador in 2001, and its activities relate to infant 
and child development and education. In 2005 an AVSI branch was opened in Pisullí, a 
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disadvantaged, urban neighbourhood to the northwest of Quito. In collaboration with 
Fundación Sembrar, a local non-profit organization, and the local parish, AVSI funded a 
community development centre where it implements a modified version of PelCa (Preescolar 
en la casa - home preschool). The program expanded rapidly, including after-school programs 
and other services to more than 700 children, youth and their families in 2013. There are more 
than 50 members on the local staff.   
 
2.3.1 The Intervention 
PelCa is a preschool program targeted to parents of children age 5 and under, based on 
group-parenting sessions. Fortnightly meetings are held in the NGO for small groups (usually 
six to seven mothers – and occasionally a father or another guardian, such as a grandmother - 
with their children), under the guidance of a family advisor. In the first part of the meeting, 
children socialize with each other, playing games using didactic materials, while parents read 
and discuss material about family education. In the second part of the meeting, parents and 
children work together: they learn songs, educational games and various development activities 
that parents can reproduce with their children at home (e.g., reading books, playing with 
puppets, playing building games, etc.). The family advisor gives every child a notebook of age-
appropriate activities that focus on different areas of development, and parents and children are 
expected to undertake these activities in the two weeks between the program sessions. In the 
last part of the meeting, the family advisors verify whether tasks that were assigned to the 
mothers in the previous two weeks were undertaken. The family advisors then verify the 
learning of each child, monitoring whether they have completed home assignments with the 
parent (e.g., by having children show drawings, or having children answer questions based on 
a story that was to be read to them by the parent). The family advisor gives each parent and 
child reinforcement activities to perform at home in the next two weeks. These activities are 
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geared towards mothers and children achieving specific targets and goals.18 These NGO-set 
goals are the basis for our choices of outcomes that we evaluate in the paper. 
Goals for the mother: Acquire more self-confidence and self-awareness and a greater 
ability to relate to the environment and its people; discover their value and the value of things. 
At the personal level: Reawaken your interest in life; become responsible through a 
personal commitment; increase the perception of your own possibilities and abilities in order 
to take initiative; value correctly material things and saving. 
At the level of relationships with the family and community: Practice patience and 
reflection; strengthen the level of involvement of each member of the family within the family; 
share with your partner the need to take responsibility for educational development of the 
children; develop an aptitude that favours the autonomy of children; build relationships of 
solidarity with the group in the meetings, and with the neighbours of the neighbourhood. 
Goals for the children: Favour the integral growth of the children in their different 
areas of development (psychometric, language, cognitive, socio-affective). 
Families usually acquire knowledge about the program through a poster hung outside 
the NGO and by word of mouth in the neighbourhood. Once they express interest, AVSI 
employees visit the family at home in order to collect information on the family circumstances, 
observe life conditions at home, assess the real need of support, and identify family weaknesses 
and strengths. Children up to 3 years old are eligible to enter the program (so that he/she can 
participate in the program for at least two years). The mother commits to participate in 
fortnightly meetings and to perform at home the assigned tasks. The selection process also 
takes into account a family’s general financial standing and the proximity of the home to the 
NGO sites where sessions are held. Parents and children can remain in the program until the 
child is 11 years old but once the child is 5 they move to the NGO PelCa school program. The 
application process for the PelCa pre-school program starts at the end of April and lasts for 
                                                     
18 The goals are taken from the NGO handbook. 
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two weeks. Approximately 50 families (the number can vary depending on funding for that 
year) are selected to start the program in September. 
 
2.3.2 Design: choosing a comparison group 
Our treatment group includes mothers who enrolled in the PelCa preschool program 
and their children who by now are in primary school. Naturally, these mothers were selected 
to the program from among many applicants. In the summer of 2012, we selected a control 
group by mimicking the program’s selection process - but at a larger scale. Therefore, the NGO 
advertised the PelCa program in schools and through posters, as it had previously done in the 
program. However, it extended the period of application to approximately two months so as to 
reach as many families as possible, and, indeed, it attracted a much larger pool of applicants 
relative to a regular year.19 We selected applicant families with a preschool-age child and, 
similar to our treated mothers, also had at least one child enrolled in primary school. The 
identifying assumption is that the sample of mothers with children in primary school age who 
did not participate before in PelCa but chose to do so now with a younger preschool age child 
constitute a good comparison group for representing the counterfactual for PelCa mothers and 
their primary-school-age children. 
The families forming the control and treatment groups were invited to an interview in 
June-July 2012. The mother participated in a structured interview, while her primary school 
children were tested for cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The mother was asked to bring her 
children’s vaccination certificate and birth certificate which includes a record of the child’s 
birth height, weight and head circumference and the older child's school report cards of the 
previous and current years. We then selected from among the applicants, those who had an 
older child at a primary school age. We also held a follow up interview with these control and 
treatment group a year later in summer 2013. 
                                                     
19 Usually the application period was closed as soon as the number of admitted families reached the 
target for that year - which usually was two weeks. However, we needed a much larger number of 
applicants in order to form an adequate control group. 
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2.4 Data 
The data were collected through face-to-face interviews with mothers and children. 
The interview was based on a questionnaire we developed for the purpose of this study.20 The 
questionnaire provides information on family members (mother, partner and children), 
demographic characteristics, labour-market activities (type of job, full-time/part-time, 
formal/informal sector, wage, etc.), intra-household decision-making, and parents’ inputs into 
child rearing. All questions targeted current and retrospective information before enrolment in 
the program.21 The interview lasted approximately 45 minutes. The mother was then asked to 
take the Big Five Personality Test22 and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale.23  
Meanwhile, each child took a test of cognitive.24 Data on weight, height and head 
circumference at birth of the school age children were gathered through vaccination certificates 
and birth certificates. For some children, this information was incomplete or unavailable.  
Eventually we collected data on height at birth for 44 percent of the children, weight at birth 
for almost 41 percent, and head circumference at birth for almost 38 percent. We think that 
these low rates preclude the possibility of using these variables for meaningful analysis. The 
mother was also asked to bring the child's school report cards of 2010-11, 2011-12. 
In 2012, 164 children and 115 mothers formed the control group, while 219 children 
and 166 mothers formed the treatment group: 383 children and 281 mothers in total. We 
interviewed a few grandmothers who participated in the program on behalf of the mothers, but 
                                                     
20 We piloted the survey questionnaire in January 2012, interviewing 23 treated mothers: 12 of them had 
a primary-school-age child who participated in the PelCa preschool program and 11 of them with a 
primary-school-age child that did not participate in the PelCa program. We revised the questionnaire 
following this pilot test. 
21 We can provide details about the questionnaire upon request. 
22 The Big Five Personality Test is based on decades of research. In 1981 these factors became known 
as the “Big Five” to indicate the broad dimensions to which they refer. It has since been used intensely. 
It consistently evaluates five broad traits of personality through a series of questions: openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. 
23 The Rosenberg test was developed in 1965 by Dr. Morris Rosenberg, and it is widely used today by 
psychologists, sociologists, and social scientists. It has been translated into various languages (e.g., 
French, Norwegian, Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, and Italian). Consisting of 10 Likert-type questions, 
it is used to evaluate the self-esteem of an individual. 
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we excluded these families from the analysis sample because we do not have grandmothers in 
the comparison group.  
In summer 2013, we conducted follow-up interviews. Ten female interviewers from 
the area conducted home visits with all mothers in the sample. In order to obtain comparable 
information in the two rounds of data collection, we used the same questionnaire, but with 
slight modifications. We added questions about home technology, mother's health, how 
mothers deal with negative shocks, mother's life satisfaction, and mother's view of the NGO 
activities. Some questions were added in order to clarify puzzles we encountered in the 2012 
survey. However, in all the new questions we also asked about retrospective information. 
Mothers were asked to bring the vaccination and birth certificates again (because many of these 
documents had been missing in the previous year) and the school report card of the child for 
the year 2012/13. The children were assessed again in Spanish and mathematics, using tests 
appropriate for the student’s school grade. The follow-up sample included 136 control children 
(82.93 percent) and 98 control mothers (85.22 percent), while the treated sample cover up 
included 197 children (89.54 percent) and 150 mothers (89.82 percent). 
 
2.4.1 Treatment-Control Comparisons: Balancing Tests 
We examine in this section if pre-treatment covariates are balanced between treatment 
and control groups. The evidence suggests that mothers and children in both groups are very 
similar on observed and predetermined characteristics, supporting our view of the empirical 
setup as a quasi-natural experiment. The first two columns of Tables 2.1- 2.2 display the means 
for the treatment and control groups, while the last two columns present the difference in means 
between the two groups and its standard error. With respect to the child characteristics (Table 
2.2), we can see that child age is unbalanced. This is probably due to the fact that we selected 
children from 1st to the 7th grades and that, as we will see, control children are more likely to 
repeat the school grade and therefore be older. The F-test on the significance of all the 
characteristics together suggests that overall children’s characteristics are not linearly 
correlated with treatment status. 
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Mothers' characteristics (Table 2.1) are balanced in most of the dimensions, except that 
control mothers were more likely to be employed before treatment: 47.0 percent of treated 
mothers were working versus 60.9 percent of control mothers. Control mothers were also more 
likely to be working full time. The F-test on all of the maternal characteristics25 before 
treatment is significantly different from zero. This is likely to be driven by the imbalance in the 
previous working condition of the mothers; as anticipated, we will control for this difference 
in multiple ways. 
Pre-treatment paternal characteristics and most of the household characteristics are 
well balanced,26 with a few exceptions: whether the family owned a house, the number of 
rooms and the availability of drinkable water in the house. Overall, 10 percent of the pre-
treatment characteristics differences are significantly different at 10 percent level of 
significance. We therefore will include in the regressions pre-treatment control variables to 
capture these differences between the treatment and control groups. It will be shown that the 
estimates are not sensitive to adding these controls.  
 
2.4.2 Entropy Balancing 
One way to control for the differences in some of the pre-treatment characteristics is 
to use entropy balancing, as described in Hainmueller (2012). Entropy balancing is a data-
preprocessing method to achieve covariate balance. It computes the means (or higher moments 
of covariate distributions) of the covariates in the treatment group and looks for a set of entropy 
reweights so that the means in the reweighted control group match the means in the treatment 
group. We implement entropy balancing for the means of the covariates that we will include as 
control variables in our analysis (child pre-treatment characteristics, household pre-treatment 
demographic characteristics and household pre-treatment economic characteristics).27  
                                                     
25 Pre-treatment characteristics related to intra-household decisions before treatment are included. 
26 Details are provided in the Appendix Tables A1- A2.   
27 Among these covariates, we also include an indicator of whether mothers were working full time 
before treatment. 
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 Entropy balancing makes the treatment-control covariate balance almost perfect: 
differences in means are not significantly different from zero for all covariates (Appendix Table 
A2.3).28 This approach is preferred over a propensity-score matching because the former 
eliminates all treatment-control imbalances. In addition, the propensity-score matching 
requires treated and controlled units to be comparable within the common support. As a 
consequence, the individuals who do not lie in the common support (5 out of 281 mothers in 
2012 and 22 out of 496 mothers in the pooled data) are dropped from the sample.29 
 
2.5 Empirical Strategy and Results 
2.5.1 Empirical Strategy 
We estimate the effect of participating in the program on the outcomes of interest using 
the following regression model: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑖𝑖 is the individual and 𝑇𝑇 is time. 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of maternal and child outcomes 
of interest. Since we face a multiple outcomes problem, we will also compute summary 
indices3031 for domains of outcomes. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is a dummy equal to 1 when mother and 
child participate in the PelCa program and 0 otherwise. In order to shed light on heterogeneous 
treatment effects by number of years of participation in the program, we will also use the 
specification outlined above with two treatment dummies, one indicating longer treatment 
exposure, and a second indicating shorter exposure. Exposure varies from two years and four 
                                                     
28 We also obtain balanced samples through entropy balancing when we consider the children’s samples 
or when we pool the two years of data together. 
29 For purposes of robustness, we also re-estimated the effects of the program through a propensity score 
matching, with and without replacement, and the results are very similar to the estimates we present in 
the paper (these results are available upon request). 
30 We followed Kling et al. (2007) to construct each summary index as an “equally weighted average of 
z-scores of its components, with the sign of each measure oriented [...] so that more beneficial outcomes 
have higher scores. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by 
the control group standard deviation.” 
31 We developed a Stata package “mseffect” to calculate the mean effect size on the summary index with 
the advantage that we account for different weights, reversibility of outcome sign, and different types of 
robust standard errors. 
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months to seven years and eleven months. We divide the sample to two treatment groups with 
a dividing line at six years of exposure by 2012. This implies that 87 mothers participated in 
the program for less than six years.  
𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 vector includes year of birth, birth order, number of 
siblings as of 2005, i.e. before the program started, and gender. 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 
are pre-treatment household demographic characteristics: mother’s and father’s age, their civil 
status (married, lived together, mother was single) at the time of the birth of the first child, and 
the parents’ level of education before the birth of the first child, a dummy equal to 1 if the 
mother was born in Quito, a dummy equal to 1 if the parents came from the same city and the 
number of children the mother had in 2005. 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are pre-treatment 
household economic characteristics: whether the mother worked before treatment, whether the 
father worked, and the mean firm size of mother’s and father’s employer, average monthly 
family income before treatment. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 is a dummy equal to 1 when the observation 
corresponds to 2013, 0 if 2012; 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term, clustered at the mother level when we run 
regressions pooling the observations in the two years together or when we analyse outcomes 
for children. 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 are school fixed effects.
32 They are included when we analyse 
outcomes for children. More detailed description of the control variables is provided in the 
Appendix.  
 
2.5.2 Results based on Summary Indices   
As we note in Section 3.1, the primary purposes of the PelCa program are to empower 
mothers, harmonize intra-family relations, and increase early childhood investment in health 
and education. The breadth of the goals implies that the tangible consequences of the program 
can be analysed from a variety of angles, and, for each of these angles, we can examine multiple 
dimensions. We decide to measure the following domains, each of which is composed of 
multiple outcomes for mothers and children. For mothers, the domains (and specific outcomes) 
                                                     
32 55 are the schools that children attend in 2012. 
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are: labour-market outcomes (whether the mother is working, working full-time, working with 
a contract and average family monthly income), mothers' economic and social independence 
(whether the mother has her own money, participates in voluntary activities, is currently 
studying and whether the mother alone or together with the partner decides on her working 
conditions), mothers’ intra-household decision-making (mother or both mother and father 
decide what to do on child’s education, mother/both decide what to do when the child is ill, 
mother/both decide on children’s discipline, mother/both decide on spending, mother/both 
decide on food spending, mother/both decide on having children, mother/both decide on 
contraceptives, mother/both decide on important items, mother/both decide on mother’s health 
and mother/both decide if mothers can visit), mothers’ self-esteem and Big Five personality 
traits (Rosenberg scale, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and 
openness to experience), mothers' care of children (mother’s time inputs for child, weekly help 
from mother, mother’s aspirations for child’s education, mother’s expectations for child’s 
education and whether her child feels that she helps him) and fertility choices (whether the 
mother is pregnant and whether she would like more children). 
For children, the domains (and outcomes) are: test scores and report card grades 
(language test score, mathematics test score, report card mathematics grade and report card 
language grade), schooling dropout and grade repetition, attitude towards schooling (whether 
the child likes school, whether the child likes school from mother's prospective, whether the 
child feels that his parents demand children to follow certain behavioural rules and whether the 
child chose a book as gift33).  
Before presenting the detailed estimates of the effects on each specific outcome, we 
analyse each domain by creating domain-specific summary indices. This allows us to control 
for the potential problem of over-rejection of the null hypothesis due to multiple inference. 
Because different outcomes have different data scales, simply averaging the estimators for the 
treatment effect is not likely to produce a meaningful statistic. To address this concern, we 
                                                     
33 At the end of each interview, children were offered a gift. They could choose between a book and a 
game. We interpret the choice of a book as interest in schooling activities. 
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follow the summary-index approach as in Kling et al. (2007). The summary index of multiple 
outcomes is the average of z-scores of each outcome variable. Z-scores are calculated by 
subtracting the control mean from the outcome and dividing by the control standard deviation. 
Indeed, the summary index is a special case of the z-score34 and is identical to the mean effect 
size of treatment if there is no missing value. In the regression specification this approach yields 
standardized estimators as follows: the treatment effects for 𝐾𝐾 outcomes are aggregated and 
reflected in a single standard normal statistic,  
𝜏𝜏 = 1
𝐾𝐾
�
𝜷𝜷1k
𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘
,     𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾 
where 𝜷𝜷1𝑘𝑘 indicates the average treatment effect for outcome 𝑘𝑘 and 𝜎𝜎𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶 denotes the 
standard deviation of the 𝑘𝑘th control outcome.35 By doing so, the above equation can be thought 
of as a point estimator representing a collection of standardized treatment effects. In general, 
the sign of the summary index reveals information on the direction of the aggregate impact of 
a class of outcomes, and the more the summary index deviates from zero, the stronger is the 
implied aggregate effect. 
We also construct a separate summary index for each year in order to give a general 
understanding of the domain in that specific year. Analysing these summary indices36 in order 
to examine the effect on empowerment of mothers, we find evidence of a positive treatment 
effect on many domains. The program enhances mother’s participation in the labour market; 
the corresponding summary index in 2012-13 is 0.503, positive and statistically different from 
zero at the 99 percent confidence interval (Table 2.4, Panel A). A large effect (0.276) is also 
observed on mothers’ economic and social independence (Table 2.4, Panel B). A similar 
                                                     
34 Here we replace the minuend and the divisor in the z-score by the control group mean and standard 
deviation respectively. In another words, we do require some dispersion in the controlled outcomes to 
guarantee the validity of standardization. 
35 Having included the covariates, the 𝐾𝐾 average treatment effects (𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏) and sample variances can be 
easily acquired through a linear regression. However, this paper also take account of the covariance of 
effects and therefore adapt a seemingly uncorrelated regression (O’Brien, 1984; Kling et al., 2007): 
𝐘𝐘 = 𝑰𝑰𝑲𝑲⨂(𝑻𝑻 𝑿𝑿)𝜷𝜷 + 𝝊𝝊 
where 𝑻𝑻 is the treatment indicator(s), and 𝑿𝑿 consists of controlled regressors as well as a constant term. 
36 Estimated effects on summary indices of mothers are presented in the first row of Tables 2.3-2.6 and 
of Appendix Tables A2.5-A2.6. 
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positive pattern is evident for the household decision-making outcomes (Table 2.6), albeit the 
estimated coefficient for the summary index is smaller in size (0.093). We note that the 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of control variables and also to a re-weighting with entropy 
balancing. Taken together, these results suggest that probing further investigation on each 
specific aspect of mothers’ outcomes would be of interest. We do not find a strong treatment 
effect on mothers’ self-esteem or on personality traits (openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism): the summary index coefficient 
capturing the program effect on these aspects is trivial (0.040) and not precisely estimated. On 
the contrary, access to credit was shown to improve women’s self-esteem by Kabeer 2001. 
However, our findings do not necessarily imply the absence of a treatment effect on self-esteem 
or personality traits, as it could also be that the instruments used to measure these outcomes 
were not the most appropriate. 
The program encouraged boosting parental inputs into early child development. In 
examining the program’s effects on childhood development, the overall index capturing 
mothers’ care towards children did not show improved results.37  However, four measures of 
children outcomes (test scores, report cards, drop-out rates, repeating grades) showed 
improvements for children who were in the program. One measure (attitude toward school) 
showed no change. It is therefore likely that the better children schooling outcomes resulted 
from other improvements generated by the program such as the increase in family income, and 
the direct cognitive and non-cognitive skills training that the children received in the biweekly 
meetings with the family adviser. The treatment effects on children’s outcomes are presented 
in Table 2.8. Children in the PelCa program made progress in test scores and report card grades, 
even though the estimate is not precisely measured (0.163, se=0.122). Treated children are 
significantly less likely to drop out from school or repeat the grade (-0.182, se=0.073). 
However, attitudes toward schooling among treated children did not improve by a large extent: 
                                                     
37 The five relevant outcomes are mother’s time inputs toward the child, weekly help from mothers, 
mother’s aspirations for child’s education, mother’s expectation for child education, whether the child 
feels his/her mother’s help (Appendix Table A2. 5).  
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the estimated mean effect on the summary index is only 0.026 (se=0.071). The last row of 
Table 2.8 exhibits an overall index that aggregates all the outcomes of children38: its coefficient 
is 0.206 and it is statistically significant at 1 percent level even when all control variables are 
included. This estimate confirms an overall positive impact of the PelCa program on children, 
too. 
In the rest of the paper we will further investigate program-treatment effect on the 
individual outcomes that we aggregate for each of the mothers’ indices. First we will present 
and discuss estimates based on the full sample, with and without reweighting the pre-treatment 
covariates. Second, we will check if our results hold when the sample is reweighted through 
entropy balancing. Finally, we will perform other robustness checks. 
Next, in order to gain a better insight on the treatment effects on mothers, we explore 
treatment heterogeneous effects. Table 2.7 presents the aggregate-estimated effect on the 
summary indices with control for all covariates and for subsamples of mothers. In columns 3-
4, we present estimates by mother’s education as measured before enrolment in the program, 
in two sub-samples, mothers who completed up to primary school and mothers with more than 
primary school education. These are almost equal samples, 136 and 144, respectively. At a first 
glance, treated mothers with a higher education have better labour market outcomes (the 
estimated coefficient is 0.611) than their less-educated counterparts (0.462), both estimates 
being statistically significant at 1 percent level. Similarly, mothers who initially had higher 
levels of education are also more likely to have a role in family decision-making: the mean 
effect size for mother’s “decision power” in the household decision-making process is 0.205 
(se=0.087) for more educated mothers relative to 0.098 (se=0.076) for mothers with a lower 
education. However, the F-tests on treatment effect differences in labour-market outcomes and 
household decision-making (in square brackets) show that these differences are not statistically 
significant at 10 percent. It is interesting that the mean effect on the summary index of all 
mothers’ economic and social independence outcomes is higher for mothers with a lower 
                                                     
38 We reverse the sign for adverse outcomes of schooling dropout and grade repetition when calculating 
the overall summary index on children’s outcomes. 
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education (0.420 vs. 0.386), however, the F-test statistic suggests that they are not statistically 
different from each other in this domain.  
Next, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects by mothers’ pre-treatment role in 
decision-making. One may also expect that mothers who initially were less involved in family 
decision-making will benefit more from the program in this regard. To identify these mothers, 
we divide the full sample into two: mothers who had more impact, and mothers who had less 
impact on intra-household decisions up to 2005.39 The evidence presented in Table 2.7, 
columns 5-6, suggests that the latter group had larger gains in the labour market, the economic 
and social independence domain and household decision-making. The estimated effect for both 
groups on labour-market outcomes is large, 0.729 (se=0.145) and 0.394 (se=0.131), 
respectively. The summary index, which normalizes the aggregate treatment effects into [0, 1] 
interval, shows a truly large estimated impact (0.729) on mothers who had a lesser role in 
family decision-making before joining the program. In addition, the F-test for the difference 
between these two groups strongly rejects the hypothesis that the effect on the labour- market-
outcomes index is equal. With respect to the effect on decision-making in the family, findings 
show similar differences between the two groups, with a result of 0.197 (se=0.073) for the first 
group and an estimate close to zero for the second group. The F-statistic (2.987) implies that 
the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. Finally, mothers who entered 
the program with a lesser role in family decision-making have slightly better economic and 
social independence outcomes (0.482 vs. 0.415), but the difference is not significantly different 
from zero.  
We also examined the subsamples of mothers by pre-treatment working conditions, 
and we present this evidence in columns 7-8 of Table 2.8. Among the group of treated mothers, 
148 reported that they were working when their interviewed child was born, and 133 who 
reported they were not working at that time. The estimated results for the two subgroups show 
                                                     
39 We made use of pre-treatment variables of mothers’ intra-household decisions. After calculating the 
number of total household decisions that mothers made in 2005, we divide the full sample into two by 
the mean of total decisions. In the 2012 sample of mothers there are 179 and 93 mothers who made more 
decisions and fewer decisions respectively. 
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that mothers who were not working before joining the PelCa program, are enjoying more job 
opportunities compared with treated mothers who were already working before. Their 
summary indices integrating 7 related outcomes are 0.794 (se=0.191) and 0.340 (se=0.126) 
respectively, with the F-test on their difference strongly rejecting their similarity at 1 percent 
significance level.  
In terms of intra-household decisions, the same pattern emerges between the two 
treated subsamples. Although the F-statistic is less significant, the estimated effect for mothers 
who were not working before is greater in size (0.213) and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level; compared to the effect for mothers who previously were working of 0.086, a 
figure that is smaller and statistically insignificant. The program has the same effect for the two 
groups on economic and social independence outcomes (0.484 in the sample of mothers who 
were not working before and 0.351 for mothers who had worked before).  
 
2.5.3 Detailed Effects on Mothers’ Outcomes  
Labour-market Outcomes  
Labour-market outcomes epitomize the empowerment and emancipation of women. 
As we pointed out in the previous section, the summary index in Table 2.4, Panel A suggests 
an overall significant improvement in mothers’ employability and family income. In 2012 
treated mothers are 17.6 percent more likely to be working, 20.7 percent more likely to be 
working full-time and 20.4 percent more likely to be working in the formal sector (Table 2.3, 
Panel A). The percentage effects relative to the untreated mothers in terms of employment, 
full-time employment and formal employment are 36.1 percent, 132.3 percent and 234.5 
percent, indicating a very large increase in mother’s employability. When we pool 2012 and 
2013 observations together, and cluster the standard errors at the mother level (Table 2.4, Panel 
A), we find that treated mothers are still 16.4 percent more likely to be working, 19.4 percent 
more likely to be working full-time and 19.3 percent more likely to be working in the formal 
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sector.40 These estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent 
significance level, and they are not affected by adding any of the control variables in the 
regression. These estimates reflect a large gain relative to the control group mean. 
We estimated the treatment effect in sub-samples stratified by number of years in the 
program. The first group consists of mothers who were in the program for six years or more, 
and the other group consists of mothers who were in the program for less than six years. We 
present the estimates, based on the summary index as outcomes, in the first two columns of 
Table 2.7.  These estimates show a larger effect on labour-market outcomes for the group who 
participated in the program for a longer period of time, but the treatment difference is small 
and not significantly different from zero (0.545 vs. 0.450). A similar pattern is seen with the 
estimated impact on the disaggregated outcomes. Mothers who participated longer are 20.6 
percent more likely to be employed, 25 percent more likely to be full-time workers, and 23.6 
percent more likely to be hired in the formal sector; the corresponding treatment effects for 
mothers who spent less time in the program are 15.1 percent, 16.7 percent and 17.2 percent. 
The pooled-data analysis confirms 2012 results.41  
Moreover, we find that treated mothers have more stable employment: 69.33 percent 
of the working mothers from the program were working in both 2012 and 2013, whereas only 
48.97 percent of the working mothers in the control group were working in both 2012 and 2013. 
Another important result shows that the 2012 average monthly income of treated families is 
$44.50 higher (Table 2.3, Panel A) than the families in the control group – a finding that we 
attribute largely to increased wages for mothers. The median wage of workers in the 
neighbourhood is the minimum wage ($292 per month in 2012) and, therefore, the income gain 
from the program is large. In 2013 we collected the data on mothers’ wages. Using this 
information we estimate that family income is up mainly because an increase in mothers’ 
wages: treated mothers earn $13.30 more per week than control mothers, i.e. more than $57 
                                                     
40 The types of jobs that treated mothers hold are typically low-skilled jobs: mainly domestic cleaners, 
but also seamstresses and shopkeepers. More details on the job categories are available upon request. 
41 These results are available upon request. 
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extra per month (Table 2.4, Panel A), while fathers' wages are not significantly different in the 
two groups. 
 
Economic and Social Independence Outcomes 
This section examines the effects of the PelCa program on mothers’ independence 
from both an economic and social perspective. As outlined above, the relevant summary index 
estimated in Table 2.4, Panel B, shows a strong aggregate impact of the PelCa program on 
mothers’ independence (0.276), with a p-value smaller than 1 percent. In Panel B of Tables 2.3 
and 2.4, we see that treated mothers in 2012 are 22.2 percent (se=0.064) more likely to have 
their own money relative to 44.7 percent (49.6 percent increase) of control mothers. The 
increase is 17.8 percent (se=0.051) when we pool the 2012 and 2013 data together relative to 
48.7 percent (36.6 percent increase) of control mothers. Again, these effects are unchanged 
when we add to the regression each set of control variables.  
Another sign of the program’s effect on women’s empowerment is that 8.5 percent of 
treated mothers are studying at the survey date, which is about 160 percent point higher then 
controlled mothers. This estimate is significant at the 1 percent level and holds even once we 
add all the control variables. For both 2012 and 2013, 6.71 percent of treated mothers were 
studying, whereas only one mother from the control group was studying in both years. A 
concern may be that entering the job market may lower the incentives and time for studying, 
and mothers who participated in the program were more likely to be working. To address this 
issue, we check whether mothers who gave up studying in 2013 also found a job in 2013; we 
find little evidence of this. 
Another sign of the program’s effect on women’s empowerment regards her say about 
her working status. In the 2012 survey, we asked mothers who decides whether they can work. 
Treated mothers were 13.2 percent (se=0.044) more likely to answer that the decision about 
whether they can work outside of the home is made either on their own or together with their 
partner. The estimated impact relative to the mean of control group is 16.4 percentage points 
higher. This holds true when we pool data from the 2012 and 2013 surveys: treated mothers 
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are 10.4 percent (se=0.031) more likely to have a role in this decision. We find no significant 
difference in this change by the number of years mothers are in the program (Table 2.7, 
columns 1-2), though the estimate is larger for mothers who have remained in the program for 
the longest period of time (0.397) than for other mothers (0.288). Both estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, but not significantly different from each other. 
  
Household Decision-Making Outcomes 
In the first rows of Tables 2.5 and 2.6, we show that the estimated impact on the 
summary index for the household decision-making domain is strictly positive (0.126 in 2012 
and 0.093 in the pooled data) and statistically significant at the 10 percent level.42 Focusing 
here on the individual outcomes that make this index, we estimate that treated mothers are more 
likely to make decisions alone or with their partners about issues related children's education 
(9.9 percent effect, significant at the 1 percent level) and on children’s discipline (8.7 percent 
effect, significant at the 5 percent level), which are 11.6 percentage and 10.4 percentage greater, 
respectively, than the outcome means of control mothers.  These estimated effects remain 
unchanged when controls are added. In the 2012 and 2013 pooled data, we estimated similar 
effects. However, when it comes to other domains (intra-household decisions on spending, on 
having children, on contraceptives and on what to do when children are ill), we find little 
difference between control and treated mothers. In the follow-up survey in 2013, we also 
collected intra-household decision outcomes on who decides on issues related to mothers’ 
health, on purchasing important items and on whether mothers can visit friends and relatives. 
Effects on these intra-household decisions are non-conclusive. When stratifying the sample by 
length of participation in the program, we find that mothers who have been in the program for 
a longer period of time are more likely to be involved in household decision-making. 
The estimated effect on the summary index for more-treated mothers is 0.210 in 2012 
(significant at the 1 percent level), while being negligible and statistically insignificant for the 
                                                     
42 The estimated index in the pooled data is smaller and less significant because we include three 
additional outcomes from 2013. These additions have insignificant effects. 
less-treated (Table 2.7). The above facts hold true when we add or remove controls and/or pool 
the two years together. The F-statistic on the difference-in-treatment effects between the two 
groups is 1.700 (significant at the 10 percent level), which suggests that the longer mothers 
stay in the program the greater their empowerment within in the family. 
Together with the results based on the single-treatment dummy, it seems safe to 
conclude that mothers treated with the PelCa program assume greater intra-household 
responsibilities and participate more fully in intra-household decision-making.  
Access to credit was also found to have a positive effect on women’s power in 
household decision-making, for decisions related to the loan (Kabeer 2001, 2005). The effect 
of access to credit seems higher than what we find here. However, this is due to the lower initial 
power of women who received the loan in the analysis by Kabeer (2001, 2005), where 20 
percent of women in the comparison group had some sort of role in decision-making, compared 
to the women in our study, where even before the treatment 70/80 percent of women had some 
power within the household. 
2.5.4 Effect on Children Outcomes 
The summary indices on children’s outcomes are summarized in Table 2.8, columns 1-3: the 
overall estimated effect that aggregates all children outcomes is 0.206 (se=0.080), suggesting 
that children appear to be positively affected by participating in the PelCa program together 
with their mothers. The index aggregating test scores and report card grades in Spanish 
language and mathematics is 0.163 when including all the controls. This implies that treated 
children probably have slightly higher school records. The effect becomes clearer when we 
divide the children’s sample by gender.43 Female students in the Pelca program appear to have 
a better performance (0.313, se=0.160) than male students (0.195, se=0.150) on this domain, 
although the difference between the two groups is statistically insignificant. This is consistent 
43 Table 2.9 reports the heterogeneous effects on children’s outcomes by gender and mothers’ 
education. 
In columns 1 and 2, the estimated summary indices are based on 191 female and 192 male 
students separately. 
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with the effects of the High Scope Perry Preschool program on schooling, which are stronger 
for female students (Heckman et al., 2010). 
We also sub-classify the children’s sample by their mothers’ educational levels (Table 
2.9, columns 3-4).44 Interestingly, children whose mothers have acquired less education obtain 
higher cognitive test scores and report-card grades (0.390, se=0.130) compared with children 
with more educated mothers (-0.323, se=0.235). F-statistics for group differences in the 
treatment effects are reported in square brackets and show that the estimated impacts for the 
two groups are significantly different. In addition, those more educated mothers were more 
likely to be employed initially and most likely would have still been working during the Pelca 
program, and therefore perhaps spent less time with their children. The estimates presented in 
Table 2.9 (columns 5-6) support this expectation. We stratify the sample by mother’s pre-
treatment employment status and find that children with unemployed mothers at baseline had 
significantly higher test scores and report card grades (0.458 vs. 0.0114).  
For children’s school dropout rates and grade repetition, the mean effect size is -0.192 
(se=0.082) when we exclude covariates; it becomes -0.182 (se=0.073) when adding all the 
relevant controls, indicating that treated children generally have better educational attainment. 
In Table 2.9, we find that estimated impacts on female students and male students are similar: 
girls are less likely to dropout or repeat the grade (-0.256 se=0.089) compared to boys (-0.087 
se=0.116), but not significantly so. The result goes in the direction of other pre-school programs 
such as the Abecedarian project, the High Scope Perry Preschool program and the Chicago 
Child-Parent Centres, where grade retention is significantly lower for treated students (Nores 
et al., 2005; Temple and Reynolds, 2007). 
The estimated influence on children’s attitude towards schooling is unclear (0.026). 
However, if we sub-classify the sample by gender, we find evidence of a positive program 
effect on the attitude toward schooling among male participants. The estimated index is 0.142 
44 We divide the full sample of children into two groups according to whether their mothers have 
completed primary school; our data show that 210 mothers finished primary school, and 174 mothers 
did not. 
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(se=0.097) on boys, while the effect on girls is almost zero (0.008) and statistically 
insignificant.  
 
2.6 Robustness Checks  
2.6.1 Evidence on Entropy Balancing 
In this section we examine whether treatment effects remain even when reweighting 
the sample with entropy balancing, The results after imposing entropy balancing are reported 
in columns 4-6 of Tables 2.3-2.6, Table 2.8 and Appendix Tables A2.3-A2.7. 
 With respect to mothers’ outcomes, we also calculate summary indices for the 
reweighted sample. The estimated effects on the indices of mothers’ labour-market outcomes, 
independence and household decision-making exhibit similar patterns to those previously 
found. We note that the estimated impacts on summary indices tend to suggest a slightly larger 
overall effect on mothers’ employment in 2012 (0.577 vs. 0.482 in Table 2.3). However, the 
95 percent confidence interval around the estimated coefficient with re-weighting (0.388, 
0.766) overlaps with the confidence interval without re-weighting. The pooled data in Table 
2.4 do tell the same story. When it comes to disaggregated labour-market outcomes of mothers, 
the estimated parameters remain roughly the same: in 2012 treated mothers are 21.6 percent 
more likely to be working (the estimated coefficient in the reweighted sample is slightly higher 
than in the sample without reweighting, where we estimated a 17.6 percent increase), 23.4 
percent more likely to be working full time (20.7 percent without reweighting), and 22.0 
percent more likely to be working in the formal sector (20.4 percent without reweighting). 
These estimates are not statistically different from the estimates in the original sample. The 
same pattern is observed regarding the estimated effects on average monthly family wage in 
2012, and mothers’ wage in 2013.  
The estimated effect on mother’s independence does not change much either when we 
use the entropy re-weighting. Treated mothers are 20.5 percent more likely to control their own 
money, consistent with the 22.2 percent likelihood we found earlier. The effects of the program 
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on other outcomes are also similar to previous results: treated mothers in the reweighted sample 
are approximately 9.5 percent more likely to be studying either in 2012 or 2013 or both; and 
they are about 11.6 percent more likely to participate in making the decision on their job status. 
We find small effects on mothers’ engagement in social voluntary activities. Again, the interval 
estimates at 1 percent for economic and social independence outcomes based on the reweighted 
sample overlap greatly with the estimates using the original sample.45 
The estimated effects on intra-household decision-making also exhibit the same pattern 
with entropy re-weighting: positive effect on mother's power in the decisions on children's 
education and children's discipline (columns 4-5 in Tables 2.5-2.6) and no significant effect on 
other decision-making outcomes. The estimated aggregate effect on intra-household decision-
making in 2012 is 0.124 (statistically significant at the 1 percent level), which is, again, almost 
identical to the previous result without re-weighting (0.126). In the pooled data, the estimated 
effects on the indices using the weighted data are smaller and less significant, which is 
consistent to our finding using the unweighted data, partly because the effects on the additional 
outcomes in the panel data are negligible. 
We can see the effects on the children’s sample adjusted by entropy balancing in Table 
2.8 (columns 4-6). We find the very same pattern that we found in the unadjusted data. As 
before, the estimated treatment impact on children’s attitude towards schooling is still vague. 
The estimates on test scores, report card grades and educational attainment are also consistent 
with those found in the original sample. Their interval estimates at the 5 percent level overlap 
with point estimates of the original sample (with or without covariates).    
We also check whether improved women's status hinders men's status in the family. 
Reassuringly, we find no evidence of a change in the economic status of fathers with entropy-
balancing either. 
 
2.6.2 Additional Robustness Checks  
                                                     
45 This is true both for 2012 data and the pooled data. 
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Our analysis relies on the comparability between treatment and control groups. When 
we examined pre-treatment characteristics, we found that 10 percent were not balanced at the 
10 percent significance level. We interpreted this difference in observable pre-treatment 
characteristics as random, in support of the two groups being comparable. Our identification 
strategy contributes to the comparability of the two groups by controlling for the self-selection 
coming from the willingness to participate in such a program: only mothers who were willing 
to participate in the program could enter the control or the treatment group. The validity of our 
identification strategy lies on the assumption that mothers who decided to participate in 2012 
did not participate before for reasons that will not affect the outcomes we analysed. However, 
if control mothers were not willing to participate before 2012 because, for example, they were 
more likely to be working46 the imbalance in the previous working condition would be non-
random and might affect later outcomes, hindering our analysis. In order to check for this, we 
re-do the analysis by subsamples: first we analyse the treatment effects in the group of treated 
and control mothers who were not working at baseline, and secondly in a sub-sample of treated 
and control mothers who were working at baseline (2005). The estimated treatment effects 
obtained from these two sub-samples are very similar to each other and to the estimates we 
obtained from the full sample. This evidence rules out the possibility that our results are driven 
by non-comparable treatment and control groups in terms of employment rate at baseline. 
It is still important however to understand why control group mothers did not enrol in 
the program previously. From the pie chart in Figure 2.2, we can see that most of the mothers 
did not enrol in the program because they did not know about it (44.55 percent); because they 
lived too far from the NGO offices (25.74 percent); due to issues related to their application 
forms (for example, lost application forms (11.88 percent), and due to previous affiliations with 
other NGOs in the area (8.91 percent). These answers exclude the possibility that mothers chose 
not to enrol in the program because they questioned its effectiveness as this is not one of the 
                                                     
46 We have already shown that treated mothers were less likely to be working before, 47.3 percent vs. 
60.9 percent (Table 2.1). 
reasons stated. We also note here that none of these is correlated with the previous working 
condition or with working full-time before. 
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate all models by limiting the sample to the 
control mothers who did not enrol in the program either because they were already affiliated 
with another NGO, or because there was a problem with their application forms. The first group 
of control mothers, if anything, should be more attentive than treated mothers. The second 
group can be interpreted as randomly assigned to the control group. Unfortunately the sample 
here is very small (21 mothers), but the estimated effects we obtain from this sample are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained from the full sample but they are much less precisely 
estimated.  
As another robustness check, we also re-estimated the various models using propensity 
score matching (with replacement). The mean bias is reduced to 6.7 percent and the median 
bias to 4.0 percent. The sample consists of 58 treated mothers and 90 control mothers. We also 
estimate a propensity score matching without replacement: the mean bias is reduced to 5.4 
percent and the median bias to 5.0 percent. The sample consists of 90 treated mothers and 90 
control mothers. As we already indicated above, we prefer entropy balancing which allow 
maintaining the sample size, even though when we reduce the sample size through propensity 
score matching, we obtain very similar results. 
Finally, we do not have data on dropout rates from the program, but potential attrition 
could make the treatment mothers a selective group. To check for this we exploit the fact that 
the sample of treated mothers who stay in the program for a shorter time is less selective than 
the sample of treated mothers who stay for longer. Hence, as a further robustness check we re-
run our analysis including a dummy for treatment years above the median.  As presented 
in column 1 of Table A2.8, estimated mean effect sizes of longer treatment exposure with 
respect to shorter exposure on both mothers’ outcomes (Panel A) and children’s outcomes 
(Panel B) are nearly zero and are very statistically insignificant. The estimated 
coefficients on the treatment variable (column 2), measuring the impact of being treated 
shortly compared to the control group, are generally quite similar to the effects of the 
whole treatment group as we 
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discussed earlier. Above facts hold true when we use the pooled data or look into each maternal 
and child specific outcome. Therefore it is safe to conclude that the treatment effect is not 
driven by treated mothers or children who have been in the NGO for longer.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
In the current study we analyse an innovative method to empower women and help 
children to develop: PelCa, a home-preschool program that involves mothers, putting them at 
the centre of their children's education. Relying on a quasi-natural experiment we are able to 
identify and measure the effects of the program on both mothers and children. 
First, we find that the intervention empowers women across different domains. It 
facilitates their entry in the labour market: treated mothers are much more likely to be working, 
more likely to be working full-time and more likely to be working in the formal sector. All of 
these estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level and robust to the 
inclusion of covariates. Moreover, treated mothers become more financially independent, and 
more likely to possess money for which they make the sole spending decisions; to be studying; 
and to decide whether they can work outside of the home. The treatment further modifies the 
allocation of power in the house: mothers become more likely to take part in decisions on 
children's education and to take part in decisions on children's discipline. However, we find no 
effect on mother’s role in decisions on what to do when the child is ill, on various types of 
expenditures, on having children, or on the use of contraceptives. Treatment intensity plays a 
role here: the longer the mother stays in the program, the more empowered within the 
household she becomes. Moreover, mothers who were less powerful at baseline are the ones 
who gain the most power in the household following participation in treatment.  
All of the above results hold when we estimate aggregate treatment impacts, using 
summary indices instead of individual outcomes, in order to account for multiple inference, 
when we use entropy balancing to adjust for differences in pre-treatment covariates, and when 
we use other robustness checks. 
99 
 
We also evaluate the program’s impact on children. We firstly probe into children’s 
cognitive tests. The estimated impact on the summary index of cognitive achievement of treated 
children is 0.163 (se=0.122), marginally significant. More specifically, the estimations by 
subgroups allow us to track the source of these effects: girls participating in the program appear 
to make more progress (0.313, se=0.092) in test scores and report card grades than boys (0.195, 
se=0.095), even though the estimates are not significantly different; children whose mothers 
have a lower educational attainment benefit much more from the program in terms of improved 
cognitive tests (0.390, se=0.130) than children of more-educated mothers (-0.323, se=0.235). 
Our findings suggest the existence of differential treatment effects based on mothers’ pre-
treatment working status – kids with less-educated mothers in 2005 are helped more by the 
program regarding their cognitive test. 
Moreover, consistent with findings from other pre-school programs, students in the 
Pelca program are much less likely to drop out of school or to repeat a grade. These effects are 
marginally larger for female students, but the difference between genders is not significant. 
Although we do not find a treatment effect on students’ attitudes toward schooling, the overall 
summary index aggregating all children’s outcomes confirms that children tend to be positively 
affected by participating in the PelCa program. Overall, there is evidence that the home-
preschool program that we study here helped mothers raise their children in a more learning 
conducive environment which led to positive effects on children, as well as on empowering 
mothers, both in society and within their household. 
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Construction of control variables
Household demographics controls  
• Mothers' and fathers' education (separately): dummy primary not completed, dummy
primary completed, dummy secondary not completed, dummy secondary completed, dummy
university (these dummies take value 0 if the variable on previous education was missing) +
dummy “unknown education” equal to 1 if the variable on previous education was missing
• Mother age (equal to minimum age if missing value) + one dummy equal to 1 if the variable
is missing
• Father age (equal to minimum age if missing value) + one dummy equal to 1 if the variable
is missing
• Dummy mother was married, dummy mother cohabitated, dummy mother was single (these
dummies take value 0 if the variable on previous civil status was missing) + one dummy
“unknown status” equal to 1 if the variable on previous civil status was missing
• Mother from Quito (equal to 0 if missing value) + NO extra dummy
• Parents from same city (equal to 0 if missing value) + NO extra dummy
• Number of children in 2005 (0…10) (the variable becomes 0 if the number of children is
missing) + one dummy equal to 1 if the number of children is missing
Household economics controls 
• Dummy mother was working before (equal to 0 if missing value) + dummy equal to 1 if the
variable is missing
• Dummy father was working before (equal to 0 if missing value) + dummy equal to 1 if the
variable is missing
• Mother's mean firm size (0, 1, 3.5, 8, 15.5, 35.5, 75.5, 300.5) (equal to 0 if missing value) +
dummy equal to 1 if the variable is missing
• Father's mean firm size (0, 1, 3.5, 8, 15.5, 35.5, 75.5, 300.5) (equal to 0 if missing value) +
dummy equal to 1 if the variable is missing
• Family average income before (0, 50, 200, 350, 450, 600, 800) (equal to 0 if missing value)
+ dummy equal to 1 if the variable is missing 
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• Birth order (1…10) (the variable becomes 1 if birth order is missing) + one dummy equal to 
1 if birth order is missing
• Child age (5…14)
• Number of young siblings in 2005 (0…3) (the variable becomes 0 if the number of young 
siblings is missing) + one dummy equal to 1 if the number of young siblings is missing
• School fixed effects 
Child controls 
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Table 2.1. Mothers' Characteristics and Pre-program Outcomes (2012) 
Treatment 
 
Control 
 
Difference in 
 
Std. error 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Mothers’ characteristics before Treatment 
Mother age 31.988 31.183 0.805 (0.729) 
Mother from Quito 0.560 0.496 0.065 (0.061) 
Parents from same city 0.510 0.456 0.053 (0.064) 
Mother lived together with partner 0.801 0.817 -0.016 (0.048) 
Mother divorced/separated/widow 0.018 0.009 0.009 (0.014) 
Mother divorced/separated/widow 0.018 0.009 0.009 (0.014) 
No. of children in 2005 1.849 1.632 0.218 (0.180) 
Did not complete primary 0.114 0.148 -0.033 (0.041) 
Completed primary 0.392 0.374 0.018 (0.059) 
Did not complete secondary 0.295 0.304 -0.009 (0.056) 
Completed secondary 0.169 0.165 0.003 (0.045) 
Started university 0.024 0.009 0.015 (0.016) 
Not religious 0.096 0.070 0.027 (0.034) 
Christian 0.831 0.861 -0.030 (0.044) 
B: Mothers’ pre-program outcomes 
Money of her own 0.582 0.526 0.056 (0.061) 
Worked 0.470 0.609 -0.139** (0.060) 
Worked full time 0.551 0.729 -0.177** (0.078) 
Self-employed 0.808 0.786 0.022 (0.067) 
Worked in the formal sector 0.256 0.300 -0.044 (0.074) 
Mean firm size 10.182 12.739 -2.557 (5.855) 
Not working because of children 0.333 0.252 0.081 (0.056) 
Not working because there was no job 0.073 0.078 -0.006 (0.032) 
Not working because partner did not want 0.073 0.052 0.021 (0.030) 
Not working for other reasons 0.048 0.009 0.040* (0.021) 
Mother/both decided on child's education 0.899 0.875 0.024 (0.066) 
Mother/both decided when ill 0.963 0.968 -0.005 (0.040) 
Mother/both decided on discipline 0.875 0.903 -0.028 (0.069) 
Mother/both decided spending 0.764 0.693 0.071 (0.054) 
Mother/both decided food spending 0.758 0.789 -0.032 (0.051) 
Mother/both decided mother working 0.800 0.770 0.030 (0.050) 
Mother/both decided having children 0.878 0.858 0.020 (0.041) 
Mother/both decided contraceptives 0.896 0.856 0.040 (0.040) 
F(23, 36) =1.2918 
Observations 166 115 281 
Notes: Statistics are based on the 2012 survey of mothers. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the 
Column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall significance of the pre-treatment 
variables is shown at the end of the table. 
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Table 2.2. Children's Characteristics before Treatment (2012) 
Treatment 
mean 
Control 
mean 
Difference in 
means 
Std. error 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.521 0.470 0.051 (0.052) 
Child age 8.344 8.835 -0.491** (0.198) 
Mean birth order 2.023 1.878 0.145 (0.136) 
1 younger sibling in 2005 0.201 0.201 -0.000 (0.041) 
2 younger sibling in 2005 0.027 0.049 -0.021 (0.019) 
3 younger sibling in 2005 0.000 0.006 -0.006 (0.005) 
Height at birth (cm) 48.258 48.790 -0.531 (0.462) 
Weight at birth (gram) 3046.155 3029.197 16.957 (74.818) 
Head circumference at birth (cm) 33.723 33.572 0.151 (0.283) 
Dummy grade 1/2 0.320 0.305 0.015 (0.048) 
Dummy grade 3/4 0.365 0.348 0.018 (0.050) 
Dummy grade 5/6 0.242 0.268 -0.026 (0.045) 
Dummy grade 7 0.073 0.079 -0.006 (0.027) 
F(11, 103) = 1.3029 
Prob > F = 0.2334 
Observations 219 164 383 
Notes: Statistics are based on the 2012 survey of children. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses in the Column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall 
significance of the pre-treatment variables is shown at the end of the table. 
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Table 2.3. Estimated Effects on Labour Market Outcomes and Mothers’ Economic and Social Independence (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Labour market outcomes 
Summary index 0.494*** 0.467*** 0.482*** 0.581*** 0.577*** 0.577*** 
(0.100) (0.099) (0.098) (0.114) (0.101) (0.096) 
Mother works 0.206*** 0.172*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
(0.058) (0.061) (0.062) (0.081) (0.069) (0.066) 
Mother working fulltime 0.222*** 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.233*** 0.238*** 0.234*** 
(0.054) (0.057) (0.059) (0.061) (0.052) (0.051) 
Mother working with contract 0.192*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) 
Average family monthly income 44.848** 44.538** 44.479** 44.507* 43.193* 43.242** 
(20.526) (21.189) (20.462) (24.849) (22.267) (20.884) 
B: Mothers’ economic and social independence 
Summary index 0.295*** 0.336*** 0.366*** 0.249*** 0.275*** 0.302*** 
(0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.089) (0.081) (0.070) 
Mother has her own money 0.213*** 0.233*** 0.222*** 0.202** 0.204*** 0.205*** 
(0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.082) (0.067) (0.065) 
Mother participates in voluntary activities 0.077 0.105 0.142* 0.069 0.087 0.105 
(0.066) (0.071) (0.072) (0.092) (0.076) (0.074) 
Mother currently studying 0.081** 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.087** 0.086** 0.095*** 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) 
Mother/both decide on mother working 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.132*** 0.112* 0.108** 0.116** 
(0.039) (0.042) (0.044) (0.061) (0.054) (0.052) 
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Estimated summary indices of 
corresponding outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns 
(4)-(6) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
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Table 2.4. Estimated Effects on Labour Market Outcomes and Mothers’ Economic and Social Independence (Pooled 2012 and 
2013) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Labour market outcomes 
Summary index 0.554*** 0.502*** 0.503*** 0.660*** 0.664*** 0.665*** 
(0.099) (0.103) (0.098) (0.116) (0.105) (0.102) 
Mother works 0.221*** 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.204** 0.204*** 0.204*** 
(0.056) (0.061) (0.060) (0.081) (0.068) (0.067) 
Mother working fulltime 0.217*** 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.240*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) 
Mother working with contract 0.190*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0. 036) (0.035) (0.034) 
Mother weekly wage†  18.168*** 14.848*** 13.331*** 18.504*** 17.886*** 17.081*** 
(4.460) (4.852) (4.874) (5.713) (4.999) (4.966) 
B: Mothers’ economic and social independence 
Summary indices 0.231*** 0.259*** 0.276*** 0.263*** 0.285*** 0.288*** 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.072) (0.061) (0.062) 
Mother has her own money 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.178*** 0.146** 0.146*** 0.146*** 
(0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.068) (0.056) (0.053) 
Mother participates in voluntary activities 0.034 0.051 0.067 0.017 0.019 0.019 
(0.050) (0.053) (0.054) (0.073) (0.059) (0.055) 
Mother currently studying 0.063** 0.077** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Mother/both decide on mother working 0.085*** 0.093*** 0.104*** 0.120** 0.123*** 0.125*** 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.048) (0.045) (0.041) 
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on 2012 and 2013 surveys. Estimated summary indices of corresponding 
outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns (4)-(6) stem from the weighted 
sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the maternal level.    † Estimated results for mothers weekly 
wage is based on the data of 2013. 
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Table 2.5. Estimated Effects on Mothers’ Intra-household Decision-making (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary index 0.119** 0.118** 0.126** 0.126* 0.125** 0.124** 
(0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.072) (0.061) (0.055) 
Mother/both decide on child’s education 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.143** 0.145** 0.143** 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.062) (0.059) (0.056) 
Mother/both decide when ill 0.016 0.003 0.006 –0.019 –0.018 –0.018
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Mother/both decide on discipline 0.087** 0.081* 0.087** 0.117* 0.116* 0.115*
(0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059)
Mother/both decide on spending 0.050 0.052 0.069 0.106 0.106 0.103
(0.050) (0.054) (0.055) (0.077) (0.067) (0.063)
Mother/both decide on food spending 0.017 -0.001 0.017 0.030 0.031 0.029
(0.049) (0.051) (0.053) (0.078) (0.067) (0.062)
Mother/both decide on having children 0.007 0.007 0.005 –0.004 –0.005 –0.006
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Mother/both decide on contraceptives –0.026 –0.008 –0.019 –0.027 –0.030 –0.030
(0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Estimated summary indices of 
corresponding outcomes are reported in shading rows. Column (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns 
(4)-(6) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
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Table 2.6. Estimated Effects on Mothers’ Intra-household Decision-making (Pooled 2012 and 2013) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary index 0.106** 0.101** 0.093* 0.076 0.068 0.070 
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.068) (0.056) (0.052) 
Mother/both decide on child’s education 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.095** 0.095*** 0.095*** 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) 
Mother/both decide when ill 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.007 0.007 0.007 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
Mother/both decide on discipline 0.083** 0.088** 0.086** 0.119** 0.119** 0.119** 
(0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.054) (0.053) 
Mother/both decide on spending 0.087 0.083 0.090 0.104 0.103 0.104* 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.078) (0.064) (0.060) 
Mother/both decide on food spending 0.033 0.011 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.076) (0.065) (0.060) 
Mother/both decide on important items 0.062 0.058 0.048 0.016 0.016 0.015 
(0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.047) (0.046) 
Mother/both decide on having children 0.001 0.001 –0.003 –0.018 –0.018 –0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Mother/both decide on contraceptives –0.039 –0.018 –0.024 –0.024 –0.026 –0.025
(0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.043) (0.033) (0.032)
Mother/both decide on mother’s health –0.011 –0.006 –0.021 –0.053* –0.052* –0.054*
(0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Mother/both decide if mothers can visit 0.020 0.022 0.013 0.040 0.043 0.043
(0.045) (0.049) (0.049) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on 2012 and 2013 surveys. Estimated summary indices 
of corresponding outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. 
Columns (4)-(6) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the 
maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7. Estimated Effects on Mothers’ Outcomes by Treatment Intensity and by Treatment Heterogeneity (2012) 
Treatment intensity Mothers’ education Mothers’ pre-treatment 
role in decision-making 
Mothers’ pre-treatment 
employment status 
2-6 years 6-7 years Up to 
primary 
More than 
primary 
Below 
average 
Above 
average 
Not worked 
before 
Worked 
before 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Labour market outcomes 0.450*** 0.545*** 0.462*** 0.611*** 0.729*** 0.394*** 0.794*** 0.340*** 
summary index (0.123) (0.120) (0.130) (0.163) (0.145) (0.131) (0.191) (0.126) 
[0.830] [0.514] [2.650]* [4.120]** 
Mothers’ economic and 0.288*** 0.397*** 0.420*** 0.386*** 0.482*** 0.415*** 0.351*** 0.484*** 
social independence (0.091) (0.088) (0.105) (0.113) (0.118) (0.108) (0.120) (0.095) 
summary index [0.616] [0.049] [0.164] [0.776] 
Household decisions-  0.076 0.210*** 0.098 0.205** 0.197*** –0.017 0.213** 0.086 
making summary index (0.067) (0.067) (0.076) (0.087) (0.073) (0.083) (0.083) (0.079) 
[1.700]* [0.861] [2.987]* [1.191] 
Observations 281 136 144 93 179 133 148 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated aggregate effect on a summary index from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Covariates of child 
characteristics, household demographics and household economics are included in regressions. In columns (1) and (2), F-test statistic for coefficients 
difference in treatment intensities are presented in squared brackets. In Columns (3) – (8), F-test (Chow-test) statistic for subgroup difference in treatment 
effects are presented in square brackets. Estimated results are based on the original sample without entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table 2.8. Estimated Effects on Children’s Outcomes: Summary Indices (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tests scores and report card grades 0.158 0.181 0.163 0.026 0.155 0.179 
(0.122) (0.117) (0.122) (0.193) (0.109) (0.112) 
Schooling dropout and grade repetition –0.192** –0.170** –0.182** –0.112 –0.174* –0.181*
(0.082) (0.073) (0.073) (0.089) (0.096) (0.098)
Attitude towards schooling 0.080 0.027 0.026 0.106 0.072 0.054
(0.063) (0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072)
Overall summary index† 0.194*** 0.213*** 0.206*** 0.084 0.174** 0.193***
(0.073) (0.077) (0.080) (0.104) (0.075) (0.072)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated effect on a summary index from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Columns (1)-(3) present results 
using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns (4)-(6) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses and are clustered at the maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
† Signs of outcomes of schooling dropout and grade repetition are reversed when calculating the overall summary index. 
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Table 2.9. Estimated Effects on Children’s Outcomes by Gender, by Parental Education and by Mothers’ Employment Status 
(2012) 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated aggregate effect on the summary index from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. F-test (Chow-test) 
statistic for subgroup difference in treatment effects is presented in square brackets. Estimated results are based on the original sample without entropy 
balancing. Covariates of child characteristics, household demographics and household economics are included in regressions. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses and are clustered at the maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Gender Mothers’ education Mothers’ pre-treatment 
employment status 
Male Female Up to primary 
schooling
More than 
primary
Not worked 
before
Worked 
before
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) 
Tests scores and 
report 
0.195 0.313*** 0.390*** –0.323 0.458** 0.014 
card grades 
summary
(0.095) (0.092) (0.130) (0.235) (0.191) (0.151) 
index [0.307] [7.117]*** [3.457]** 
Schooling 
dropout and 
–0.087 –0.256*** –0.073 -0.133* -0.076 -0.225***
grade repetition (0.089) (0.063) (0.101) (0.079) (0.104) (0.089)
summary index [1.332] [0.219] [1.177] 
Attitude towards 0.142 0.008 0.003 –0.041 -0.051 0.098 
schooling 
summary
(0.082) (0.082) (0.111) (0.114) (0.114) (0.094) 
index [0.975] [0.021] [1.742] 
Observations 192 191 207 176 185 198 
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Table 2.10. Correlations between Working Condition before Treatment and Reasons Why 
Control Mothers Did Not Apply 
Worked 
before 
Working 
now 
Worked 
fulltime 
before 
Working 
fulltime 
now 
Worked before 1 
Working now 0.2108* 1 
Did not know about the program -0.0440 -0.0952 0.1217 -0.0616
Did not have children -0.1049 -0.0497 0.0803 0.0838 
Distance 0.0833 -0.0292 -0.1444 -0.0694
Problems with the application -0.0306 0.1407 -0.1118 0.0921 
Mother was working 0.0777 0.1051 0.0803 0.2305* 
Affiliation with another NGO  0.0277 -0.0193 0.0855 -0.0405
Did not know the age limits 0.0777 -0.0952 -0.2008 -0.0434
The child was over age -0.0519 0.0101 0.1145 0.0509 
Notes: Each cell reports the correlation coefficient based on the 2012 survey; * p < 0.05. 
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Appendix Table A2. 1. Fathers' Characteristics before Treatment (2012) 
Treatment 
mean 
Control 
mean 
Difference in 
means Std. error 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Father age 35.053 33.645 1.408 (0.979) 
Father from Quito 0.506 0.513 -0.007 (0.061) 
Primary school 0.446 0.505 -0.059 (0.063) 
Secondary school 0.516 0.466 0.050 (0.064) 
University 0.038 0.029 0.009 (0.023) 
Not religious 0.118 0.094 0.023 (0.039) 
Christian 0.843 0.858 -0.015 (0.045) 
Worked before 0.873 0.870 0.004 (0.041) 
Worked full time 0.938 0.880 0.058 (0.036) 
Self-employed 0.828 0.838 -0.011 (0.049) 
Worked in the formal sector 0.375 0.460 -0.085 (0.064) 
Mean firm size 26.693 42.388 -15.695 (10.792) 
F(10, 198) = 1.3881 
Prob > F = 0.1879 
Observations 166 115 281 
Notes: Statistics are based on the 2012 survey of parents. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the 
Column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall significance of the pre-treatment 
variables is shown at the end of the table. 
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Appendix Table A2. 2. Household Characteristics before Treatment (2012) 
Treatment 
mean 
Control 
mean 
Difference in 
means Std. error 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family lived in Pisulli 0.675 0.583 0.092 (0.058) 
House was owned 0.285 0.122 0.163*** (0.049) 
House had drinkable 0.770 0.878 -0.109** (0.047) 
House had electricity 0.970 0.991 -0.022 (0.018) 
House had toilet inside 0.430 0.383 0.048 (0.060) 
Average number of rooms 3.667 3.209 0.458** (0.218) 
Family who had no vehicles 0.946 0.913 0.033 (0.031) 
Family who had bicycles 0.024 0.052 -0.028 (0.022) 
Family who had other means of 
transport 0.030 0.035 -0.005 (0.021) 
Family average monthly wage 
(USD) 
248.788 247.807 0.981 (17.250) 
F(9, 286) = 3.0513 
Prob > F = 0.0017 
Observations 166 115 281 
Notes: Statistics are based on the 2012 survey of children. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the 
Column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. An F-test on the overall significance of the pre-treatment 
variables is shown at the end of the table. 
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Appendix Table A2. 3. Balancing Tests after Reweighting with Entropy Balancing (2012) 
Treatment Control Difference 
i
Std. error 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Child characteristics 
Child age 8.633 8.633 0.000 (0.273) 
Child birth order 1.819 1.819 0.000 (0.274) 
No. of children mother had in 2005 1.849 1.849 0.000 (0.326) 
No. of young siblings in 2005 0.307 0.307 0.000 (0.094) 
B: Mother characteristics 
Mother age 31.988 31.989 -0.001 (1.035) 
Mother worked before 0.470 0.470 0.000 (0.082) 
Mother worked full time 0.259 0.259 0.000 (0.066) 
Mother's mean firm size 10.120 10.123 -0.002 (6.924) 
Single before 0.181 0.181 0.000 (0.063) 
Mother from Quito 0.560 0.560 0.000 (0.082) 
Did not complete primary (mother) 0.114 0.121 -0.006 (0.053) 
Completed primary (mother) 0.392 0.392 0.000 (0.083) 
Did not complete secondary (mother) 0.295 0.295 0.000 (0.072) 
Completed secondary (mother) 0.169 0.169 0.000 (0.060) 
Started university (mother) 0.024 0.024 0.000 (0.027) 
C: Father characteristics 
Father age 33.873 33.874 -0.001 (1.396) 
Father worked before 0.873 0.874 0.000 (0.057) 
Father's mean firm size 17.373 17.394 -0.020 (8.161) 
Did not complete primary (father) 0.072 0.072 0.000 (0.037) 
Completed primary (father) 0.349 0.349 0.000 (0.077) 
Did not complete secondary (father) 0.355 0.355 0.000 (0.086) 
Completed secondary (father) 0.133 0.133 0.000 (0.051) 
Started university (father) 0.036 0.036 0.000 (0.027) 
D: Household characteristics 
Parents were married 0.458 0.458 0.000 (0.084) 
Parents cohabited 0.343 0.343 0.000 (0.076) 
Parents from the same city 0.470 0.470 0.000 (0.083) 
Family monthly wage 247.289 247.302 -0.013 (23.870) 
Observations 166 115 281 
Notes: Statistics are based on the 2012 survey of children. Standard errors are presented in parentheses in the 
Column (4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix Table A2. 4. Estimated Effects on Fathers’ Labour Market Outcomes (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary index –0.110 –0.126 –0.113 –0.084 –0.080 –0.097
(0.103) (0.104) (0.105) (0.128) (0.108) (0.105)
Father working –0.017 –0.017 –0.021 –0.023 –0.023 –0.024
(0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Father working fulltime –0.030 –0.034 –0.029 –0.006 –0.006 –0.012
(0.043) (0.045) (0.046) (0.065) (0.048) (0.046)
Father working with contract –0.070 –0.085 –0.063 –0.045 –0.040 –0.051
(0.065) (0.070) (0.071) (0.089) (0.084) (0.082)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Estimated summary indices of 
corresponding outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns 
(4)-(6) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
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Appendix Table A2. 5. Estimated Effects on Mothers’ Care of Children (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary index 0.025 0.041 0.045 0.018 0.018 0.010 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.072) (0.065) (0.064) 
Mother’s time inputs for child 0.035** 0.035** 0.039** 0.036 0.036* 0.037* 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
Weekly help from mother (minutes) –2.137 23.479 15.565 –3.564 0.230 –3.698
(51.028) (53.791) (56.288) (58.471) (51.812) (51.201) 
Mother’s aspirations for child’s education 0.013 0.018 0.016 –0.012 –0.012 –0.012
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Mother’s expectations for child’s education 0.047 0.047 0.076 0.081 0.082 0.081
(0.049) (0.052) (0.054) (0.074) (0.066) (0.065)
Child feels mother helps –0.173 –0.177 –0.200 –0.111 –0.109 –0.114
(0.121) (0.130) (0.135) (0.165) (0.138) (0.136)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Estimated summary indices of corresponding 
outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns (4)-(6) stem from 
the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Appendix Table A2. 6. Estimated Effects on Self-esteem, Big Five Personality Traits and Fertility Choices (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary index 0.038 0.034 0.040 0.027 0.022 0.024 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.083) (0.070) (0.063) 
Rosenberg scale 0.034 0.019 0.017 –0.006 –0.004 –0.001
(0.056) (0.058) (0.060) (0.077) (0.060) (0.059)
Agreeableness –0.015 –0.023 –0.017 0.015 0.017 0.017
(0.067) (0.070) (0.072) (0.101) (0.088) (0.082)
Conscientiousness 0.010 –0.014 0.002 0.019 0.018 0.019
(0.078) (0.083) (0.086) (0.109) (0.095) (0.091)
Extraversion –0.080 –0.062 –0.028 –0.048 –0.053 –0.053
(0.066) (0.071) (0.073) (0.097) (0.087) (0.085)
Neuroticism 0.080 0.092 0.088 0.078 0.082 0.083
(0.070) (0.075) (0.077) (0.093) (0.084) (0.082)
Openness to experience 0.063 0.082 0.091 0.128 0.129 0.130
(0.075) (0.081) (0.083) (0.117) (0.103) (0.100)
Pregnant –0.017 –0.016 –0.018 –0.043 –0.042 –0.041
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038)
More children (including pregnant women)? 0.068 0.066 0.063 0.011 0.012 0.010
(0.048) (0.051) (0.053) (0.074) (0.064) (0.062)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Estimated summary indices of 
corresponding outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns 
(4)-(6) stem from the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. 
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Appendix Table A2. 7. Estimated Effects on Fathers’ Labour Market Outcomes (Pooled data of 2012 and 2013) 
Not weighted Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Summary index 0.011 –0.026 –0.006 –0.075 –0.062 –0.065
(0.083) (0.081) (0.078) (0.107) (0.089) (0.084)
Father working 0.006 –0.008 –0.006 –0.020 –0.015 –0.016
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028)
Father working fulltime 0.032 0.018 0.023 –0.008 –0.002 –0.003
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) (0.041)
Father working with contract –0.023 –0.045 –0.023 –0.057 –0.053 –0.054
(0.053) (0.060) (0.058) (0.080) (0.068) (0.065)
Child Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Demographics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Household Economics No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 496 496 496 496 496 496 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated treatment effect from a separate regression based on the 2012 survey. Estimated summary indices of corresponding 
outcomes are reported in shading rows. Columns (1)-(3) present results using the original sample without entropy balancing. Columns (4)-(6) stem from 
the weighted sample adjusted by entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered at the maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix Table A2. 8. Estimated Effects on Mothers’ and Children’s Outcomes by 
Treatment Intensity: Summary Indices (2012) 
Not weighted Weighted 
Longer 
treated 
vs. 
shorter 
treated 
Shorter 
treated 
vs. 
non-treated 
Longer 
treated 
vs. 
shorter 
treated 
Shorter 
treated 
vs. 
non-treated 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
A: Mothers’ outcomes: summary indices 
Labour market 
outcomes 
0.031 0.453*** 0.028 0.641*** 
(0.117) (0.126) (0.153) (0.196) 
Mothers’ economic and 0.108 0.305*** 0.125 0.281** 
social independence (0.091) (0.096) (0.113) (0.126) 
Household decisions- 0.023 0.108 0.000 0.166* 
making (0.079) (0.073) (0.084) (0.092) 
B: Children’s outcomes: summary indices 
Tests scores and report 0.012 0.155 -0.230 0.405** 
card grades (0.154) (0.169) (0.151) (0.180) 
Schooling dropout and 0.026 –0.194*** 0.027 –0.242***
grade repetition (0.109) (0.074) (0.096) (0.097)
Attitude towards 0.008 0.020 -0.057 0.052 
schooling (0.087) (0.026) (0.105) (0.113) 
Overall summary 
index† -0.049 0.240** -0.178* 0.316*** 
(0.096) (0.105) (0.097) (0.107) 
Notes: Each cell reports the estimated effect on a summary index from a separate regression based on the 
2012 survey. Covariates of child characteristics, household demographics and household economics are 
included in regressions. Longer treatment group and shorter treatment group are divided by whether the 
respondent has been in the NGO for more than 5 years and 8 months (the median). Column (1) presents 
the estimated effect of being longer treated with respect to being treated shorter. Column (2) displays the 
effects of shorter treatment exposure compared to the control group. Estimated results are based on the 
original sample without entropy balancing. Standard errors are presented in parentheses and are clustered 
at the maternal level; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
† Signs of outcomes of schooling dropout and grade repetition are reversed when calculating the overall 
summary index. 
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3 
Minimum Wages and Informal Employment in 
Developing Countries 
ABSTRACT 
We present new empirical evidence on the implications of minimum wages on informal employment in 
developing countries, analysing a unique dataset assembled from a set of micro surveys collected in 61 
low and middle income countries. Our identification strategy exploits relative variation in minimum 
wages across labour market groups within countries. Our estimates show that a higher minimum wage is 
associated with a larger self-employment share. The effect is approximately linear in the relative level of 
the minimum wage, even if higher levels of minimum wages are associated with higher levels of non-
compliance. The estimated impact of the minimum wage on informality is economically significant: one 
standard deviation raise in the minimum wage is associated with an 11 percent increase in the self-
employment rate.  
JEL Codes: J38, O17, J21. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Minimum wages are perhaps the most popular labour market policy tool in developing 
countries. The motivations for raising minimum wages are various, reducing inequality and 
fighting poverty being commonly held rationales. However, the potential for the minimum wage 
in achieving these goals may be hampered by informality. If workers in the formal sector are 
pushed into informal jobs as a consequence of the minimum wage hike, the impacts of the 
minimum wage on inequality and/or poverty may be nil, or even negative. As of today, there is 
no consensus in the empirical literature regarding the impact of the minimum wage on 
informality in the developing world.  
This lack of consensus possibly rests on two complementary explanations. The largest 
fraction of the literature has focused on analysing the effects of minimum wage legislation in 
advanced economies (Neumark and Wascher, 1992; Card, 1992; Dickens, Machin, and 
Manning, 1999; Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010; Draca, Machin, and Reenen, 2011; Addison 
and Ozturk, 2012; Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti, 2013; Neumark, Salas, and Wascher, 2014). 
The literature studying the impacts of the minimum wage in developing countries is 
instead sparser, and has mostly focused in Latin American economies. In addition, even among 
middle income countries existing evidence is inconclusive. Large negative effects of the 
minimum wage on formal employment are found in Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2009), but 
in Costa Rica (Gindling and Terrell, 2007), Colombia (Maloney, Nunez, Cunningham, Fiess, 
Montenegro, Murrugarra, Santamaria, and Sepulveda, 2001) and Vietnam (Nguyen Viet, 2010) 
the effects are small, and not statistically significant in Mexico (Bell, 1997), Brazil (Lemos, 
2009) and Thailand (Del Carpio, Messina, and Sanz-de Galdeano, 2014).  
Naturally, the minimum wage may have heterogeneous effects across countries, 
possibly depending on interactions with other labour market policies and structural features of 
the labour market. An important source of heterogeneity that is often ignored in the literature is 
how binding the minimum wage is. For example, in Mexico the minimum wage is relatively 
low, at 29 percent of the 70th percentile of the distribution of wages in the formal sector. In 
Colombia instead, the minimum wage is much close to the 70th wage percentile (64 percent), 
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and above the median for certain labour market groups (e.g. young and low educated workers). 
If the impact of the minimum wage is non-linear, e.g., kicks-in only after a certain threshold, 
some of these apparent contradictory results may be reconciled. This paper presents new 
evidence on the impact of the minimum wage on informality by assembling a unique dataset of 
micro surveys from 61 middle income developing countries observed in the period 1995-2012. 
Informality is measured as the share of self-employed and family workers, i.e. those workers 
who are by definition not covered by minimum wage legislation, in total employment outside 
of agriculture. However, we present robustness checks for alternative definitions of informal 
workers. 
Assessing the impact of the minimum wage across countries, or within countries over 
time, is extremely difficult because other labour market policies and macro shocks may be 
changing in sync with changes in the minimum wage. Instead, our empirical strategy consists 
in contrasting the relative effectiveness of the minimum wage across labour market groups (e.g. 
young female with basic education and young male with basic education) within countries and 
years. This interaction between the wage of labour market groups and a country/year minimum 
wage is informative about the relative bite of the minimum wage policy. The identifying 
assumption is that variations in minimum wage levels do not affect the shape of the underlying 
wage distribution for each labour market group. Our strategy follows Lee (1999), who assesses 
the impact of the federal minimum wage on US wage inequality using the variation in the 
relative bite of the minimum wage across US states.  
We assemble a pooled individual-level dataset for 61 countries and calculate the 
effectiveness of the minimum wage for a set of twelve labour market groups defined on the 
basis of individual age, gender and level of education in each country and year. The 
effectiveness of the minimum wage is calculated as the ratio of the country/year minimum wage 
to the 70th percentile of formal sector wages in each group. We call this variable the minimum 
wage ratio. Such a high percentile in the wage distribution is unlikely to be affected by minimum 
wages, but we provide robustness checks for different cut-off points. This rich data set allows 
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us to analyse not only the average effects of the minimum wage on informality, but also whether 
those impacts are heterogeneous across the same labour market groups we use for identification.  
The paper also analyses possible non-linearities in the impact of the minimum wage on 
informality. Informality does not need to be an exclusion state. It may instead be a worker 
choice, either because the worker does not value sufficiently the amenities of a formal job (e.g. 
a right to a pension or health insurance) or because he/she values highly some particular attribute 
of the informal job (e.g. greater flexibility in working hours). Empirical evidence against labour 
market segmentation has been found in several Latin American countries (see Maloney, 1999, 
and Bosch and Maloney, 2010). In this context, if minimum wages are sufficiently low (i.e., 
close to the market wage) they may have no effects on formality, or effects may be even positive 
if they provide a sufficient incentive for workers to accept a formal job. If the minimum wage 
is instead relatively high with respect to the underlying worker productivity, the disincentive 
effect on job creation is likely to more than compensate for the increased worker willingness to 
take a formal job47. Hence, different levels of the minimum wage with respect to market wages 
may have different consequences on informality. 
Our estimates show that a higher minimum wage is associated with a larger share of 
self-employment. Our estimated effects are not modest: our baseline model indicates that a one 
standard deviation increase in the minimum wage ratio raises informality by 11 percent. 
Interestingly, the estimated effect appears fairly linear, with higher minimum wages having a 
larger negative effect on formal employment. In line with these results, the negative effects on 
formality concentrate among low-paid workers: young, less educated and female employees are 
more likely to be fund in informal sectors when the minimum wage increases. We acknowledge 
and document the substantial heterogeneity across countries regarding the coverage of the 
minimum wage laws, which often vary across sectors (e.g. excluding agriculture), occupations 
(e.g. high vs. low skilled), workers’ age (e.g. young and apprentices vs. prime-aged) and 
                                                     
47 See Brown, Merkl and Snower (2014) for a similar discussion in the context of the impact of the 
minimum wage on employment. 
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geographical coverage (e.g. nation-wide vs. regional or provincial). However, a battery of 
robustness checks suggests that such heterogeneity has a small impact on the estimated results. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the identification strategy, 
section 3 provides a description of the data, section 4 presents the empirical findings, section 5 
includes robustness checks, and section 6 concludes. 
3.2 Research Design 
Our analysis investigates the implication of different levels of minimum wage 
stringency on a measure of informality, i.e. the share of self-employment plus family workers 
in total employment outside of agriculture. We identify the impact of the minimum wage by 
exploiting the different levels of effectiveness of the minimum wage across different labour 
market groups. This identification strategy allows us to control for country/year unobservable 
factors and other potential determinants of informality that are country/year specific.  
Our baseline estimates are obtained using a unique individual-level dataset collected 
across 61 developing countries. Our baseline specifications rely on individual data in which the 
dependent variable is a binary indicator for employed workers who are self-employed or family 
workers. However, our variable of interest only varies across country/year/labour market group 
dimensions. We cluster the standard errors at the group level to avoid over-stating the precision 
of the estimates (Cameron and Miller 2015). We alternatively work with a country/year/labour 
market group aggregated dataset and report weighted average regressions that mimic the 
individual data. 
We define labour market groups or cohorts by country/year on the basis of workers’ 
age, gender, and education. For each country/year/group observation we calculate a measure of 
the effectiveness of the minimum wage. Following Lee (1999), we define the strictness of the 
minimum wage, MWct, as the ratio of the prevailing minimum wage in a country/year and some
measure of centrality (or location) of wages for each labour market group. Lee (1999) uses the 
median wage as an indicator of location. The underlying assumption is that the median is 
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unaffected by the minimum wage, and hence provides a valid benchmark against which one can 
assess how stringent the minimum wage is. Minimum wages in developing countries close to 
or even above median wages are not rare, in particular for young, female and less educated 
workers. To limit possible spillover effects of the minimum wage into our measure of centrality 
our benchmark specification uses the 70th percentile of the group-specific distribution of wages 
as a measure of location. In robustness checks we show that variations in the measure of 
centrality do not affect the results.  
The choice of the dimensions that define the groups is subject to a trade-off between 
having a large number of cohorts C with few individuals per cohort 𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶  (with imprecise estimates 
of the appropriate minimum wage by cohort and population cohort means when analysing 
aggregate data) and a smaller number of cohorts with more individuals and therefore more 
precise estimates of the population cohort means. Labour market groups should be chosen in 
order to have homogeneous individuals within each cohort in order to minimize the variance of 
the measurement error when calculating the average minimum wage’s stringency across groups. 
In addition, cohorts should be sufficiently heterogeneous with enough between variation in 
order to obtain more precise estimates of the parameter of interest. Our model will adopt robust 
standard errors in order to account for the heteroskedasticity arising from the difference in the 
precision of the calculation of averages of cells of different sizes. In the baseline specifications 
we consider a total of 12 possible groups by interacting gender with three age groups (16-29; 
30-59; 50-65) and two education levels (primary or less and more than primary).
Our individual-level model is therefore: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐′𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁    𝑗𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝐽𝐽    𝑇𝑇 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 (1) 
where yit is an informality dummy for individual i observed at time t,  MW  cjt is our
measure of minimum wage’s strictness for each country c, cohort j and year, Zit is a set of
individual characteristics in terms of age, gender and educational attainment measured by 
country specific dummies across time, Xit is a set of other individual-level characteristics and
μc and μt are, respectively, country and year fixed effects.
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The effects of the minimum wage on informality is therefore defined by exploiting the 
within country, time and cohort dimensions variation in the data. Our research design therefore 
resembles that of an experiment where the definition of a minimum wage level at the country, 
region or sectoral level would impose alternative minimum wage stringency levels across 
cohorts on the basis of their representative 70th wage percentile. 
Each cell in our setting should therefore represent a variation in the minimum wage 
stringency level of equal weight in order to avoid a bias induced by the difference in relative 
numerosity of each cell. Our baseline individual-level estimates are therefore weighted in order 
to give equal weight to each cell.48 
An alternative setting would consist in estimating our model on averaged data, such as: 
𝑦𝑦�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐′?̅?𝑍𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 for  𝑗𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝐽𝐽    𝑇𝑇 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 (2) 
where ȳjt and ̄Zjt are now measured at the group level, i.e. for group j at time t.
Group level averages are likely to be characterized by sampling error in finite samples 
if the cell size is too small. In our setting this may induce a measurement error in our measure 
of minimum wage by cohort and year generated by the small size of the cohort/year cells and 
induce an attenuation bias in our individual-level estimates as well as in the estimates on 
aggregated data. Since the cell size is inversely proportional to the number of cohorts used in 
the analysis, and therefore a lower number of cells JT increases the variance of the estimator, 
then the problem that the researcher faces in this case is typically a trade-off between bias and 
variance. According to Verbeek and Nijman (1992, 1993) and Nunziata (2015) a cell size of 
100 should typically eliminate the bias. In what follows we adopt a minimum cell dimension of 
100 individuals and perform some robustness checks adopting cells of a different size. One 
element that we have to bear in mind is that dropping those cells whose dimension is smaller 
than the adopted minimum threshold may also introduce a selection bias in our estimates. All 
these aspects are discussed in the details in the empirical findings section. 
48 In order to give the same weight to each cell we assign a weight to each individual observation which 
is equal to 1 over the number of observations in the cell. 
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3.3 The Data 
Our estimations are performed on a rich and unique newly assembled dataset covering 
61 developing countries. We use two main sources to construct it: first, the new International 
Income Distribution (I2D2 henceforth) data set, a global harmonized household survey database 
that allows us to compare different countries around the world and across time. The vast 
majority of the surveys included in the I2D2 are nationally representative. The dataset is 
extremely rich and comprehensive in coverage, but it is also noisy, as it collects data from 
surveys that were not designed to be comparable. Our empirical strategy limits the impact of 
these flaws by restricting the identification to comparisons across groups within country/year 
waves, i.e., by effectively eliminating variation across countries or within countries over time.  
We merge the I2D2 with the International Labour Organization Global Wage dataset, 
which covers minimum wage levels across the world. We use the ILO dataset to build indicators 
of the effectiveness of the minimum wage across 12 different labour market groups. These 
groups are: female/male between 18 and 29 years old who are low/highly educated, female/male 
between 30 and 50 years old who are low/highly educated, female/male between 51 and 65 
years old who are low/highly educated.  
In order to construct our final estimation sample we need to drop a number of 
country/year surveys. When we merge the I2D2 with the ILO database we have 425 waves for 
88 countries. We first drop the waves for which the minimum wage in the ILO Global Wage 
Database is missing either because minimum wages do not exist, or because the information 
could not be found. We also limit the sample to the years 1995-2012. We are left with 75 
countries and 382 waves. 
Secondly, we analyse the distribution of wages and minimum wages for the remaining 
countries. In some cases minimum wages are at odds with the wage distribution in the 
country/year (e.g. they are too high or too low). This is possibly due to measurement errors in 
one of the two databases or problems with the units of measurement in the I2D2 that could not 
be solved. When we drop these problematic waves we are then left with 64 countries and 333 
survey waves.  
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Thirdly, we drop surveys for very small countries in which the majority of the cells 
have less than 50 observations; we are left with 62 countries and 325 survey waves.  
Fourth, we exclude two waves that show some problems in specific variables: Togo 
2006 (missing education) and Tanzania 2009 (most values for industry are missing). This leaves 
us with 323 waves relative to 61 countries. Fifth, in order to derive meaningful measures of the 
effectiveness in the minimum wage we include in the empirical analysis only those cells with 
at least 100 observations. We are then left with 61 countries and 321 waves.  
We also exclude observations for which the minimum wage ratio over the 70th 
percentile wage is strictly greater than one. This is a clear indicator that there is a measurement 
problem in the wage distribution, or the minimum wage. Finally, as we want to focus our 
attention on the share of self-employed outside agriculture, we exclude the individuals who 
work in this sector. We are left with 61 countries, 321 waves and 2,485 labour market groups, 
for a total of 10,095,393 individual-level observations. 
Figure 3.1 displays the country coverage in our sample and the average minimum wage 
ratio across countries. The latter is characterized by a significant variability across countries. 
Countries where the minimum wage is more binding across cohorts and time are mainly from 
the Central and Latin American region (Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Venezuela) and Europe and Central-Asia (Bulgaria, Serbia, Turkey). The 
effectiveness of the minimum wage in the developing world is actually quite high. On average, 
across all countries considered, the ratio of the minimum wage and the 70th percentile is at 0.5. 
We can also infer from the data that the generosity of the minimum wage has increased in recent 
decades, as indicated by the comparison of Figure 3.1, displaying the ratio in the 1990s, with 
Figure 3.2 that displays the ratio in the 2000s. 
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Figure 3.1. Minimum Wage Ratio across Countries in the 1990s 
Notes: The wage ratio shown in the map is a weighted average of the minimum wage/70th percentile wage in the country across 
cohorts (where the weights are the shares of each cohort wage employment in total wage employment). If there are more survey waves 
for a country, we take a simple average of the country averages across years. The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and 
the ILO Global Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum wage exists; we further 
limit our sample to labour market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations and where the minimum wage is below the 
70th percentile. Years 1995-1999.  
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Figure 3.2. Minimum Wage Ratio across Countries in the 2000s 
Notes: The wage ratio shown in the map is a weighted average of the minimum wage/70th percentile wage in the country across cohorts 
(where the weights are the shares of each cohort wage employment in total wage employment). If there are more survey waves for a 
country, we take a simple average of the country averages across years. The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO 
Global Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum wage exists; we further limit our 
sample to labour market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations and where the minimum wage is below the 70th 
percentile. Years 2000-2012.   
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Such high figures in the effectiveness of the minimum wage may be not as harmful on 
formal employment as expected in the presence of non-compliance. As expected, non-
compliance with the minimum wage law in developing labour markets is high, and increasing 
with the level of the minimum wage. This is illustrated in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.  
In some cases, more than 50 percent of the workers’ wages are below the minimum 
wage. The pervasiveness of non-compliance with the law suggests that the impact of the 
minimum wage on formality may be less obvious than the high levels of effectiveness of the 
minimum wage may suggest, and potentially non-linear. If the minimum wage is very low, 
firms may not need to resort to informal employment. If instead the minimum wage is too high, 
firms may prefer risking fines by paying wage workers a wage below the legislated minimum. 
Thus, firms are likely to trade off two forms of informality in developing labour markets: wage 
employment below the minimum wage and self-employment.  
This heterogeneity in the bite of the minimum wage does not only concern time and 
countries, but also groups of individuals: indeed, we find that the minimum wage has a different 
level of effectiveness depending on the group of workers considered. To show this we calculate 
the difference between the strictness of the minimum wage for particular groups and the 
country averages. We then pull the data across countries and years.  
Figure 3.4 shows a kernel of the relative effectiveness of the minimum wage 
across age groups. As expected, young workers (18-29) are the most affected by the 
minimum wage legislation: the minimum wage for them is more binding than the average. 
The least affected by the minimum wage are instead the prime age workers (30-50). In 
Figure 3.5 we also find that the minimum wage is generally more binding for less educated 
workers. Differences across gender are less pronounced, in part because female wages are 
more compressed than males, but there is some indication that the minimum wage is more 
binding for women than men (Fig. 3.6). Our identification strategy exploits this 
heterogeneity in the minimum wage’s strictness across labour market groups. 
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3.4  Empirical Findings 
3.4.1 Baseline Specification 
Table 3.1 presents our baseline empirical findings. The results are presented by column 
augmenting the model with additional controls, starting with country fixed effects only in 
column (1), adding year fixed effects in column (2), their interaction in column (3), Z dummies 
in column (4), country-specific Z dummies in column (5), and individual-level controls 
including an indicator of urban/rural, industry classification (mining, manufacturing, public 
utilities, construction, retail and wholesale trade, transport and communications, financial and 
business services, public administration or other unspecified services), whether the individual 
is the head of the household/spouse/other relative and the household size. 
Our results are consistent across columns, with some differences in the point estimates. 
A higher minimum wage is typically associated with a larger share of informality. According 
to the model including the largest set of controls in column (6), a 1 percentage point increase 
in the ratio of the minimum wage over the 70th percentile of wages outside agriculture in a 
specific cohort, increases the self-employment share of that specific cohort by 0.16 percentage 
points. Given that the standard deviation of the minimum wage ratio in the estimation sample 
is 0.221 and that the average informality share is 0.312, a one standard deviation in the 
minimum wage ratio increases informality by 11.1 percent49. The estimated effect is significant 
at the 1 percent level. Similar results are obtained by estimating our model on aggregated data 
(3). Here the point estimates of the preferred specification in column (5) are somewhat larger 
at 0.26, but note that here we are not controlling for individual characteristics and sectoral 
composition.  
Some countries are observed for more than one year in our sample, while others are 
only observed once. As a result, our results may be over-representing countries where we have 
more waves. We check whether this may affect our estimated effect in Table A3.1 in the 
49 11.1% is given by ((0.160*0.221)/0.312)*100. 
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appendix (where we keep only the first available year for each country) and find that the results 
are basically unchanged. 
Since the minimum wage legislation usually applies to full-time workers only, Table 
3.2 presents results from surveys in which we can exclude part-time workers to compute the 
minimum wage ratio. The number of observations drops to 9.4 million but the point estimates 
are very close to the estimates on the full sample.  
In Table 3.3 we test whether the effect of minimum wage legislation on informality is 
non-linear. In order to do that, we identify in every country/year the groups for which the 
minimum wage lies within the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th deciles of the wage 
distribution. We then replace in the regressions the minimum wage ratio for a set of indicator 
variables for each of the minimum wage deciles. Our results show that the impact of the 
minimum wage on informality increase almost monotonically with the decile of the minimum 
wage. If the minimum wage lies in the 70th decile of the cohort’s wage distribution, the self-
employed share is 0.096 percentage point higher than if the minimum wage lies in the first 
decile of the wage distribution. We find no evidence of the impact of the minimum wage on 
informality levelling out as the minimum wage level approaches or even crosses the median. 
On the contrary, we find that moving the minimum wage from the 6th to the 7th decile of the 
distribution of wages presents the largest step jump in informal employment, with a difference 
of 0.019 points.  
3.4.2 Subsamples 
We also estimate our model on subsamples defined on the basis of age, gender and 
education (Tables 3.5-3.11), finding that the effect of the minimum wage is heterogeneous 
across individual characteristics, with the effects being larger on young workers (Table 3.7-
3.8), low educated (Table 3.10) and females (Table 3.5).  
In column (6) of Table 3.5 we show that in the model including the largest set of 
controls, a one percentage point increase in the ratio of the minimum wage over the 70th 
percentile of wages outside agriculture in a specific cohort of female workers increases the self-
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employment share of that specific cohort by 0.124 percentage points. The estimated effect is 
significant at the one percent level and more than doubles the effect found for male workers 
(Table 3.6). In terms of age, workers who are affected the most by the rise in minimum wages 
belong to the 18-29 age group (Table 3.7) and to the 30-50 years age group (Table 3.8). Finally, 
high educated workers (with secondary or post-secondary schooling) are not affected by rises 
in the minimum wage (Table 3.11).  
3.5 Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, we estimate our model restricting the sample to cohorts whose 
sample average is calculated using at least 200 observations, which limits the possibility that 
our measure of the minimum wage ratio is corrupted by measurement error due to the small 
size of the cohort cells. We face a trade-off between the more accurate measures obtained by 
the larger cell size and the possible bias introduced by the selection of those cells to be large 
enough. Our sample is now slightly smaller, since we lose around two percent of the 
observations. The estimations presented in Table A3.2 show that our results are mostly 
unaffected, indicating that we are unlikely to suffer from sampling error. Robustness checks 
with larger cohorts have been performed and are available upon request. 
All the results presented above consider individuals who work outside the agricultural 
sector for those surveys were sectors can be identified. However, the information on the 
occupational sector in some surveys has a large number of missing values. As a further 
robustness check we then exclude from our sample those surveys where the percentage of 
missing values in the variable indicating the sector of occupation is higher than 10 percent, i.e. 
those surveys where we are forced to select a share of the respondents that is smaller than 90 
percent. The estimates presented in Table A3.3 show that our findings are unaffected. We also 
check whether the non-linearity of the minimum wage effects are also present in the sub-
samples considered above. Our findings in Tables A3.4-A3.10 suggest that across labour 
market groups effects also appear to be linear. Finally, we check whether our results are robust 
to different definitions of informality. In the paper we defined informality as the share of self-
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employed and family workers, i.e. those workers who are by definition not covered by 
minimum wage legislation, in total employment outside of agriculture. In Table A3.13 informal 
workers are defined as the share of self-employed in total employment outside agriculture; in 
Table A3.14 informal workers are defined as the share of low educated50 self-employed only 
in total employment outside agriculture; in Table A3.15 informality is defined as the share of 
low educated self-employed and unpaid family employees in total employment outside 
agriculture. Results vary somewhat in magnitude across definitions, but irrespective of the 
definition adopted, results go in the same direction. 
Finally, we check whether our results hold when we also change the definition of the 
effectiveness of the minimum wage. In the baseline specifications we defined it as the ratio of 
the minimum wage over the 70th percentile wage of (full-time if possible) wage workers 
outside of agriculture and the public sector. In Table A3.16 we define it as the minimum wage 
over the median wage of each labour market group: results hold. 
3.6 Conclusions 
We presented a set of new empirical findings on the economic implications of 
minimum wage legislation in developing countries obtained from a unique newly assembled 
dataset containing 321 micro surveys from 61 developing countries during the years 1995-
2012. The focus of our analysis is on the relationship between minimum wages and informality, 
measured as the share of self-employment and family workers. We avoid common pitfalls of 
cross-country comparisons by relying on the effectiveness of the minimum wage across labour 
market groups for identification. Our identification strategy exploits the relative bite of the 
minimum wage across age, gender and education groups within country years. 
Our estimates show that a more generous minimum wage is typically associated with 
a larger share of informality. Our preferred baseline effect indicates that a one standard 
deviation increase in the ratio of the minimum wage over the 70th percentile of formal wages 
50 Low education indicates primary education or no schooling. 
139 
is associated with an increase in the self-employment share of that specific cohort by 11.1 
percent. The effect is highly significant and very robust across a large number of alternative 
specifications.  
The negative impact of the minimum wage on formality is larger among low-paid 
workers: the young, female and low educated. We find however that the effects are virtually 
linear in the degree of effectiveness, although the largest jumps in the negative effects on 
formality are found for those groups where the minimum wage is above the median formal 
wage.  
Our results show that, on average, the minimum wage is likely to have relatively 
important effects on informality in the developing world, a feature that should be borne in mind 
when evaluating the welfare consequences of minimum wages. Governments aiming to reduce 
poverty using the minimum wage as a policy lever should take into account that the effects on 
informality are likely to be concentrated precisely across those groups that are more vulnerable 
to poverty, in particular the young, the women and the less educated.  
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Figure 3.4. Deviations in the Minimum Wage Ratio from Country Means by Age
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the kernel density estimation of the deviations of cohorts’ minimum wage ratios with respect 
to countries’ average minimum wage ratios, by age. Young workers are 18-29 years old, prime age workers are 30-50 
years old, old workers are 51-65 years old. The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO Global 
Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum wage exists; we further 
limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations and where the minimum wage 
is below the median wage. The share of self-employed is the
share of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of agriculture. Only full-time self-
employed are considered when they can be identiﬁed; both full- and part-time self-employed are considered
when full-time self-employed cannot be identiﬁed. The minimum wage ratio in a cohort is deﬁned as the minimum 
wage over the cohort 70th percentile wage. The deviations are calculated as the diﬀerence between
the cohort minimum wage ratio and the country average minimum wage ratio across years.
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Figure 3.5. Deviations in the Minimum Wage Ratio from Country Means by Education
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the kernel density estimation of the deviations of cohorts’ minimum wage ratios with respect to 
countries’ average minimum wage ratios, by education level .Low educated workers have a level education up to 
primary (included); highly educated workers have at least secondary education. The sample comes from merging the 
I2D2 dataset and the ILO Global Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the 
minimum wage exists; we further limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 
observations and where the minimum wage is below the median wage. The
share of self-employed is the share of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of agriculture. 
Only full-time self-employed are considered when they can be identiﬁed; both full- and part-time self-employed are 
considered when full-time self-employed cannot be identiﬁed. The minimum wage ratio in a cohort is deﬁned as the 
minimum wage over the cohort 70th percentile wage. The deviations are calculated as
the diﬀerence between the cohort minimum wage ratio and the country average minimum wage ratio across years.
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Figure 3.6. Deviations in the Minimum Wage Ratio from Country Means by Gender
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the kernel density estimation of the deviations of cohorts’ minimum wage ratios with respect to 
countries’ average minimum wage ratios, by gender. The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO 
Global Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum wage exists; we 
further limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations and where the 
minimum wage is below the median wage. The share of self-employed is the
share of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of agriculture. Only full-time self-
employed are considered when they can be identiﬁed; both full- and part-time self-employed are considered when full-
time self-employed cannot be identiﬁed. The minimum wage ratio in a cohort is deﬁned as the minimum wage over the 
cohort 70th percentile wage. The deviations are calculated as the diﬀerence between
the cohort minimum wage ratio and the country average minimum wage ratio across years.
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Figure 3.7: Non-Compliance and Minimum Wage Ratio in Low Educated Cohorts
(a) Low educated 18-29 years old men. (b) Low educated 30-50 years old men.
(c) Low educated 51-65 years old men. (d) Low educated 18-29 years old women.
(e) Low educated 30-50 years old women. (f) Low educated 51-65 years old women.
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the positive relationship between the minimum wage ratio (y axis) and the 
non-compliance rate (x axis) in cohorts of individuals who are low educated (primary or no 
schooling). The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO Global Wage Database 
2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum wage exists; we 
further limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations 
and where the minimum wage is below the median wage. The share of self-employed is the share 
of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of agriculture. Only full-
time self-employed are considered when they can be identiﬁed; both full- and part-time self-
employed are considered when full-time self-employed cannot be identiﬁed. The minimum wage 
ratio in a cohort is deﬁned as the minimum wage over the cohort 70th percentile wage. The non-
compliance rate in the cohort is deﬁned as the share of workers outside agriculture whose wages 
are below the minimum wage.
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Figure 3.8. Non-Compliance and Minimum Wage Ratio in Highly Educated Cohorts
(a) Highly educated 18-29 years old men. (b) Highly educated 30-50 years old men.
(c) Highly educated 51-65 years old men. (d) Highly educated 18-29 years old women.
(e) Highly educated 30-50 years old women. (f) Highly educated 51-65 years old women.
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the positive relationship between the minimum wage ratio (y axis) and 
the non-compliance rate (x axis) in cohorts of individuals who are high educated (secondary or 
post-secondary schooling). The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO Global 
Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum 
wage exists; we further limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 
100 observations and where the minimum wage is below the median wage. The share of self-
employed is the share of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of 
agriculture. Only full-time self-employed are considered when they can be identiﬁed; both full- 
and part-time self-employed are considered when full-time self-employed cannot be identiﬁed. 
The minimum wage ratio in a cohort is deﬁned as the minimum wage over the cohort 70th 
percentile wage. The non-compliance rate in the cohort is deﬁned as the share of workers outside 
agriculture whose wages are below the minimum wage.
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Table 12: Summary Statistics
Country Informality Minimum Wage Male Low Age Living in Head of the No. of
Ratio (%) Educated (%) Urban Area (%) Household (%) Waves
East Asia and Pacific
Indonesia 0.3 0.5 26.8 46.0 35.7 62.8 57.2 11
Lao PDR 0.6 0.1 22.9 25.7 34.0 59.1 48.6 2
Mongolia 0.1 0.4 48.6 0.0 37.6 76.1 47.7 3
Philippines 0.3 0.8 44.3 1.9 38.7 100.0 47.2 11
Solomon Islands 0.4 0.2 30.9 18.3 33.1 50.1 52.6 1
Thailand 0.2 0.4 49.1 31.4 35.2 100.0 40.3 4
Europe and Central Europe
Azerbaijan 0.2 0.1 43.8 0.0 39.1 55.4 48.7 1
Bulgaria 0.1 0.6 23.5 0.0 42.5 68.7 57.6 4
Hungary 0.1 0.4 48.0 40.9 40.5 66.7 51.8 1
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0 0.1 51.1 37.9 36.4 59.1 42.6 1
Moldova 0.1 0.2 39.9 0.0 40.3 68.3 62.4 1
Serbia 0.1 0.6 39.1 7.5 40.9 . 39.7 1
Tajikistan 0.3 0.1 31.2 0.0 36.6 48.3 48.3 2
Turkey 0.2 0.7 14.4 38.2 36.4 81.4 67.2 6
High Income Non OECD
Latvia 0.0 0.3 53.2 0.7 41.3 54.0 45.4 4
Malta 0.1 0.4 31.8 5.1 38.3 100.0 47.3 2
Uruguay 0.2 0.3 46.5 25.0 39.8 97.4 49.0 17
Latin America and The Caribbean
Argentina 0.2 0.5 40.3 24.7 38.4 100.0 51.3 16
Bolivia 0.4 0.4 39.4 29.9 34.8 87.7 51.9 11
Brazil 0.3 0.4 44.1 49.1 36.1 93.9 50.7 16
Colombia 0.5 0.6 46.0 23.3 37.8 96.3 47.7 14
Costa Rica 0.1 0.6 10.0 42.5 31.1 48.0 53.1 9
Dominican Republ 0.2 0.5 15.9 37.5 31.5 77.4 50.9 14
Ecuador 0.4 0.6 42.6 33.0 38.2 78.6 46.3 10
El Salvador 0.2 0.6 50.7 74.2 31.0 68.9 37.1 8
Haiti 0.5 0.3 0.0 62.7 38.5 57.7 51.9 1
Honduras 0.2 0.5 43.8 59.9 29.6 74.0 39.7 16
Jamaica 0.2 0.3 47.2 0.0 32.6 56.5 46.2 4
Mexico 0.2 0.3 41.2 32.1 36.3 84.3 47.8 10
Nicaragua 0.2 0.5 34.7 0.0 28.5 90.0 25.5 2
Panama 0.2 0.7 4.5 16.4 33.8 68.1 57.5 17
Paraguay 0.3 0.7 38.9 10.0 35.0 83.0 48.2 12
Peru 0.4 0.7 38.2 8.9 35.9 86.4 42.1 16
Venezuela, RB 0.4 0.7 42.3 30.9 37.0 18.5 43.8 9
Middle East and North Africa
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.1 0.1 16.8 35.6 36.6 68.4 56.9 2
Jordan 0.1 0.6 15.1 37.1 36.1 75.9 62.8 2
Morocco 0.2 0.8 0.0 100.0 39.5 86.8 73.1 1
Tunisia 0.2 0.6 22.9 52.1 35.6 72.8 50.8 1
South Asia
India 0.4 0.3 13.4 37.0 36.2 61.7 56.7 2
Nepal 0.5 0.4 25.4 51.2 35.2 70.4 55.1 2
Pakistan 0.4 0.4 6.7 52.2 34.7 55.6 52.8 7
Sri Lanka 0.3 0.4 29.5 19.7 37.4 27.7 43.3 10
Sub Saharan Africa
Burkina Faso 0.4 0.2 7.5 54.9 32.7 86.4 64.4 3
Burundi 0.3 0.1 27.8 31.8 34.5 98.4 62.1 1
Cameroon 0.5 0.3 26.4 30.9 31.7 81.7 59.2 2
Chad 0.3 0.3 0.0 68.6 38.7 66.3 91.6 1
Ethiopia 0.4 0.4 34.6 50.3 34.0 94.2 59.5 7
Gabon 0.3 0.2 33.4 22.8 35.9 88.5 64.1 1
Ghana 0.3 0.4 37.8 9.9 35.2 70.0 62.9 3
Kenya 0.4 0.6 22.8 41.9 34.0 62.1 66.2 1
Madagascar 0.3 0.1 42.5 31.1 35.0 83.6 54.8 1
Malawi 0.6 0.3 20.5 70.8 32.5 37.2 71.0 2
Mauritania 0.5 0.5 0.0 69.8 39.9 69.5 81.2 1
Mauritius 0.2 0.2 34.5 34.8 39.0 . 46.9 5
Mozambique 0.4 0.7 0.0 100.0 39.2 75.5 87.6 2
Niger 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 38.2 12.7 90.3 1
Nigeria 0.5 0.3 13.9 46.7 42.2 54.9 83.8 1
Rwanda 0.3 0.2 29.1 90.9 30.2 39.0 51.0 2
Tanzania 0.5 0.5 29.9 73.0 35.2 75.7 63.9 1
Uganda 0.5 0.1 29.6 48.1 30.7 47.6 62.3 1
Zambia 0.5 0.2 47.2 22.3 29.9 83.9 40.5 1
The table reports the country averages for informality, minimum wage ratio, percentage of male, percentage of low educated individuals, average age, percentage of people living in an 
urban area, percentage of individuals being the head of the household and number of waves per country. The variable signaling the percentage of people living in an urban area is missing 
for Serbia and Mauritius. The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO Global Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the 
minimum wage exists; we further limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations and where the minimum wage is below the 70th percentile wage. 
Informality is defined as the share of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of agriculture. Only full-time self-employed are considered when they can be 
identified; both full-and part-time self-employed are considered when full-time self-employed cannot be identified. The minimum wage ratio is calculated as the minimum wage over the 
70th percentile wage of (full-time if possible) wage workers outside of agriculture and the public sector; wages are weighted with survey weights.
Appendix. Details on the Dataset Construction and  Sample
When we merge the I2D2 with the ILO Global Wage Database 2012 and we limit our sample to the 
1995-2012 period we start with 425 waves for 88 countries.
We then drop the waves for which the minimum wage in the ILO Global Wage Database 2012 
is missing either because it does not exist in the years we need or because it is unknown. This way 
we lose the following countries: Bangladesh, Belize, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Guyana, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Maldives, Puerto Rico, Suriname, Timor-Leste, 
Turkmenistan, West Bank and Gaza, Republic of Yemen. We are left with 382 waves for 75 
countries.
Then we have a look at the distribution of wages and minimum wages. When wages do not seem 
representative of the country we drop the wave. We are left with 333 waves corresponding to 64 
countries. The countries that we lose are Afghanistan, Albania, Botswana, Cambodia, China, 
Guatemala, Lithuania, Romania, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic and Vietnam.
We drop cells where the share of self-employed outside of agriculture seems to be zero, and we 
are left with 333 waves corresponding to 64 countries. We have dropped Croatia because all the self-
employed and non-paid employees in the 2004 wave belong to the agriculture sector. Hence, the 
share of self-employed outside of agriculture in Croatia is zero.
We now exclude cells formed by less than 50 individuals. This way we drop the Russian 
Federation. We are left with 325 waves corresponding to 62 countries.
We then exclude 2 waves that show some problems in the variables: Togo 2006 (where 
education labels are not appropriate) and Tanzania 2009 (many values of industry agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, public utilities - are missing). This way we also lose the last wave of Togo. We 
are left with 323 waves relative to 61 countries and 584 cohorts, corresponding to 3,164 
observations in the aggregate data, 14,823,986 observations in the individual-level dataset.
If then we exclude cells based on less than 100 individuals we are left with 61 countries, 321 
waves, 476 cohorts and 2,746 observations in the aggregate data, 14,611,085 observations
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in the individual-level dataset.
We then exclude observations for which the ratio minimum wage over the 70th 
percentile wage is strictly greater than 1. We are left with 61 countries, 456 cohorts, 321 
waves, 2,485 observations in the aggregate data and 13,488,764 observations in the 
individual-level dataset. As we want to focus our attention on the share of self-employed 
outside agriculture, we exclude the individuals who work in this sector. We are left with 61 
countries, 321 waves, 456 cohorts, 2,485 observations in the aggregate data and 10,095,393 
in the individual-level dataset.
List of Countries in our Sample
Argentina 1995; Argentina 1996; Argentina 1997; Argentina 1998; Argentina 1999; Argentina 2000; 
Argentina 2001; Argentina 2002; Argentina 2003; Argentina 2005; Argentina 2006; Ar-gentina 
2007; Argentina 2008; Argentina 2009; Argentina 2010; Argentina 2012; Azerbaijan 1995; 
Burundi 1998; Burkina Faso 1998; Burkina Faso 2003; Burkina Faso 2009; Bulgaria 2001; Bulgaria 
2003; Bulgaria 2007; Bulgaria 2008; Bolivia 1997; Bolivia 1999; Bolivia 2000; Bolivia 2002; 
Bolivia 2003; Bolivia 2005; Bolivia 2007; Bolivia 2008; Bolivia 2009; Bolivia 2011; Bolivia 2012; 
Brazil 1995; Brazil 1996; Brazil 1997; Brazil 1998; Brazil 1999; Brazil 2001; Brazil 2002; Brazil 
2003; Brazil 2004; Brazil 2005; Brazil 2006; Brazil 2007; Brazil 2008; Brazil 2009; Brazil 2011; 
Brazil 2012; Cameroon 2001; Cameroon 2007; Colombia 1996; Colombia 1999; Colombia 2001; 
Colombia 2002; Colombia 2003; Colombia 2004; Colombia 2005; Colombia 2006; Colom-bia 2007; 
Colombia 2008; Colombia 2009; Colombia 2010; Colombia 2011; Colombia 2012; Costa Rica 2001; 
Costa Rica 2002; Costa Rica 2003; Costa Rica 2004; Costa Rica 2005; Costa Rica 2006; Costa Rica 
2007; Costa Rica 2008; Costa Rica 2009; Dominican Republic 1996; Dominican Republic 1997; 
Dominican Republic 2000; Dominican Republic 2001; Dominican Republic 2002; Dominican Republic 
2003; Dominican Republic 2004; Dominican Republic 2005; Dominican Re-public 2006; Dominican 
Republic 2007; Dominican Republic 2008; Dominican Republic 2009; Dominican Republic 2010; 
Dominican Republic 2011; Ecuador 2003; Ecuador 2004; Ecuador 2005; Ecuador 2006; Ecuador 
2007; Ecuador 2008; Ecuador 2009; Ecuador 2010; Ecuador 2011; Ecuador 2012; Egypt, Arab Rep. 
1998; Egypt, Arab Rep. 2006; Ethiopia 2003; Ethiopia 2004; Ethiopia 2005; Ethiopia 2006; 
Ethiopia 2009; Ethiopia 2010; Ethiopia 2011; Gabon 2005; Ghana 1998; Ghana 2005; Ghana 2012; 
Honduras 1995; Honduras 1996; Honduras 1997; Hon-duras 1998; Honduras 1999; Honduras 2001; 
Honduras 2002; Honduras 2003; Honduras 2004;
Honduras 2005; Honduras 2006; Honduras 2007; Honduras 2008; Honduras 2009; Honduras 
2010; Honduras 2011; Haiti 2001; Hungary 2004; Indonesia 1996; Indonesia 1998; Indonesia 
1999; Indonesia 2000; Indonesia 2001; Indonesia 2002; Indonesia 2003; Indonesia 2004; Indone-sia 
2005; Indonesia 2006; Indonesia 2010; India 1999; India 2007; Jamaica 1996; Jamaica 1999; Jamaica 
2001; Jamaica 2002; Jordan 2002; Jordan 2010; Kenya 2005; Kyrgyz Republic 1997; Lao PDR 
2002; Lao PDR 2008; Sri Lanka 1996; Sri Lanka 1998; Sri Lanka 1999; Sri Lanka 2000; Sri 
Lanka 2001; Sri Lanka 2003; Sri Lanka 2004; Sri Lanka 2006; Sri Lanka 2008; Sri Lanka 2009; 
Latvia 2005; Latvia 2006; Latvia 2007; Latvia 2008; Morocco 1998; Moldova 2005; Madagascar 
2001; Mexico 1996; Mexico 1998; Mexico 2000; Mexico 2002; Mexico 2004; Mexico 2005; Mexico 
2006; Mexico 2008; Mexico 2010; Mexico 2012; Malta 2009; Malta 2010; Mon-golia 2009; 
Mongolia 2010; Mongolia 2011; Mozambique 1996; Mozambique 2008; Mauritania 2000; Mauritius 
2007; Mauritius 2008; Mauritius 2009; Mauritius 2010; Mauritius 2012; Malawi 2004; Malawi 2010; 
Niger 2002; Nigeria 2003; Nicaragua 2005; Nicaragua 2009; Nepal 1998; Nepal 2008; Pakistan 
1999; Pakistan 2001; Pakistan 2004; Pakistan 2005; Pakistan 2006; Pak-istan 2007; Pakistan 2008; 
Panama 1995; Panama 1997; Panama 1998; Panama 1999; Panama 2000; Panama 2001; Panama 
2002; Panama 2003; Panama 2004; Panama 2005; Panama 2006; Panama 2007; Panama 2008; 
Panama 2009; Panama 2010; Panama 2011; Panama 2012; Peru 1997; Peru 1998; Peru 1999; Peru 
2000; Peru 2001; Peru 2002; Peru 2003; Peru 2004; Peru 2005; Peru 2006; Peru 2007; Peru 
2008; Peru 2009; Peru 2010; Peru 2011; Peru 2012; Philip-pines 2001; Philippines 2002; 
Philippines 2003; Philippines 2004; Philippines 2005; Philippines 2006; Philippines 2007; Philippines 
2008; Philippines 2009; Philippines 2010; Philippines 2011; Paraguay 1995; Paraguay 1997; Paraguay 
1999; Paraguay 2001; Paraguay 2002; Paraguay 2003; Paraguay 2004; Paraguay 2006; Paraguay 2007; 
Paraguay 2008; Paraguay 2009; Paraguay 2010; Rwanda 2005; Rwanda 2010; Solomon Islands 
2005; El Salvador 1995; El Salvador 1996; El Salvador 1998; El Salvador 1999; El Salvador 
2000; El Salvador 2001; El Salvador 2006; El Salvador 2007; Serbia 2008; Chad 2003; Thailand 
2000; Thailand 2002; Thailand 2006; Thai-land 2009; Tajikistan 1999; Tajikistan 2003; Tunisia 
2000; Turkey 2005; Turkey 2006; Turkey 2007; Turkey 2008; Turkey 2009; Turkey 2010; Tanzania 
2006; Uganda 2005; Uruguay 1995; Uruguay 1996; Uruguay 1997; Uruguay 1998; Uruguay 
2000; Uruguay 2001; Uruguay 2002; Uruguay 2003; Uruguay 2004; Uruguay 2005; Uruguay 
2006; Uruguay 2007; Uruguay 2008; Uruguay 2009; Uruguay 2010; Uruguay 2011; Uruguay 
2012; Venezuela, RB 1995; Venezuela, RB 1998; Venezuela, RB 2000; Venezuela, RB 2001; 
Venezuela, RB 2002; Venezuela, RB 2003; Venezuela, RB 2004; Venezuela, RB 2005; Venezuela, RB 
2006; Zambia 2010.
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Appendix Table A3.1. Effects of MW Ratio on Share of Self-employed (First Wave Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-employed Share Self-employed Share Self-employed Share Self-employed Share Self-employed Share Self-employed Share
MW ratio 0.284∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.085 0.324∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.092) (0.050)
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YearFE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × YearFE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Z dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Z dummies × CountryFE No No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No Yes
Degrees of freedom 405 405 405 405 405 385
No. Countries 61 61 61 61 61 59
R-sqr overall 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.133 0.158 0.294
Observations 918936 918936 918936 918936 918936 837385
The table reports the effect of an increase in the minimum wage ratio on the share of high educated (secondary or post-secondary education) self-employed when only the first wave per each
country is considered. The sample comes from merging the I2D2 dataset and the ILO Global Wage Database 2012. We keep household surveys of developing countries where the minimum
wage exists; we further limit our sample to labor market groups (cohorts) formed by more than 100 observations and where the minimum wage is below the 70th percentile wage. The share
of self-employed is the share of self-employed and non-paid employees (i.e. family worker) outside of agriculture. Only full-time self-employed are considered when they can be identified; both
full- and part-time self-employed are considered when full-time self-employed cannot be identified. The minimum wage ratio is calculated as the minimum wage over the 70th percentile wage
of (full-time if possible) wage workers outside of agriculture and the public sector; wages are weighted with survey weights. The Z dummies included are: a dummy signaling if the individual
has a low level of education (primary education or no schooling), a dummy for individuals who are 18-29 years old, a dummy for individuals who are 30-50 years old and a dummy for being
male. The controls included in the 6th Column are dummies for industry (agriculture, manufacturing, etc.), urban/rural, whether the individual is the head of the household/spouse/other and
the household size. In the estimations equal weights are given to each labor market group. Standard errors are clustered at cohort level in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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